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The role of Ghana in African liberation and unity, 1957–1977

Adom, Humphrey, Ph.D.
Temple University, 1991

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Title of Dissertation:
THE ROLE OF GHANA IN AFRICAN LIBERATION AND UNITY 1957 TO 1977

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Date submitted to Graduate Board: .................. 4-17-91

Accepted by the Graduate Board of Temple University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date .......................... (Dean of Graduate School)
THE ROLE OF GHANA IN AFRICAN LIBERATION AND UNITY, 1957-1977

A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by Humphrey Adom

May, 1991
ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF GHANA IN AFRICAN
LIBERATION AND UNITY,
1957-1977

by Humphrey Adom
Doctor of Philosophy
Temple University, 1991

Major Advisor: Dr. Lloyd Jensen

Ghana, the first African country south of the Sahara to free itself from colonial rule in 1957, made African liberation and unity its major foreign policy goal in Africa. On the eve of Ghana's independence celebration, Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime minister of this new African state, irrevocably tied the independence of Ghana to the total liberation of the continent from colonial tutelage. Accordingly, Ghana took up the leadership role by providing a locale to stir up a radical nationalist movement on the continent. A serious campaign against colonialism and racism ensued. Nkrumah's main objective was that this successful African revolution would lead to United
continent-wide government of Africa similar to that of the United States or the Soviet Union.

This study investigates the role played by Ghana in pursuit of this policy goal between 1957 and 1977. Within this twenty year period, Ghana was under four different regimes, two civilian and two military. Its role in African affairs also changed considerably in style and content. At one time or another, Ghana's role in African liberation could be categorized as radical, moderate or conservative. In another context, Ghana's concept of African unity has changed from one of political integration, involving total surrender of sovereignty, to one of economic cooperation and regional economic communities. Several domestic and foreign factors explain these changes in Ghana's policy goals.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many friends and my own professors at Temple University have helped me with this manuscript. I wish to thank all of them for helping me to fulfill my dream. I particularly wish to thank close friends in my church (Community Covenant, Philadelphia) who devoted most of their free time to record all my research papers so that I could make notes. Special thanks to Tremain Rebecca Smith, Paula Francette Kefover, Seville Joyce Janning, and Victoria Cathy Naeder. I am also grateful to the following friends for helping me with reading and editing: Joseph Adler, James Baston, and David Serlion, a former student at Temple University. I am also indebted to Sharon Lynne Swadis, a graduate student at Temple University for helping me to compile and double check all my endnotes. I extend the same gratitude to Michael Lear-Olimpi, a graduate assistant in Journalism, for his valuable help in reading all the chapters with me while I worked on the final edition.

What I appreciated most, however, was the interest and involvement of all those who helped me with the manuscript in one way or another, even when some of their reactions were critical. I wish to thank my two advisors, Dr. Lloyd
Jensen and Dr. Lynn Miller, for reading the manuscript at least twice and offering me invaluable suggestions. Their comments and criticisms helped me to eliminate innumerable errors. Dr. Lloyd Jensen in particular checked the manuscript chapter by chapter and was very patient with me. I am also grateful to Dr. Robert Osborn, chairman of the Political Science Department, my personal advisor in my teaching assignments and other matters. I am indebted to the Charlotte Newcombe Foundation for funds provided to meet some of the costs of my readers.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my friend, Brian Joseph Basenfelder, at Temple University, who for the past ten years has been my voluntary reader and research assistant in the library. This dissertation would probably have remained in the draft form if not for Cynthia Arlene Brown of Telefund Management, Incorporated in Philadelphia. She spent many hours with me reading and editing. She also did the secretarial work on her personal computer free of charge.

Finally, I must add that without more support and detailed information from my wife, Letitia, and my two brothers, Edwin and Solomon, this dissertation would be incomplete.

I dedicated this dissertation to my mother, Juliana Adorkor Brown, on her 80th birthday for being the backbone of my education.
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CHAPTER 1

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND PAN-AFRICANISM IN GHANA

African nationalists, politicians and students of African studies have debated the concept of nationalism as applied to the nation-states which emerged in Africa after World War II. One argument was that these new nation-states do not fit into the common definition of a nation; that is, a group of people with common historical background, language, religion, and culture. The second argument was that these nations were created by artificial means and methods.

The former European colonies were little more than geographic constructs. In several areas, tribal villages were divided by colonial boundaries. After independence, these divisions were to become sources of irritation over boundary disputes left to be resolved by the new nation states themselves. Thus, by this superficial mapmaking scheme the British and the French created colonies like Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the Ivory Coast, etc.

The British historian and politician Lord Harley, preferred the term Africanism to Nationalism for cogent reasons which are shared by many Africans. This broad
term, Africanism, embodies a number of activities which can be reviewed such as: Messianic, Nativistic, Tribal, Pan-African, economic, religious, and social.

He depicted two phases of Africanism. The first phase emanated from anti-European reaction and concerted irredentism. The second phase is characterized by disintegration of certain traditional ways and the adoption of non-African influences which could combine to give Africanism more coherent forms than it ever had.

According to Louis Snyder, editor of the book, *Dynamics of Nationalism*, nationalism in its modern form is by no means a completely new phenomenon, but rather a revival and fusion of older trends. It existed in cruder form in the tribalism of primitive peoples. Throughout recorded history to the Eighteenth Century, tribal nationalism was submerged in metropolitanism (attachment to the local village or region, akin to modern ruralism or regionalism).

However much weight each of these opinions carries, certain assertions are undeniable. First, the colonial powers delineated the African territorial states by establishing arbitrary boundaries. This enabled them to collect diverse tribal and ethnic communities within specified territorial formations and to rule them. These boundaries were eventually to become the basis of operations for nationalist political movements.

Second, the colonial powers provided a lingua franca to the linguistically variegated tribal communities; mostly
English, French or Portuguese. This allowed for unprecedented opportunities for groups or persons within these communities to communicate with one another as well as with the outside world. The few Africans who were privileged to obtain a European education were able to transcend their original tribal morals. Finally, through a Western style of education, the colonial powers were able to impose a common culture upon their subjects. In this way, a common political and social base was established. Thus colonial rule aside from unifying the various tribal groups under one government evoked not only political evolution but also a definite social revolution with political consequences.

This chapter will trace the origins and analyze some of the dynamic forces behind African nationalism prior to and after World War II. The first part of the chapter will focus attention on West African nationalism and how it culminated in the right of national self-determination and self-government. What were the forces that generated African nationalism and, for that matter, Ghanaian nationalism as a whole? What were the consequences of these early nationalist movements? What were the differences between the old nationalist and the new nationalist movements of post World War II? The second part of the chapter will look at the original concept of Pan-Africanism. What are its political, cultural, and
ideological forms? How has this concept been interpreted by various African and in particular Ghanaian leaders? How has this movement contributed to political, social and economic awakening within and among the various African states?

In this chapter, the Gold Coast, which subsequently became Ghana, will be used as a case study of West African nationalism, which is the subject of this dissertation. In order to comprehend fully the major forces which undergirded the nationalist movements in the Gold Coast, some knowledge of British imperial rule is essential. The name, Gold Coast, was given to the country by the Portuguese explorer, Don Diego D'Azambuja, who apparently found an abundance of gold in the possession of the natives. In the wake of this discovery, the Portuguese were followed by other Europeans from Denmark and Great Britain. These nations traded with the natives for gold, ivory and slaves. Their presence was enshrined in the forts and castles which they built along the shores of the territory.

Great Britain was the last European nation to come into contact with the shores of the Gold Coast and eventually became its imperial ruler in 1844 due to two important factors. First, the period coincided with the Industrial Revolution when the European countries competed with one another for raw materials from overseas. This
period is known in colonial history also as "The Scramble for Africa." Second, frequent tribal wars developed between the coastal regions of the Gold Coast and the belligerent Ashanti tribal kingdom in the hinterland.

The first direct impact of British imperial rule was the Bond of 1844. This Bond was an agreement between some few Fanti chiefs of the west coast and Sir George Maclean, the British representative who became the first governor of the country. The Bond gave the British exclusive trading rights with the Fanti. It also allowed for British criminal jurisdiction and the willingness of the Fanti chiefs to adopt British customs and laws.

What were the political implications of the Bond? In other words, did the agreement of the Bond mean that the few native chiefs had traded tribal sovereignty to the British for protection? A detailed examination of the Bond indicated that this was not the case. The Bond did not confer any territorial rights that allowed for the conversion of the protectorate into a dominion of the Crown. It could be said with some certainty that the natives recognized the authority of the Queen of England and her representative, the governor of the Gold Coast, as guardians and not owners of the land. The short and simple Bond read as follows:

1. Whereas power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, within divers countries and places adjacent
to Her Majesty's forts and settlements on the Gold Coast, we, Chiefs of countries and places so referred to, adjacent to the said forts and settlements, do hereby acknowledge that power and jurisdiction, and declare that the first objects of law are the protection of individuals and of property.

2. Human sacrifices and other barbarous customs such as panyarring, are abominations, and contrary to law.

3. Murders, robberies, and other crimes and offences will be tried and enquired of before the Queen's Judicial Officers and the Chiefs of the districts moulding the customs of the country to the general principles of the English law.

Thirty years after this Bond, three crucial ordinances were enacted by the British administration which were held by the educated natives of the Gold Coast as detrimental to the sovereignty of the people. These were The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1874 and 1883, The Town Council Ordinance of 1894 and the Land and Forest Bills of 1896 and 1911. The Land and Forest Bill gave the British government control over land tenure in the Gold Coast allowing it to tap its natural resources. This bill also empowered the British to claim any unoccupied land for forest preservation. Ultimately, the combination of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1874 and the Land Bill of 1896 facilitated the colonization of the Gold Coast by the British at the turn of the century. Consequently, by 1901, the various tribal states of the Gold Coast, excluding the Northern Territories, were organized into a crown colony.
European rivalry for colonies in these regions prompted Britain to forge treaties with the native tribes.

The overall impact of this legislation, enacted by the British to consolidate their power in the Gold Coast, sparked a protest movement in the country. This indigenous protest laid the foundation for a nationalist movement in this new British colony. The major force behind this rudimentary nationalist movement was the Aborigines Right's Protection Society, henceforth known as A.R.P.S. It was formed in 1892 to protest the passing of this legislation.

The assemblage of this society was truly imposing, grand and impressive. It was called to power not by accident of birth but by the free choice of the nation and embraced all that the people possessed of political wisdom and practical statesmanship.9

The members of A.R.P.S. were the chiefs and the few educated Africans holding prominent positions in the various tribal communities. This primordial nationalist movement kindled group consciousness among the diverse tribes of the Gold Coast which in turn facilitated more social and political interaction. The A.R.P.S. realized that in order to present a solid front against British rule, the tribal organizations and the factions which they bred had to be abolished. They acknowledged that tribalism would be the major internal opposition to the ideas and ascendancy of the A.R.P.S.
The Society aimed at the following:

1. To protect the ancient customs and the aborigenes' rights in their ancestral land.
2. To prevent the British government from tampering with inherent powers of the chiefs.

In brief, the Aborigenes Rights Protection Society was to act as a watchdog for the customs, institutions and civic rights of the people of the Gold Coast. It was a powerful lobbying body which protested at home to the governor or directly to the British Parliament in England against any ordinance which was not in conformity with native custom or tradition. The effectiveness of this organization was its ability to focus on matters of national rather than parochial interest. Subsequent governors recognized the Society and worked closely with its executive committee on all important matters. Political, economic and social trends both internal and external were to reshape the structure and activities of the organization in the ensuing years.

It became apparent to the British authorities that the best way to consolidate their control over the people of the Gold Coast was by working through existing African institutions. This system was known as Indirect Rule. The instrument of this indirect rule was the provincial council of chiefs, because traditionally chiefs were the spokesmen of their respective tribes. It would then elect from their
members representatives to the national legislative council. Another argument in support of this system was that too rapid modernization of African institutions would in the long run be disastrous since these institutions would be incapable of meeting the new demands imposed upon them.

The system of Indirect Rule, adopted in 1919 by Sir Gordon Guggisburg, the governor of the Gold Coast, was welcomed by the chiefs who thought that their prominent position in the society had been recognized by the British. To the educated class, however, it was a different story. It was a breach of traditional norms and customs. First, customarily, a chief communicates with his own people or with another chief only through a linguist. It would be improper and against tradition to nominate chiefs to debate openly with each other or anyone on a piece of legislation or ordinance. Second, most of the chiefs were illiterate which implied that only the literate chiefs would be nominated to the national legislature, whether or not they had the true interest of the people at heart. The other alternative was to have an interpreter who would act as a linguist to the illiterate chiefs. Third, there were more of these chiefs than better educated representatives from the three municipalities. Fourth, the British colonial rulers accepted the opinion of the people from the illiterate chiefs and not from the educated Africans.
Fifth, by increasing the powers of the paramount chiefs at the expense of the subordinate chiefs and the people, it would not only undermine certain personal liberties but would also encourage the creation of tribal feudalism. Finally, none of the chiefs were delegated any administrative powers but were mere stooges of the colonial government.

On economic issues, the intelligentsia felt that colonial rule had a negative impact upon the implementation of any effective policy of industrialization and general socio-economic development for the welfare of the natives. More specifically, the colonial system in its support of European enterprises deliberately restricted the growth of African industries to prevent them from competing with their European counterparts. The fully developed industries were gold mining, timber, and cocoa. The first two were in the hands of the Europeans. The natives were the perpetual producers of essential raw materials to feed the European factories overseas. The African producers of raw materials in turn became consumers of the finished products. What made the conditions more intolerable to the African intelligentsia was that the prices of both the raw and finished products were dictated by the European firms. It seemed apparent that elimination of colonial rule would open the way for the growth of African industries to
compete on the world market and economic development for the country in general.

In short, African economic prosperity and hence social development was viewed as a function of the control of political power. Later on, during the radical phase of the nationalist movement, the politicians in the 1950's would be heard preaching the words, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you."

On the socio-cultural side, this educated class demanded professional leadership and full social equality in housing and medical treatment facilities. There was a strong desire to maintain certain old traditions and folkways, especially the role of the chiefs in the African society.

For example, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, there were only two public schools which were for elementary and secondary education. Almost all the schools and medical facilities were in the hands of missionaries. Later they were accused by some politicians of being only interested in teaching the natives how to read the Bible and to submit to colonial rule.

External factors, like the impact of World War I on these domestic conditions, were contributing factors to the awakening nationalism in the Gold Coast. There was an economic stagnation as all natural resources and manpower were diverted to fighting the war. Essential commodities
and consumer goods were scarce and prices of goods soared too high for the pocket of an average working native in the Gold Coast. In addition to this deplorable situation, the Gold Coast troops were obliged to fight their own tribesmen across the frontier line on behalf of Great Britain in a war which had nothing to do with them. As a point of historical interest, it has been claimed by the Royal West African Frontier Force\(^1\) that the first victory in World War I won by the Allies was at the border between the Gold Coast and German Togoland. These soldiers came back from the war without any job for them in the civilian sector.

At this "prismatic"\(^2\) stage of the traditional society as it moved slowly towards modernity, the intelligentsia felt that they should take over the leadership role from the chiefs. They felt themselves to be the best qualified to understand and handle the various complexities of a modernizing society. They also wanted to keep the chiefs away from national politics and to confine them to their traditional role in their respective societies. A split therefore occurred within the rudimentary nationalist organization, the A.R.P.S., with the chiefs on one side and the intelligentsia on the other.

The next move of political cohesion and consciousness in the Gold Coast was the formation of the National Congress of British West Africa (N.C.B.W.A.) as a result of this ever widening gap between the chiefs and the
intelligentsia. This organization came into being as the result of the pioneering work of J. E. Casely-Haford, the second native of the Gold Coast to be called to the bar in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century, and Dr. Akiwande Savage, a Nigerian physician practicing in the Gold Coast. The National Congress of British West Africa met for the first time in Accra on the 20th of March 1920 under the chairmanship of Dr. T. Hutton Mills of the Gold Coast.

The Congress was the first indication of West African nationalism. Its members, like the A.R.P.S., were comprised of the African professional class from the British colonies in West Africa, namely Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia. Its main purpose was to provide a unified front among the natives in the four British colonies through which grievances could be voiced and the aspirations of the rising urban middle classes could be expressed. Some of the demands of the Congress are briefly outlined below:

1. Self-government should be implemented in the colonies so that people of African descent could participate in their own government.

2. The system of nomination to the legislative council should be abolished because it was undemocratic and should be replaced by a general election.
3. The Judiciary should be separated from the Executive (the Governor). The Congress also called for the establishment of a West African Court of Appeal (W.A.C.A.).

4. Certain ordinances covering unsettled disputes and collective fines must be revoked.

5. Effective municipal government and administration must be introduced into West Africa.

6. Chiefs must be appointed and disposed of by their own people.

7. The native system of land tenure had to be respected.

8. Racial discrimination must be abolished in the civil service and West African natives must be allowed to serve in the West African medical consignment.

9. A university must be established in West Africa.

10. Immigration of foreigners, in particular Syrians and other non-Africans, into West Africa must be regulated.

11. Partition of former German Togoland should be done with due regard to the wishes of the people.

Some of these demands clearly called for some modification of the existing native institutions and customs which were beginning to be better understood by the new generation born and educated under British colonial rule.
In spite of its radical nature and its appeal to the broader section of the population in the urban areas, the Congress was able to accomplish small but significant changes in African society. Because it was a rising urban middle class phenomenon in a so-called socio-economically classless African society, it lacked the support of the people in the rural areas and eventually became defunct in 1930 with the death of its founder, J. E. Casely-Hayford.

Some of the accomplishments of the Congress in the Gold Coast worth mentioning are:

1. Direct election of candidates from the municipalities to the legislative council.
2. The establishment of the West African Court of Appeals.
3. Some improvements in the health and educational services by construction of Achimota College and the Korle-Bu Hospital in 1925 and 1927, respectively.
4. The construction of the Takoradi Harbor.

The National Congress of British West Africa was the first true nationalist movement which called for self-government in the British West African colonies. It initiated open elections which resulted in weakening the political powers of the chiefs and the governor. Its establishment of a university helped in the creation of more highly educated natives able to participate in the
nationalist movement. The Congress also heightened the awareness of both the natives in West Africa and the British government as to the seriousness of the reforms to be made and opened up a channel in which the A.R.P.S. could function without the backing of the chiefs. Finally, the Congress sensitized the people to the concept of nationhood of the Federation of British West Africa, which was one aspect of Pan-Africanism.

The discussion thus far has pointed to the fact that nationalism in the Gold Coast has been a concept derived from the frustration and ambitions of a tiny minority of the population, namely the chiefs and the intelligentsia. This group acted promptly to safeguard the customs and institutions of the people. Later it began to demand political, economic and social reforms as the society progressed from the traditional to the modern. As in most advanced societies, the minority of the populace has a disproportionate influence in the authoritative allocation of resources and values. In every sphere of human endeavor, individuals with skills or expertise come to occupy an influential position in the society. In politics these credentials, combined with the ability to organize, is a source of power. In this respect, one cannot overlook the role of education in forming an elite class in this developing country. This is because of the emphasis which modernizing societies place on achievement which is based
on universal and rational criteria. This tends to displace ascriptive, particularistic, and traditional norms characteristic of tribal societies.

In the town and urban areas where a large number of the educated lived, the authority of the chiefs and tribal sentiments were weakened. A new social class emerged which eventually became the vanguard of the new radical nationalist movement of the Gold Coast. In areas where Western-type economic activities, enterprise and education have been intensive, nationalism has been most advanced. However, this situation could be modified by certain environmental factors.

Throughout history, nationalism has been known to be a middle-class phenomenon. How can this assertion be related to the situation in the Gold Coast? The answer is simple. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, European economic activities and education had transformed the fundamental, social life of West African tribal society, especially in the Gold Coast. With this transformation, large towns and urban areas with modern means of communication emerged. The communication system did help to break much of the isolation between tribal societies. One of the consequences of this reform from a political point of view was the emergence of new social-economic categories. This type of economic revolution, which was to have a direct impact on the social and political life of
the people, occurred in two stages. The first stage was the
mass movement of farmers from the growing of food crops to
the cultivation of cocoa. By the early part of the
twentieth century, cocoa farming was a high paying cash
crop due to a great demand on the world market. The second
stage occurred by the second decade of the twentieth
century, when the Gold Coast was producing half of the
world's supply of cocoa.

The cocoa industry had become the backbone of the
country's economy. Cocoa farmers were thus able to send
their children to schools in the large towns and even
abroad for higher education. It was assumed that these
educated classes would return to their villages to become
the elements of progress there. Instead, they flocked to
the large towns and urban areas in search of white-collar
jobs. With the new economic interest at hand, these new
classes have been in the forefront of nationalism in the
Gold Coast.

The study of this nationalism in the Gold Coast could
be approached as a function of the rise of social classes.
The new economic system, which involved the use of money to
make money, made it possible and necessary to employ wage
labor. More recently, as elsewhere in the world, the
employment of wage labor has precipitated the formation of
labor unions to protect the employees' welfare. These
labor unions in their attempt to exert an influence on
policy decisions, which could enhance their interest, became deeply involved in nationalistic politics. Such examples could be cited in the Gold Coast as far back as the early 1930s. The cocoa embargo in 1930 and 1938 by the Cocoa Farmers Association was a case in point. It was a protest against the low price of cocoa. In addition to this wage labor class, the growth of the economy gave rise to a small, but well-to-do class of Africans typified by commercial farmers and timber merchants. This group, together with the high ranking government officials, constituted the upper class.

Although this emerging new middle class constituted a small portion of the population, it has been the most important class in the society. As the social elite, it set the standard for the rest of the society to follow. In order to build, protect and advance its status in the colonial situation, this middle class, like its counterpart in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, turned to nationalism as one means for attaining these ends.

The connection between the rising nationalism and the middle class in the Gold Coast could be explained by two important factors. First, the highly educated members of this class, through their monopoly of intellectual tools, could comprehend the various complex forces that make for social reforms. They could manipulate these forces through
political channels to enhance their status. Second, the members of this class have the money, leisure time, and the influence within the society to pursue part-time political careers.

As the number of this group increased, so were their demands for greater and more attractive opportunities. From the 1930s to the outbreak of World War II, strong grievances were generated by the new classes. This ultimately put them on a collision course with their European counterparts, who possessed effective social and political power. In other words, the rising African middle class began to view its European counterparts within the colonies as a ruling class to sustain colonialism. Faced with these obstacles, the professionals, together with their commercial allies, began to found political organizations and movements to redress the situation. The middle class became more and more conscious of the necessity of securing a popular base among the illiterate masses. This was especially essential in the rural areas, if the middle class were to convince the British colonial authorities that they really represented the citizenry at large.

For some time, mobilization of the masses would be difficult for three major reasons. First, the illiterate masses would be unwilling to support a radical movement which the chiefs did not support. Second, most of the people who lived outside the urban areas did not feel the
direct impact of the day-to-day pressures which the new economic system had imposed on those in the municipalities, i.e. housing, unemployment, high cost of living, etc.

Third, most of these people in the rural areas had accepted British rule and would be unwilling to risk any confrontation with the Colonial rulers.

To overcome these problems, the urban elites had to identify with them culturally and then incorporate some of their basic demands, such as transportation, into their program. Also, they had to adopt the influential elders into their political organizations. But, most important of all, they had to educate the rural masses about their civil rights.

Nationalism In Action

The demise of the National Congress of British West Africa did not mean the death of nationalism in the Gold Coast or British West Africa. It had defined the channel through which political action could take place. The period between 1930 and the end of World War II could be described as a transition from traditional and conservative to dynamic and radical nationalism. For example, in the Gold Coast, this political consciousness gave rise to nationally oriented political groupings, various youth movements and trade unions. Some of these groups were the Association of West African Merchants (AWAM)\textsuperscript{14} in the Gold Coast and the Ashanti Cocoa Federation.\textsuperscript{15} Younger people also began to
show signs of national awakening at this period, by channeling organized expressions in youth conferences. However, it should not be misconstrued that these youth conferences were incipient political parties nor were they national conventions per se. The conferences were groups of educated young people who discussed various problems facing the country. They served to educate the general public and to provide a united front to protest against certain policies of the colonial government.¹⁶

The turn to the new phase of nationalism could be attributed to a sharp decline in the price of cocoa on the world market caused by the Great Depression. This condition was aggravated further by the highly destructive cocoa disease, Swollen Shoot. By the late 1930s, several acres of cocoa farms throughout the country were completely in ruins. The only solution then was to cut down the diseased tree to avoid further spread, a solution which was not approved by the cocoa farmers.

During this time, some of these farmers, together with primary school graduates, drifted to the towns which were unable to offer them adequate employment. Those who were able to find jobs as clerks, messengers or laborers, received such low wages that they could not even afford to take care of their families in the big towns. The few one or two room houses which were built by the colonial administration in such areas as Accra and Sekondi proved to
be too expensive for an ordinary working clerk. Consequently, the problem of housing in the urban areas became acute. In addition, sanitary facilities were appalling while medical facilities remained at a bare minimum. Sooner or later slum clearance became another problem in the towns and the municipalities. Obviously, without the expansion of the economy, the rate of upward mobility would be progressively curtailed.

This could be explained in two parts. The first was due to the failure of the colonial government to attend to these economic and social grievances because everything was left in the hands of the big European firms. Second, there was "nondecision making" in certain key policy areas. These problems naturally would have some political repercussions. One such reaction was the formation of a Central National Committee, an organization whose members were politically conscious Africans. The aim of this body was to unite the dissidents of the A.R.P.S., the chiefs and the educated members of the society, to protest to His Majesty's government against the Water and Sedition Acts. The sedition law made it a criminal offense for an African to be found in possession of any kind of literature deemed to be seditious by the governor. This ordinance, it was argued, would prevent freedom of speech and expression, thereby limiting the role of media in the nationalist movement. In short, this law made it possible for the
governor to terrorize the press and to suppress whatever little radical nationalism existed in the country. The Central National Committee also called for the inclusion of an African in the Executive branch of the government.

Due to the activities of the Central National Committee and subsequent uprising, such as the 1938 Cocoa Freeze, a number of reforms was initiated. The most important was a new constitution which was drafted in 1944 under the governorship of Sir Allen Burns. The constitution was prepared with the consultation of the chiefs and other so-called important official African members in the legislative council. This constitution, hailed by middle class educated Africans and chiefs, was described by the British press as the most democratic in British tropical Africa.\(^9\) It remained for the emerging, young generation of World War II to condemn this constitution.

The Radical Phase

The radical phase of nationalism in the Gold Coast began immediately after World War II with the formation of the first political party in the country. This political party, the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.) was under the leadership of Dr. J. B. Danquah and a few African members in and outside the Gold Coast legislative council. Some of these members in the future would make a career out of the banner of nationalism.
The leadership of the U.G.C.C. consisted of conservatives, liberals, and traditionalists, similar to the National Congress of British West Africa in the early 1920s. Its program was moderate and demanded self-government in a short period of time. The need to take this political platform to the masses necessitated the appointment of a full-time secretary. The choice fell on Kwame Nkrumah, who was then the secretary to the West African Students' Union in Britain. He was known to be sophisticated and shrewd. He was a capable organizer and a fine orator who had made intensive studies of political and nationalist movements in the United States and Great Britain, where he received his university education. With such a capable secretary at hand, the U.G.C.C. began to enlist under its banner everyone who had a grievance against the colonial government.

The social unrest which emerged after World War II developed in 1948 into riots and looting in Accra, Kumasi, and some of the other urban areas. Coincidentally, that very day a boycott on European goods was called off. However, the two events which happened on February 28, 1948, were not initiated by the U.G.C.C. but the Convention's leaders exploited them to advance their own political objectives.

The underlying cause of these disturbances were numerous but the obvious ones were:
1) The low prices paid to the cocoa farmers;
2) A system of marketing by which the people of the Gold Coast had to pay higher prices for imported consumer goods under the control of certain European monopolies such as the United African Company; and
3) Disappointment of post-World War II veterans who neither could find jobs nor receive any compensation for their war time services in Burma.21

The inaction of the British colonial government in these matters led to a spontaneous mass revolt. A commission, under the chairmanship of Atkin Watkin was established by the British colonial secretary, Mr. Creek Jones, to investigate the causes of these disturbances and discovered a whole range of grievances.

It was an axiom of British colonial policy that progress, in the traditional African society, could be soundly achieved by representative government only under two conditions. The first rested on the foundation of traditional and social usage which already existed. The second was that the transition and development should be in the zone of acceptance of the people. The commission's report went on to state further that "It is not impossible, within these limitations due to tradition and usage, to adapt an anachronism to introduce the framework of modern
The report implied that a European system could not be arbitrarily imposed on an African society. The sound recommendation of the commission appeared to involve a radical change in the existing system. A further comment implied also that the Gold Coast government has, in its past and present actions, showed an inability to meet popular demands for progress. The mere idea of an elected African majority in the legislature in the absence of any real political power provided no outlet for the people. The whole gesture is symbolic.

With these findings, an all African committee headed by an African Supreme Court judge, Sir Henry Coussey, was appointed by the governor to draft a constitution which would meet the political and social demands of the people. Once again, this committee was comprised of chiefs, conservative politicians, and members of the professional middle class. The radical members were excluded. Hardly had this body submitted its report when ideological differences among the members of the U.G.C.C. led to a split in the organization.

In 1949, the secretary, Kwame Nkrumah, and the youth of the U.G.C.C. broke away and formed a new and more dynamic organization, the Convention Peoples Party (C.P.P.), whose goal was "self-government now." The motive
behind this goal was succinctly expressed by Kwame Nkrumah, the founder of the party, as such:

As the Labour Government were then in power in the United Kingdom it would be more favourably disposed towards our demand. If the Conservatives were returned to power the following year our struggle towards independence might be suppressed.\(^{23}\)

Thenceforth, an extensive mass campaign was launched throughout the country. The party's colors (red, white, and green) could be seen on rough wooden poles on roads in remote villages as well as on utility poles, trees, cars, and houses in the big towns. The role of the newspapers could not be underestimated in this radical phase of the nationalist movement. The *Accra Evening News*, the official mouthpiece of the Convention Peoples Party, was used extensively to broadcast the propaganda of the party and to keep alive the spirit of the new nationalism.

Nkrumah's genius, in this respect, lay in two areas. First, he was able to translate the resolution of the Pan-African Congress, held in Manchester in 1945, into practice within a very short time. Second, he was able to give an organizational form to the political, social, and economic unrest which occurred in 1948. The masses and the youth formed trade unions, cooperatives, farmers' associations, and a political party in support of the political struggle. With the nationwide support of the C.P.P. against the U.G.C.C., the latter remained a paper organization, "issuing flamboyant manifestos in vague
generalizations" until it became defunct in 1952. As George Padmore put it,

As later events were to prove, all of them, with the exception of Nkrumah, revealed themselves to be typical bourgeois gentlemen who, while desiring political power for themselves and the upper-class Africans, had nothing in common with the workers, farmers, market women, petty traders and other underprivileged sections of the common people.24

What was the nature of this new nationalism? How did it differ from the old? The U.G.C.C., like its predecessor the National Congress of British West Africa, was right wing and traditionalist. It was led by professional men and had the respect of many of the chiefs. It desired change without revolution, seeking to remove imperial control without changing the internal status quo. It was the party of the "been to," the accepted parochial expression of those who have been to Europe or the United States for their higher education. Such people were highly respected in West Africa. Unlike the U.G.C.C., the members of the C.P.P. were radical and consisted of traders, specifically the market women, taxi drivers, transport owners, junior workers, ex-servicemen, fishermen, and farmers. Many of these people too were embittered rebels against their own tribal societies having endured the frustration of a rigid social system. For them, therefore, freedom meant not only independence from colonial rule, but also freedom from the traditional society. Although all these leaders were anti-imperialist, they were not anti-
British or otherwise racist. While the U.G.C.C. was fighting for the old society under new management, the C.P.P. was fighting for a new society under new management.

Socially, the new nationalism was characterized by a revival of some of the old cultural ways of living. These included taking African names for the first names instead of European names and wearing traditional clothing such as "kente, batakari, and dashiki" for formal occasions in place of European clothing. Cultural dances and "high life" took the place of ballroom dances and in some cases, the drinking of palm wine was a substitute for beer. The word "freedom" became the salutation word.

Constitutional Reforms and The March to Freedom

Constitutional development in the Gold Coast had an extremely slow and gradual process. For over 100 years, the Gold Coast was administered as a typical Crown Colony. From 1844 to 1946, the coastal areas known as the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti, and the Northern Territory were administered separately. The Burns Constitution of 1944 established a certain degree of unification by presenting the Ashanti with a limited representation in the central legislative council. The Northern Territory and Togoland were given direct representation in the national government with the adoption of the Coussey Constitution in 1950.
Until the 1950 constitutional changes, all legislative and executive powers lay firmly in the hands of the colonial governor, his nominees, and the elected Africans. It is not the nature of even the most liberal of colonial powers to surrender control of their dependencies unless they are compelled to do so. Some, like France and Portugal, submitted only by force. Others, like Britain, submitted only when this struggle for power between the government and the indigenous nationalist movement became so great that the government could not maintain its role without it paying too high a price.

Practically, in all former colonial territories the change in the balance of power happened when the bourgeois nationalist movements gave way to radical, younger nationalism. This change in the Gold Coast came in 1950 when Dr. Nkrumah's C.P.P. won the first general election with an overwhelming majority. The governor had no alternative but to release Nkrumah from prison to form the new government. Since then, the C.P.P. has been the dominant political party in the country.

To the leaders of the C.P.P., the constitution which brought them to power was far from democratic. The governor still possessed executive and veto powers. Certain key policy areas like defense, justice, and finance also remained in the hands of the British unofficial members in the National Assembly. The C.P.P. government
had to work under this constitutional machinery to arouse popular support for another constitutional reform. This has been described by Dr. Nkrumah as "tactical action".26 Another constitution, granted in 1953, consolidated full internal self-government. There was an all African legislature of 104 members with Nkrumah as the prime minister and an all African cabinet.

Very soon, the unanimous support enjoyed countrywide by the C.P.P. as the only national party was sharply interrupted by the emergence of regional parties. This was due in part to factions within the C.P.P. and the insurgence of tribalism, the foremost enemy to national unity in African society. The regional parties were:

1) the National Liberation Movement in Ashanti;
2) the Northern Peoples' Party in the Northern Territory; and
3) the Togoland Congress Party in the Togolese section of the country.

The reasons which led to the weakening of the C.P.P. and the emergence of tribal parties are important to the understanding of the problems faced by the Gold Coast in her march towards independence. Many of the chiefs, particularly in the Ashanti region, strained at the disrespect shown by the members of the C.P.P. towards traditional authority. Many Ashanti farmers, too, felt betrayed by the C.P.P. for misappropriating the use of the
Cocoa Reserve Funds for political purposes instead of for the benefit of the cocoa farmer himself. A great majority of the university graduates and intellectuals who originally sided with Nkrumah disapproved of the C.P.P. tactics of nepotism and patronage. In Trans Volta, Togoland, the problem was irredentist nationalism; certain leaders of the Ewe tribe desired to be united with their kinsmen in French Togoland. The people of the Northern Territories, the most underprivileged group in the country, felt neglected in all social developments.

The struggle between the C.P.P. and its new opponents culminated in an angry climax. By the middle of 1955, the prospects of full independence were assured, but the country still had no written constitution for independence. The opposition, made up of these regional parties, was demanding a federal constitution that would preserve the character of the tribal regions, guarantee the position of the chiefs, and entrench democratic rights. The C.P.P. was firmly opposed to this idea of federation. Throughout the three regions, the talk of civil war became eminent. There was the deadly threat of succession if Ghana emerged as a unitary state. The colonial secretary, Mr. Lenox Boyd, succeeded in using his influence to persuade Nkrumah's government to meet some of the demands of the opposition. Instead of a federal government, there would be a system of regional government. In addition, there were other
safeguards and concessions sufficient to enable the opposition to yield without too much loss of face. In the general election which preceded the constitutional proposal, the C.P.P. was returned with 71 seats and with an absolute majority. In August 1956, when the legislative assembly passed a resolution calling for independence within the British Commonwealth, the opposition abstained.

Clearly, the C.P.P. since its formation in 1949, has been able to lead the country and the nationalist movement to the goal of self-government. The C.P.P. dynamically welded the various tribes into a single political force. By the first independent constitution, Ghana decided to remain in the Commonwealth. The government was modeled under the pattern of the parliamentary system. The Governor General was simply a constitutional head, representing the British Crown. A national assembly of 104, representing seven municipalities and 97 rural electoral districts, was elected by direct vote on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The claims of the regions were recognized by the provisions of regional assemblies. However, by the end of 1958, they were established on only a truncated basis and a few months later were abolished. The C.P.P. government really felt that Ghana was too small to have separate units for government even if federated together. The different parts of the country did not have the administrative and
political organs which modern government requires. In a typical African society, any government that comes into office is bound to be called upon to appease many conflicting tribal interests in order to remain in office. On March 7, 1957, the Gold Coast became an independent country within the British Commonwealth under the new name of Ghana.  

The political revolution so successfully led by Kwame Nkrumah had only succeeded in superimposing a twentieth century frame of government on an essentially tribal society. The next task was to bring the society itself into the twentieth century. Probably, this task would be more difficult than the wrestling of power from the colonial office.

Pan-Africanism - Early Concepts and Movement

Some of the aims of the Convention Peoples' Party as expressed in its constitution were to serve as the vigorous conscious political vanguard for removing all forms of oppression and for the establishment of a democratic socialist society; to work with other nationalist democratic movements in Africa and other continents, with the view to abolishing imperialism, colonialism, racialism, tribalism and all forms of national and racial oppression and economic inequality among nations, races and peoples and to support all action for world peace; and to support
the demand for West African Federation and of
Pan-Africanism by promoting unity of action among the
peoples of Africa and African descent.28

It is interesting to note that despite its
terminology, the whole idea of the Pan-African movement was
born outside Africa. Historically, it started as a cry of
protest and revolt by Black Americans immediately after the
Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 in the United States;
the cry was against racial discrimination. African-
Americans were proclaimed to be free, but because of social
injustices they still found themselves in bondage. At
different times, different authors had presented the idea
of Pan-Africanism as a racial, a cultural, and/or a
political movement. Nevertheless, to most of these
champions of Pan-Africanism, these three aspects of the
movement are closely interwoven and are inseparable. The
use of the term "race" in this context is sometimes
ambiguous because the people on the African continent are
of different races. There are Arab Africans, Black
Africans, and other minority races like the white settlers
in South and East Africa. In the language of
Pan-Africanism, however, the word "race" is used to mean
people of Africa and of African descent.

In its modern form, the Pan-African ideas and
movements began in London at the turn of the twentieth
century. It was the first Congress of African people and
people of African descent from the New World. The Congress, which was the first joint effort of its kind, was organized to look into the maltreatment of Africans in the British colonies and to foster cordial relationships between the black and the white races throughout the world.

The stimulus for this conference came from Henry Sylvester-Williams, a Trinidadian barrister practicing in England. Mr. Sylvester-Williams was well acquainted with the problems in the African colonies because of his associations with a few African students. He had also acted as a legal advisor to many African delegations to the Colonial Office. This period was marked by British Colonial expansionist policies in Africa, such as the South African Charter Company of Sir Cecil Rhodes in Central Africa.

With the death of its founder, Sylvester-Williams, the Congress was furloughed into oblivion in Africa because it had no roots on the continent. Before a second Congress was organized in Paris by W. E. B. DuBois in 1919, the Pan-African movement had taken two different forms in the United States. The first was a strong separatist movement based upon black racial purity; the second was an integrationist movement with an emphasis on black and African culture coexisting peacefully with the white race. Each of these movements had its own political objectives and goals. The main idea of Pan-Africanism at this time
was intended only as a stimulus against colonialism and the right of Black people everywhere to have a choice in their government.

Pan-Africanism As A Racial Movement

The separatist concept of Pan-Africanism took an organizational form as the Universal Negro Improvement Association and the African Community League, hereafter known as the U.N.I.A. The leadership of this movement was under the Jamaican, Marcus Mossiah Garvey. Garvey formed this organization as early as 1914 in Jamaica after returning from Britain. There his contact with Black Africans stimulated his interest in the motherland. The initial purpose of the U.N.I.A. was to develop an industrial and agricultural school modeled after Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute in Alabama.

In 1915, Marcus Garvey transferred his headquarters to Harlem in New York City where the movement began to flourish with the publication of a weekly militant paper called The Negro World. Garvey's message was in essence black chauvinism. His philosophy was that Blacks must restore their self-respect through pride in the glorious past and must assure a promising future by creating Black-owned enterprises. He said:

Why should not Africa give to the world its black Rockefeller, Rothschild and Henry Ford? Now is the opportunity. Now is the chance for every Negro to make every effort toward a commercial, industrial standard that will make
us comparable with the successful businessmen of other races. 

To this end Garvey encouraged the establishment of Black-owned stores, business enterprises and cooperatives. He also insisted that the Black people of the world must work to liberate and develop the African homeland.

According to Garvey's basic philosophy, the U.N.I.A. stood neither for integration nor social equality of the white and black races, but race purity and dignity. To this thought was added the "Back to Africa Movement," the idea of transporting American Blacks back to Africa to establish a new republic. In 1919, Garvey founded the Black Star shipping line to promote trade and commerce among Blacks in the West Indies and the United States. He also established the Negro Factory Corporation. Between 1917 and 1925, the membership of the U.N.I.A. increased tremendously due to the flamboyant and supreme oratorical skills of its leaders. Most supporters of the U.N.I.A. in the United States were Southern Blacks from the rural areas who had migrated to the principal cities in the North in search of equality and higher wages. What they encountered were racial riots and economic crisis. Unemployment among Blacks was extremely high. Branches of the U.N.I.A. were also established in South America, the West Indies, and West Africa.

Although the exact number of the U.N.I.A. could not be established with certainty, it was generally accepted that
this organization was the largest mass movement of Blacks ever to be assembled. It was somewhat ironic that White Americans in the South supported Garvey and the U.N.I.A. in the Back to Africa Movement. They wanted to get rid of the black man in the South. In 1921 at the U.N.I.A. International Convention held at Liberty Hall in New York, Garvey appointed himself as the provincial president of the proposed African Republic. He called for the creation of such establishments as the Universal African Legion, the Universal Black Cross Nurses, the Black Eagle Flying Corps to name a few. The nomenclature of any establishment of the U.N.I.A. had to include the words, "Black" or "African."

Unfortunately, this Black Moses could not set his foot on the Promised Land, Africa. The movement declined rapidly when Marcus Garvey and other leaders of the U.N.I.A. were indicted and jailed in 1925 for mail fraud in connection with the sale of the stock of the Black Star shipping line. Two years later his sentence was commuted by President Coolidge. He was then deported as an undesirable alien and died in Britain in 1940.

This racial aspect of Pan-Africanism did not last long either in the United States or in Africa. Nevertheless, the significance of the movement lay in the political philosophy of its founder, Marcus Garvey. In the United States, it gave millions of Blacks the badly needed pride
and spiritual outlet which contributed to their awakening militancy. It could not be disputed that this spiritual outlet remained a potent legacy for Black Power politics as advocated in the 1960s by Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, and others.

In West Africa, Marcus Garvey's U.N.I.A. did not have any permanent influence on the indigenous people; rather, it provoked controversy. Among African nationalist groups like the National Congress of British West Africa, it was Utopia. Aside from Liberia and Nigeria, the U.N.I.A. did not attract much attention. In Liberia, the U.N.I.A. made serious but abortive efforts to settle three thousand Black Americans in certain areas. These attempts failed because of Garvey's intemperate attack on the Liberian government and his ceaseless criticism of the colonial power. In Senegal, Gambia and Sierra Leone, the colonial governments introduced immigration restriction bills against undesirables.

In Nigeria, the importation of the Negro World was prohibited "as coming within the category of seditious, defamatory, scandalous or demoralising." The Times of Nigeria said,

The idea of establishing a line of steamers owned and controlled by Africans is a great and even sublime conception for which everybody of African origin will bless the name of Marcus Garvey... The inclusion, however, of such a tremendous political plan, as of founding of a pan-African Empire, is
too obviously ridiculous to do aught else than alienate sympathy from the whole movement.\textsuperscript{32}

A clear conclusion to be drawn was that most West African nationalists supported the industrial and economic aspects of Garveyism but rejected its political pretensions. Kobina Sekyi, an eminent Gold Coast lawyer and Nationalist, put it this way, "We have little or nothing to learn from West Indian or American political institutions; but we have very much to learn from their industrial or economic organisations."\textsuperscript{33} Commenting on the idea of emigration of Negroes to Africa, he remarked, it would "create new sources of trouble... and is not to be encouraged by us."\textsuperscript{34}

One might ask whether Marcus Garvey's followers in the United States were really willing to emigrate to Africa? If not, the whole Back to Africa Movement was a fallacy. If yes, what were the domestic obstacles in their way?

First, Garvey was dealing with poor disillusioned Blacks who could not afford passage from the United States to Africa. Second, until after World War II, when the African countries began to emerge as independent states, the picture and the image of Africa painted in the minds of Americans were extremely defamatory and humiliating, thus discouraging Black Americans from immigrating to Africa even if they possessed the money. To most of the American Blacks, they were part and parcel of the melting pot. They
had traded their past for an American future and there was no turning back to a new African Republic.

A further observation on Garvey's movement was that, apart from colonial rule, West Africa had never experienced any racial problems such as those in East Africa, South Africa or the United States. This was due to the fact that there were no European settlers in this region as a result of inclement weather and the abundance of mosquitoes. Under these circumstances, it was unlikely that the natives would support such a turbulent racial movement as the U.N.I.A. It should be recalled also that the nationalist organization at the time, the N.C.B.W.A., was agitating for self-government for British West Africa within the British Empire and not for separate independent states. Such arguments exposed the myth of Garvey's New African Republic and gave substance to DuBois' Pan-African thought.

DuBoisian Pan-African Thought

In contrast to the militant racial movement of Marcus Garvey, DuBois tried to give Pan-Africanism a cultural base for political action. Dr. William E. B. DuBois was an American educator and writer as well as one of the first advocates of social equality among the races in America. He was born in Massachusetts of mixed French, Dutch, and African parentage. DuBois was educated at Fisk University and Harvard. He received his Ph. D. in sociology from Berlin University in Germany, where he was exposed to the
myth of pseudo-biological race superiority. For thirteen years, he was a professor of sociology at Atlanta University where he published his first book, The Philadelphia Negro. In it, he analyzed the social problems of the Black race both in Africa and the United States. In 1910, he resigned his professorship at Atlanta University and joined the biracial National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.) as the director of research and the editor of its periodical The Crisis. His editorial chair was a podium for preaching his gospel of social justice and equality among the races.

DuBois' ideology was that Blacks throughout the world should unite on a common platform to protest white dominance. Throughout the world, the disposition was not to treat "civilized Blacks" as civilized and to consider the Black race as existing in the world mainly for the benefit of the White race. This, DuBois argued, constituted a world problem which called for immediate attention. Like Marcus Garvey, DuBois had come to believe strongly that the rise of the black man in America should be linked to non-whites all over the world. In his new dialectic of race, the problems of the Blacks in the United States (discrimination and social injustices) and colonialism in Africa would achieve a synthesis. This conflict between Blacks and Whites would be socialized internationally in the World Council of Powers and other
international organizations. Political power, he argued, would give strength and recognition to black people. This power could only be gained when all Blacks would unite. DuBois vividly instilled this philosophy into black people all over the world in speeches at Pan-African Congresses which he organized.

DuBois' Pan-African Congresses

DuBois' first Pan-African Congress was held contemporaneously in 1919 with the peace conference of Versailles. The Congress was the first under DuBois who continued to dominate the Pan-African movement until its transplantation to the African soil in 1958. The purpose of the Congress was to petition the League of Nations to adopt a charter of human rights for Africans and people of African descent. "The natives of Africa must have the right to participate in their government as fast as their development permits." There was also a petition to place the former German territories in Africa under international supervision to be held in trust until the inhabitants achieved self-government. The congress eventually adopted a lengthy resolution, which, however did not contain one word about African rights of independence or Pan-African unification.

DuBois' second and third African Congresses were held in London in 1921 and 1922, respectively. The agenda centered mostly on the equality of the races and a demand
for local self-government for people in Africa. His fourth congress was held in New York in 1927. The last of these series of congresses under DuBois was attended by 208 delegates. Africa was represented by a few delegates from the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria.

Most of the delegates at all congresses came as individuals and not as formal representatives of organizations or groups nor could they be true representatives of organized African opinion. These so-called black nationalists were petty bourgeois idealists dedicated to social rather political reform. Nevertheless, DuBois' Pan-African thought had dominated black political and social movements both in the United States and in Africa since the end of World War II. In the United States, DuBois' ideas took the form of the civil rights movements led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and other biracial civil rights leaders and groups in the 1950's until the present. It was not sheer coincidence that the civil rights movement as inspired by DuBois and King in the United States took place simultaneously with the independence movement in Africa. For all intents and purposes, it was the best way the racial problem in the United States and the colonial situation in Africa could meet on a single platform.

The fifth Pan-African Congress, and last to be held outside of Africa, met in Manchester, England, in 1945.
This congress was organized under the chairmanship of DuBois. Among the aims and objectives of this Congress were: 1) To promote well-being among Africans and peoples of African descent; 2) To press for self-determination and independence for the colonies; and 3) To secure equality and civil rights for Africans and to abolish all forms of racial discrimination. The congress was attended by a large number of delegates, including representatives of 10 African countries. Many of these delegates later successfully led their countries to independence and won fame and power. The radical nature of the congress was explicit by its resolutions. For the first time, the congress demanded for Africa autonomy, independence and the application of the four freedoms stated in the Atlantic Charter. Aside from the several resolutions passed, the congress also formulated concrete programs for which popular support could be rallied. These included the formation of dynamic nationalist parties which combined African traditional forms of organizations with contemporary western political methods. It called upon the professional and the intellectual community in the colonies as well as workers and farmers to organize into trade unions and to fight for their political and economic rights. "Today there is only one road to effective action -- the organization of the masses." A program of
positive action based on Gandhi's technique of non-violence and non-cooperation was highly endorsed.

In short, a significant change, indeed, in the idea of the Pan-African movement was formulated. The Pan-African movement had not only become a fantasy in the minds of Black people but also a genuine instrument for political and social change.

New Concepts of Pan-Africanism

The Pan-African movement as a weapon against colonialism became possible only when the African nationalist leaders adopted and implemented the Manchester resolutions in Africa. Since then, the new international political environment in which the emerging African nations found themselves has helped to shape the attitudes of these leaders to develop new concepts for the Pan-African movement in order for their new states to survive in the turbulent environment. The new concepts of Pan-Africanism now range from complete and total decolonization of Africa to a union government of the independent African states vaguely expressed as African Unity.

Decolonization

The Pan-African movement as a weapon against colonialism is not a completely new phenomenon, as already discussed. Recently, a stronger word: decolonization is frequently used in international circles to describe the
process of dismantling colonialism. Decolonization simply means the transfer of authority and sovereignty from the colonial rulers to the indigenous people. However, the decolonization process is not a one way street. It involves an interplay between forces of radical nationalist movements and colonial rulers to confer freedom on the natives. When colonial authorities linger, international pressures are called into play.

Decolonization has been a subject which commands a great deal of solidarity among the various African states. This solidarity was first expressed by Ghana when its Prime Minister Dr. Nkrumah declared in 1957 that "there would be no meaning to the national independence of Ghana unless it was linked with the total liberation of the African continent." Since then, other African leaders have expressed the same opinion and have joined the bandwagon by giving emotional, physical, and financial support to other African states still under colonial rule.

In general, all the African countries prefer to achieve independence by peaceful means, carried out in stages by constitutional reforms. The transitional period enables the natives to prepare for the new national responsibilities which lie ahead. The transitional period should be as short as possible, but long enough for the smooth transfer of power. The time period for the complete decolonization of Africa had never been agreed upon by the
colonial powers and by the African countries themselves. For example, Nkrumah, then the president of the Republic of Ghana, demanded that the process of decolonization be completed by December 31, 1962. Other states like Nigeria with more flexible policies suggested that since the various territories had not reached the same stage of development it was dangerous to lay down a fixed date.

By and large, the people who attain independence with the full agreement and the guidance of the metropolitan state were the ones who met with fewest difficulties thereafter. A resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1960, endorsed the idea of preparing for independence; however, the time for general decolonization of Africa still remained uncertain. Despite this time factor one can say with certainty that the process of decolonization has been as rapid as the colonization.

When the process of independence started south of the Sahara in 1957, there were eight independent states on the continent, excluding the Republic of South Africa. By 1960, there were 17. By 1965, there were 32 states. Today, the decolonization process is almost ended in Africa. However, the South African issue of Apartheid and the fate of Namibia still keep the colonial question alive in the minds of Africans.
The attainment of independence by the African states does not mean the severing of all relationships with the former colonial ruler. In general, all the independent African states prefer to maintain some form of equal partnership with their former rulers. For example, all of the former British colonies are members of the British Commonwealth and the former French colonies are members of the French community. These associations are mere international governmental organizations for economic and technical cooperation.

**Neocolonialism**

The newly independent African states wanted to construct a system which would protect them against unwanted interference from the outside. This meant that the independence lawfully acquired must be safeguarded and protected. In this sense, Pan-Africanism becomes a means of combating any form of imperialism.

What is neocolonialism? It is the sum total of modern attempts to perpetuate colonialism while at the same time talking about freedom. To the leaders of the new African states, a state in the grip of neocolonialism is not master of its own destiny because the country's economic system and political policy are directed from outside. "For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress." Neocolonialism has become the main instrument
of imperialism in place of colonialism. This form of imperialism operates not only in the economic and the political spheres but also in the religious, ideological, and cultural. However, it is in the economic field where neocolonialism becomes most dangerous. This takes the form of foreign aid, technical assistance, monopoly of imports and exports, and the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperialists. In this way, the fear is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed part of the world.

In many instances, investments under neocolonialism tend to increase rather than decrease the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world. The struggle against neocolonialism is not aimed at excluding the capital of the developed world from operating in less developed countries. It is aimed at preventing the financial powers of developed countries being used in such a way as to impoverish the less developed.

One means by which the Pan-African ideas are being used to combat neocolonialism is the policy of nonalignment at the international level. The policy of nonalignment is based on cooperation with all states whether they are capitalist, socialist, or mixed economy. Such a policy involves foreign investments from any source, "but it must be invested in accordance with a national plan drawn up by
the government of the nonaligned State with its own interests in mind.\textsuperscript{41}

There is an anxiety among the African leaders to protect the sovereignty of their new states from outside interference but what about interference from the inside in the form of territorial claims or annexation? Is it another form of imperialism or is it a form of African Unity? As Doudou Thiam has stated, "many African leaders suffer from a new disease called leadership."\textsuperscript{42} They support the Pan-Africanism and the pronouncement of African Unity, just to disguise their expansionist tendencies and to control united Africa. The claim for territorial expansion in the form of border dispute or annexation is based on the previous argument that the imperialists partitioned certain African territories which were geographic or ethnic units before colonization. The disputes between Ghana and Togo, Morocco and Mauritiana, Polysariah and Morocco, and Ethiopia and Somalia are cases in point.

**Pan-Africanism As An Ideological Alternative To Communism**

The Pan-African idea as a weapon against communism was first expressed by Marcus Garvey. He addressed a warning to the Black minority in America which the Bolshevist Party considered as a favorable medium for the infiltration of communism in the United States.
The danger of Communism to the Negro in countries where he forms the minority of the population is seen in the selfish and vicious attempts of that party or group to use the Negro's vote and the physical numbers in helping to smash and overthrow by revolution a system that is injurious to them as the white underdogs, the success of which will put their majority group or race still in power, not only as Communists but as white men.43

This concept of Pan-Africanism was elaborately developed by George Padmore, an ex-member of the Communist International. In his classical work, "Pan-Africanism or Communism," Padmore removed this ideology from all its racial context and presented it as a choice to emerging new African states.

In our struggle for national freedom, human dignity and social redemption, Pan-Africanism offers an ideological alternative to Communism on the one side and Tribalism on the other. It rejects both white racialism and black chauvinism. It stands for racial co-existence on the basis of absolute equality and respect for human personality.44

Unlike communism, the idea of socialism is now very popular in Africa. Most of the African leaders support socialism as an instrument for economic and social change. The wide acceptance of socialism is heavily based on the assumption that the traditional African communal society is a framework of empirical natural socialism. Sociologists and ethnologists who have carefully studied African ways of living have stressed this trait in African societies. The individual defines himself by the group to which he belongs. The group and the individual are not separate
entities but one and the same reality. On the social plane, this phenomenon is one of community and not of collectivism. This is where African socialism differs from "scientific" socialism. African socialism is a natural phenomenon whereby the individual participates willingly in the social group while "scientific" socialism is based on doctrinal construction of rules, regulations, and coercion.

The claim in support of socialism in Africa as an ideology against communism raises a number of questions. Are the Africans in favor of democratic socialism or socialism of the people's democracy? Are they going to lean towards economic developments based on authoritarianism? Are they going to incorporate African traditional values? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this dissertation. It is important, however, to note that Nkrumah of Ghana in his autobiography has clearly emphasized

Capitalism is too complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialistic society. But even a system based on social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing up, during the period following independence, by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind. Without discipline true freedom can not survive.48

Pan-Africanism As A Concept

For African Unity

African Unity is a topic widely discussed by African leaders and politicians. Indeed, all the African leaders
at one time or another have expressed the desire for some form of continental unity in their various speeches and conferences. The concept is one of the deep aspirations of the Pan-African movement. To most of the leaders and observers, several questions arise. What form should this unity take? Is it going to be a political unification at a regional level or a union government of all the African states or is it going to be a loose association with heavy emphasis on economic, social, and cultural cooperation?

There are two schools of thought. The first consists of radicals who prefer political union of all the states in Africa at a federal level similar to that of the United States or the Soviet Union. The most outstanding spokesman for this course was Kwame Nkrumah. Other leaders such as Sekou Touré of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali also had expressed the same view as did other members of the Casablanca group. The Republics of Ghana, Guinea and Mali had proclaimed emphatically in their various constitutions that they were prepared to surrender part or all of their sovereignty in the interest of African Unity.

Those who support the organic union argue that political unification of the African continent would make the artificial boundaries and regional demarcations established by the colonial rulers obsolete and would eradicate other social and cultural differences inherited from the colonial rulers. "In united Africa, there would
be no frontier claims between Ethiopia and Somalia, Zanzibar and Kenya, Guinea and Liberia, Mauritania and Mali or between Togo and Ghana." Kwame Nkrumah, in particular, argued that "African unity is, above all, a political kingdom, which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way round." On the other side of the coin, the gradualists prefer a loose form of cooperation to start with, arguing that political union will automatically follow. This means that functional integration should be the prerequisite for political unification. Among this group are Liberia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and most of the Francophone West African nations. Specifically, "in the constitutions of the nations of the Conseil de l'Entente and those of the countries in Equatorial Africa, a different formulation is used. Instead of the phrase, 'African Unity,' they prefer that of 'association and cooperation between states.' The difference in wording reflects the two different approaches to the concept of African Unity.

In spite of the sharp differences between these groups, they all shared one thing in common: the liquidation of colonialism and imperialism in all its forms (political, economic, and ideological). It was this common stand which brought the groups together to form the
Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). The charter of the O.A.U. clearly indicates that the majority of the African leaders who met at Addis Ababa preferred a flexible form of cooperation in the economic, scientific, social, and cultural areas to political union.

For 113 years, the Gold Coast was administered by Great Britain as a typical Crown colony. The transition from this Crown colony to the independent state of Ghana was characterized by three phases of national awakening.

The first seeds of nationalism were planted the moment the British colonizers set foot on its soil. The rudimentary nationalist movements took the form of the Aborigenes Rights Protection Society, which was founded to protect native traditions and institutions from encroachments of the British government.

The second phase of the nationalist movement was the impact of western culture. It was derived in the first place from the frustrations and ambitions of the tiny minority of the population, namely the educated class or the intelligentsia created by British colonial rule. The evidence of this birth of political consciousness was manifested with the formation of the National Congress of British West Africa in Accra immediately after World War I. Although this organization demanded social, political, and economic reforms in the four British colonies in West Africa, it lacked the support of the chiefs and the people
and therefore was not the true representative of the people. The change in the balance of power from Britain to the people of the Gold Coast came about when the nationalist movement with its characteristic bourgeois complexion was superceded by a younger, radical nationalist movement after World War II. Such a nationalist movement strirred up by post World War II economic and social unrest was led by the Convention Peoples' Party. In 1957, the Gold Coast attained independence within the British Commonwealth. The manner by which the newly won independence would be consolidated would set the pattern for other emerging African states. Pan-Africanists and observers all over the world hailed Ghana's independence as a milestone on the road to complete emancipation from colonial rule and to prove that Africans were capable of governing themselves.


5. Ibid., p. 19.


7. In colonial times, an illiterate was one who could not read or write English or any other European language.

8. The three municipalities were Accra, Cape Coast, and Sekondi-Takoradi.

9. The intelligentsia at this time included clergymen, teachers, lawyers, doctors and small businessmen.


11. The Royal West African Frontier Force was a joint military high command by the British government for its four West African territories: Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia and was headquartered in Accra.


13. Achimota College was the first public high public school built by the British government and housed facilities for kindergarten, primary, secondary school and a university college. It was rated as the best teacher training college in West Africa. It later became the foundation for the University of Ghana.

14. The Association of West African Merchants was a consortium of four European capitalist companies: The United African Company (UAC), Great Britain; The United Trading Company (UTC), Germany and Switzerland; The French Company of West Africa (CFAO), and Societe Compagne Occidental de l'Afrique (SCOA), both France.

16. Ibid., p. 112.


19. Ibid., p. 60.


22. Ibid.


27. The name Ghana was originally suggested by Dr. J. B. Danquah, as an inspiration derived from glories of a past African empire that thrived from 300 A.D. to 1100 A.D. around the middle of former French Sudan (now Mali).


30. Ibid., p. 83.


33. Ibid., p. 101.
34. Ibid., p. 103.
35. The Congress had 57 delegates from 15 countries among these were delegates from 9 African countries. See Langley, *Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945*, p. 63.
37. Ibid., p. 150.
41. Ibid., p. X.
44. Ibid., p. 355.
48. Ibid., p. 9.
49. The countries of the Conseil de l'Entente were Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Niger, and Dahomey (now Benin).
50. The countries of Equatorial Africa are Congo, Chad, and Central African Republic.
CHAPTER 2

TOWARDS AFRICAN LIBERATION UNDER KWAME NKRUMAH

RADICAL MILITANT STAGE

In March 1957, Ghana became the first European dependency of Black Africa to achieve independence. At that time, the only independent country in West Africa was Liberia. The French and other British areas in West Africa were still in the planning or hoping stage. The French were developing autonomy within the French union under the Loi Cadre\(^1\) in the various territories. Nigeria was working out her plans for independence in the face of many difficulties and almost insurmountable economic, political, and social problems between the three regions: Northern, Western, and Eastern. Most of the other areas, such as the Belgians in the Congo and the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique as well as Guinea Bissau were not even considering independence. British East Africa and the Central African Federation were having settler and multi-racial problems which were believed to preclude any attempts at independence in the near future.

Ghana's headstart in the continent-wide search towards self rule made it a showplace to which the emerging new states south of the Sahara could look for guidance. This
situation in which Ghana found itself raises a number of questions. How did the Ghanaian leaders recognize its unique position? How did they perceive the continuing situation in Africa? In the light of this situation, what policy goals did they believe Ghana should pursue to realize African liberation and unity? What help should Ghana offer and under what circumstances? On the eve of the celebrations of Ghana's independence, the Prime Minister of this new nation, Kwame Nkrumah, declared that "there would be no meaning to the national independence of Ghana unless it was linked with the total liberation of the African continent." He went on to state that Ghana would do all in its power to assist in the liberation movements in those states in Africa which were not yet free.

In pursuance of this goal, Ghana took the lead in April 1958 and organized the Accra Conference of eight Independent African States. Its chief purpose was to rally the independent states into a unified front in order to help the other African states still under colonial tutelage to free themselves. A second purpose was to examine and help resolve the problems dividing themselves. In December 1958, Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party also sponsored the historic non-governmental All African Peoples Conference in Accra. This conference, which was attended by sixty-two political and trade union organizations and other nationalist movements from twenty-eight African countries,
dramatically focused on nationalistic, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and pro-federation aspirations of Africa.

Other conferences such as The All African Farmers Conference, The All African Women's Conference, and The African Freedom Fighters Conference to mention but a few also took place in Ghana. One important resolution at all these conferences was to achieve the goal of freedom and independence through nonviolent revolution. At the end of these conferences, a permanent secretariat was established to coordinate the political activities of anti-colonial forces throughout Africa. Out of these conferences came important decisions to guide the future of the continent. All these liberation activities in Africa have been supported morally, financially, and physically by Ghana.

This chapter will examine the specific role played by Ghana towards African liberation from 1957 until and after the Organization of African Unity was established in 1963. Surprisingly Ghana was excluded from the O.A.U. Liberation Committee for a variety of reasons which will be discussed later. What were the purposes and accomplishments of the two Accra conferences? Why was Ghana so preoccupied with the Congo Crisis? Would Ghana still maintain its leadership role in Africa?
Policy Formulating Machinery Of
The Foreign Service

The international climate after World War II and the liberal tendencies to which it gave rise helped to arouse sympathy for the processes of decolonization. Within the limits of certain domestic and foreign factors operating at the time, Nkrumah's commitment to Africa was total. By seeking to secure allies for this cause of decolonization, wherever it could be found, Nkrumah succeeded in making Ghana the focus of attention both in Africa and the world.

Immediately after independence, Nkrumah took up the portfolio of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to be able to carry out his African objectives as he had planned. The same year, he appointed his old friend, George Padmore, as his personal advisor on African Affairs. Even when Nkrumah relinquished this post to one of his cabinet ministers, the new minister and his permanent secretary had to attend frequent and prolonged meetings with him. Thus he was able to keep track of his African objectives and to ensure that they were properly developed.

Most of the senior administrative positions in the civil service which were held by the expatriates from the British colonial office at the time were Africanized as quickly as possible in order to realize the independent status of Ghana. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs underwent drastic changes and reorganization to cope with its new
task, African liberation and unity. Its actual reorganization did not take place until 1961. One motivating factor was related to political developments on the African continent. Several colonial territories had gained their independence by the end of 1960 and Ghana had to work in close collaboration with these countries. Most important of all, the Congo Crisis, which erupted some few months after the country became independent in 1960, was pulling the independent African states apart. Three distinct political groupings had emerged on the continent.

Another determining factor in the reorganization was that for a long time Nkrumah strongly believed that the Foreign Service was not tuned to his African objectives. Because of its colonial training and mentality, but that it was absolutely British in substance and nature. "To Nkrumah Africa was the basic area of external policy, all activities outside Africa being designated principally to promote the objectives of the African cause."3 To cope with these political developments, Nkrumah established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the African Affairs Secretariat to deal solely with African problems. Ghanaian diplomats were posted to every independent African state and were entrusted to disseminate information regarding Ghana's assistance to Freedom Fighters and nationalists. Selection of diplomats to the most sensitive posts was made by Nkrumah himself. In most cases, politicians were chosen
above career diplomats except in areas where specialized skills were required. In 1959, Nkrumah created the Bureau of African Affairs, which George Padmore headed, outside the mainstream of the foreign services to carry out most of his African objectives. The Bureau became Nkrumah's sole instrument for the liberation activities in the field.

Organizing The African States

Exactly one year after its independence, Ghana hosted two important conferences in its capital, Accra, to work out the new concepts of the Pan-African movement. These concepts were to become the backbone of the foreign policies of the newly emerging independent African states. Unlike the earlier Pan-African Congresses of Dr. William DuBois, the participating countries were from Africa only. Surely the time had come for the African countries to view the international political situation in their own interests. Hence, the Ghanaian leaders who organized these two conferences declined to use the term, "Pan-African Congresses" in favor of The Conference of the Independent African States (C.I.A.S.) and the All African Peoples Conference (A.A.P.C.) respectively.

The Conference of The Independent African States

On April 15, 1958, Dr. Nkrumah opened the Conference of Independent African States. The conference was
originally planned for eight heads of states but unfortunately, only President William Tubman of Liberia attended. The rest were represented by their foreign ministers. Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was represented by his son. The Ghana delegation was led by George Padmore.

As a point of interest, the origin of this conference started with a conversation between Dr. Nkrumah and President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia during the latter's visit to Ghana at its independence celebration. They agreed that only independent countries including South Africa should be invited and there should be no observer from a dependent country. Independent countries were in control of their own manifest destinies without constraints of external forces. However, South Africa suggested that the colonial powers in Africa should be invited as well. The other countries refused and therefore South Africa excluded itself from the conference. At the 1957 Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers, Nkrumah arranged for the African ambassadors in London to lay the ground work for the gathering.4

Uninvited delegates who arrived at the conference included a man from Haiti who claimed to be an ambassador-at-large of the Black republic of the Carribean. Dr. Felix Roland Moumie, the former leader of the outlawed United Party of the Cameroons, came with the Egyptian delegation to rally support from the conference. Algerian
leaders arrived uninvited, yet they demanded to be heard. Upon the insistence of the five Arab states,\(^5\) the Algerian delegates were allowed to testify, but were not seated nor were they regarded as members of the conference. Since five of the delegations used English and three used French, a United Nations team of interpreters gave simultaneous translations both in English and French.

With the exception of the opening and closing ceremonies, sessions of the conference were heard in closed session. The Ghana parliament house in which the conference was held was crowded with foreign ambassadors, except for the French ambassador, who excluded himself. One might ask, why did the French ambassador alone opt to exclude himself from such an international gathering.

Algeria's revolutionary war against France was raging. Moreover, France was attempting to use the Sahara as a testing ground for nuclear weapons which led the French ambassador to fear that these issues would be the main topic of all deliberations.

Dr. Nkrumah warned against the new forms of colonialism (neocolonialism) that were then appearing in the world. He condemned racism and all forms of discrimination. He said that Africa was a lasting stronghold of colonialism, noting that "We must give every possible encouragement as we can to African freedom fighters to whom we are linked by common destiny."\(^6\)
Nkrumah protested vehemently against the proposed use of the Sahara for testing nuclear weapons, saying that "Radioactive winds know no international frontiers."

All opening speeches delivered at the conference with the exception of those of President Tubman of Liberia and Prince Selassie of Ethiopia, condemned France on their Algerian policy and strongly attacked racism, colonialism, called for vigilance by independent states to preserve their sovereignty. A more forceful speech came from Ethiopia's minister of commerce and industry, Mr. Ato Abebe Reta, who remarked bitterly,

I regret that the free people of Africa represent one-third of the total population of this continent. Although we count some seventy million inhabitants, twice as many await to see the dawn of freedom. In parts of Africa, the inhuman racist regime is being perpetuated under the guise of so-called democratic government. It becomes the duty of us the independent nations of Africa to mobilize world conscience and public opinion, with the view to eliminating the injustices of this most inhuman practice.

Dr. Whabi Elbury, the leader of the Libyan delegation remarked that the purpose of the conference was the promotion of understanding among the different races and religions of Africa, especially between the Arab countries and the people of Africa south of the Sahara.

The most controversial speaker of the day was Dr. Mahoud Fawzi, the leader of the United Arab Republic delegation who had wanted to use the conference as a platform for Arab solidarity. Shrewdly, he linked the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict with the question of Algeria and France. Egypt, at that time had merged with Syria to form the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), though all its delegates at the conference were Egyptian. He presented for discussion support for the Arab nation of Palestine and the need to include the position of Israel in the agenda.

Liberia at this point suggested that non-African problems should not be brought to the conference by the back door. The purpose of the conference should be centered on African issues and not the problems of the Middle East. The speech of President Tubman was very much revealing for subsequent events in Africa. He said, "Through hardship and humiliation, we as Africans have demonstrated qualities of patience, perseverance and endurance. I believe through the possession of such qualities we are destined to assume a new role in world affairs." He warned, however, "That is possible only if the people of Africa can overcome their suspicion and envy of each other."

The Conference of the Independent African States adopted the following agenda:

1) To exchange views on matters of common interest.
2) To explore ways and means of consolidating and safeguarding our independence.
3) To strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the independent countries.
4) To decide on workable arrangements for helping fellow Africans still subject to colonial rule.

5) To examine the central world problem of how to secure peace."

At the end of the eight day conference, the delegates came out with resolutions on the agenda which were later approved by the eight governments. In the economic sphere, the members of the conference pledged to coordinate their economic planning through a joint effort and to study the potentialities and technical possibilities of their respective countries. This should be accomplished either through their own individual efforts and/or through cooperation with "special agencies" of the United Nations. The delegates agreed to foster trade and communication among the member states and to attract foreign capital and skills "provided they do not compromise the independence, sovereignty and integrity of their states." To mobilize the human resources of the cultural and social aspirations, the declaration called for the exchange of students, professors, and educational and scientific materials. The declaration also called for the study of African culture, history, and geography.

In world affairs, the declaration stated, "We resolve to preserve the unity of purpose and action in international affairs...and the fundamental unity of outlook on foreign policy, so that a distinctive African
personality will play its part in cooperation with other peace loving nations to further the course of peace." It went on further to plead with the great powers to discontinue the production and testing of nuclear weapons as well as the reduction of conventional weapons. Another point focused on South West Africa, now Namibia, and called for a just solution to that problem.

On the Algerian question, the conference urged France to withdraw its troops and to enter into immediate negotiations with the Algerian Liberation Front. An appeal was also made to the nations of the world to exert pressure on France to adopt a policy in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The idea of pledging moral and material aid to the Algerians, strongly advocated by Dr. Fawzi, was opposed by Ghana. It was suggested that it was sufficient to say that "every possible effort" should be made to help them,...where there was already a state of war, "might mean the assistance... of arms which we did not consider are in the interest of peace."

The conference agreed also that a mission should be sent as soon as possible to the capitals of the world to insist "in the name of Africa," that Algeria's independence should be recognized. The question of the French Cameroons and French Togoland was also resolved. The use of force by France in the French Cameroons was condemned by the
conference and the delegates requested that France observe the principles of the international trusteeship system and satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people of the Cameroons by opening direct negotiations with their representatives. On French Togoland, the conference recommended that France should cooperate fully with the United Nation's commissioner in order to ensure fair and democratic elections in the territory. At the end of the declaration, it was recommended that representatives of the eight states at the United Nations should form an African bloc to coordinate all matters of common concerns to the African states. The next conference was scheduled to be held two years later in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Dr. Nkrumah closed the conference stating, "It is certainly not just a figure of speech when I say that if formerly the Sahara divided us, this is certainly not the case today." He stated further,

The former imperialist powers were fond of talking about Islamic Africa and non-Islamic Africa and about Mediterranean Africa and Tropical Africa. These were artificial descriptions which tended to divide us. At this Accra conference, these tendentious and discriminating epithets are no longer valid. Today, the Sahara is a bridge uniting us. We are one, an entity symbolized by our united African personalities."

By this conference, Ghana had made a significant contribution in bringing the eight states together to take up their responsibility in the interest of the continent. The African Personality was making itself known. The
conference highlighted the differences for what they were and offered a valuable lesson for the future. The conference also indicated that Pan-Africanism had moved to the African continent where it really belonged. "Free Africans were actually meeting together, in Africa, to examine and consider African affairs." For the conference to produce any significant result and avoid pitfalls, Dr. Nkrumah went far to establish himself as something more than just a local leader. He became a personality to reckon with throughout Africa.

Two months after the conference, Dr. Nkrumah, accompanied by some high Ghanaian officials, made a tour of all the capitals of the countries which attended the conference, covering twenty-two hundred miles. In a typical Ghanaian tradition, the trip was to express an appreciation to the other heads of states who were unable to attend the conference but honored his invitation by sending their top ranking officials. "Dr. Nkrumah has done much to fill the 'vacuum' which, he said, sometimes follows international conferences of that kind."

Ethiopia, the oldest state in Africa, was the first objective of Dr. Nkrumah. The three days which the Ghanaian prime minister spent there were devoted to civic activities and discussion of the Ghanaian-Ethiopian relationship. The Emperor and the Prime Minister agreed to exchange ambassadors and discuss ways and means of
following up the long resolutions passed at the Accra conference. Emperor Haile Selassie agreed to return Nkrumah's visit.

At Khartoum, Dr. Nkrumah held a widely attended press conference during which he explained that commonwealth membership did not hamper him on his attitude towards his African liberation movement. The atmosphere in Morocco and Libya was not much different. Dr. Nkrumah's visit to these Arab states aroused new interest in events south of the Sahara. In Tunisia, Nkrumah met for the second time his old friend, Habib Bourguiba. Again the Algerian problem overshadowed all discussions. In a joint communique, Dr. Nkrumah pledged loyal support for Algeria.

The visit to the United Arab Republic was the longest one and received the most publicity in the world's press. He met representatives of the Algerian Liberation Front and the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold. President Abdul Nasser thought he found a radical militant ally in Africa south of the Sahara who would combat European domination of Africa and support Arab solidarity against Israel. For the latter course, he was mistaken because there was growing rivalry between Cairo and Accra.

Cairo was the center of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement dominated by the Egyptians and the Russians while while Accra was becoming the mecca for the Pan-African
movement. Ghana had also established diplomatic relations at embassy levels with Israel shortly after its independence. A long-term trade agreement totalling seven million pounds for capital and consumer goods had also been established between the two countries. Israel had entered into financial arrangements with Ghana providing about 49% of the capital for the establishment of the Black Star Shipping Line. This was being done through the Israeli Zim Navigation Line which provided the operational and training personnel for a nautical college. Another venture was the Ghana National Construction Company in partnership with Solel Boneh, which was to undertake all major national construction in the country. In this respect, Ghana had much to gain from her relationship with Israel.

By the end of his tour in Liberia, crowds began to see Nkrumah as a liberator of gigantic proportions. His popularity and interest in the affairs of Africa south of the Sahara would now increase immensely. The visit had shown that the leaders of the eight independent African states were no longer separated by distances.

In summary, Nkrumah saw the Ghanaian revolution as only the first step to a total African political/social revolution. He recognized that between 1945 and 1958, the African revolution lacked a positive program and a coordinative strategy. His Conference of the Independent African States had revived the Pan-African Conference
System. Soon, the fire of national liberation which kindled in Ghana would burn in many Black African countries in the 1960s.

The All African Peoples Conference

Truly, history repeats itself. Just across the street from where in 1920 a group of lawyers and doctors met to establish the National Congress of British West Africa, about two hundred official delegates and several observers met at the Accra Community Center on December 5, 1958 for the All African People Conference. "These were not students in London or Manchester, American intellectuals or splinter groups in Cairo, but delegates from Africa's strongest parties in many of Africa's governments." It was an assembly of political and trade union leaders, literally from the length and breadth of the continent. They responded to the call before the conference in the summer: PEOPLES OF AFRICA UNITE! YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE BUT YOUR CHAINS!! YOU HAVE A CONTINENT TO REGAIN!! YOU HAVE FREEDOM AND HUMAN DIGNITY TO ATTAIN!! HANDS OFF AFRICA!! AFRICA MUST BE FREE!!!!

The purpose of the conference was to work out practical problems and to spur on the drive to independence based on Gandhi's strategy of non-violent revolution. The conference sought to encourage nationalist leaders in Africa to unify their isolated and sometimes lonely efforts to organize political movements and to press for political
power. The atmosphere inside and outside the conference hall was enough to show that this was an All African Peoples Conference of a new kind. The conference was originally sponsored by thirty-six nationalist organizations that had been invited to the Ghana independence celebration in March that year. Though the conference was non-governmental, financial support of 27,710 pounds sterling came from the Ghana government in the form of a direct grant.22

Among the leading political parties and organizations in West Africa which did not attend the conference were the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine, (R.D.A.), the leading political organization in French West Africa and the Northern Peoples Congress which was the largest and governing party of northern Nigeria. In other ways, too, the conference was less representative of West Africa than was anticipated. From the southern British Cameroons, there was only a splinter group which spoke of nothing but Dr. Endeley and his colleagues in the Southern Cameroon government as "The Trojan Horse of the Imperialists."23 The French Cameroons was represented by Dr. Felix Moumie instead of the followers of M. Ahijo's leading party. By use of different names, some parties were represented two or three times at the conference. There was nobody from Gambia or any other Spanish territory. On the whole, French West and Equatorial Africa were represented by
opposition or dissident groups and their speeches were far more militant than those of Ghana or British West Africa. The opposition party in Ghana, the United Party (U.P.) was represented by Modesto Apaloo.

A question does arise as to why key organizations did not attend. The fault or claim could not be placed on the organizers if, as they claimed, all were invited. However, the widespread absence of these dominant organizations leads to the suspicion that some were invited and others were not, for one reason or another.

There were observers from all over the world who attended this unique conference. Among them were three British parliamentarians, a party of six Soviet writers, Mr. Mason Sears, who was the United States Permanent Representative at the Trusteeship Council, and Mrs. DuBois, who was the wife of the father of the Pan-African Congresses. Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and Chou En Lai of the People's Republic of China sent messages of goodwill to the conference as did John Foster Dulles of the United States.

The opening session of the All African Peoples Conference was addressed by Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah. Five committees also met each day to report back to the full conference on the final day. Recommendations and resolutions were passed on the following agenda:

1) Colonialism and imperialism.
2) Racism, discrimination and land.

3) Tribalism, religious separatism and the position of traditional tribal institutions in contemporary Africa.

4) The adjustment of African frontiers.

5) The creation of a federation and other groupings which would ultimately lead to a Pan-African Commonwealth and the establishment of a permanent organization out of the conference.

For all intents and purposes, the conference was political in tone and did not deal in detail with economic, educational and social problems as such. Two themes appeared to underline many of the speeches and deliberations: 1) acquisition of political power by Africans throughout the continent as rapidly as possible and 2) finding ways to avoid 'Balkanization' of West Africa into small, economically unstable states.

To provide the highest standard of life, Nkrumah listed four stages to be followed by political leaders:

1) The attainment of freedom and independence.

2) The consolidation of that freedom and independence.

3) The creation of unity and community between the free African states.

4) The economic and social reconstruction of Africa.24
In his welcoming address, Dr. Nkrumah declared, "This decade is the decade for African independence. Yet we are not racialists or chauvinists. We welcome into our midst peoples of all other races, other nations, other communities who desire to live among us in peace and equality. But they must respect us and our rights, our right as the majority to rule. That, as our Western friends have taught us to understand it, is the essence of democracy." He warned them against imperialism which might arise not necessarily from Europe but also from within. He concluded that Africans should develop their own communities. Nkrumah foresaw the creation of regional groupings throughout the whole of Africa and the ultimate linkage into one African commonwealth or the United States of Africa. He called on the African leaders to "use the political power which the people invested in them through freely won elections to bring about the speediest economic and social reconstruction of their countries."

At this point, the Prime Minister referred to the GhanaGuinea Union, which was announced in Accra a month before the conference, and said that it would be the nucleus of a united West Africa, which other independent states could join. Tom Mboya of Kenya, the Chairman of the conference, emphasized, "We will not tolerate any interference with the development of an African personality or any attempt by any country, and I say any, and I mean
any, country to undermine the independence we are fighting for."^{27}

Methods of obtaining political power were stressed by Kodjo Botsio, the leader of Ghana's ruling party, the C.P.P., and head of the steering committee for the conference. He said that

the secret weapon of the C.P.P. was organization. Together with organization is the demand for universal adult suffrage. The right of one individual to one vote regardless of race, color or creed. Universal adult suffrage is the key to the final attainment of independence. Once this right is conceded, the way is opened. With the united will of the people behind you, the power of the imperialist can be destroyed without the use of violence.^{28}

Mr. Botsio declared that the All African Peoples Conference marked the opening of a new epoch in "our struggle for total emancipation of Africa"^{29} and was the beginning of a "final assault on colonialism."^{30} Mr. Modesto Apaloo, Ghana's Opposition Party spokesman, stated that he thought treatment of Africans by Africans could be as bad as that of Africans by Europeans.^{31} In a similar fashion, Mr. Cassel, leader of the Liberia True Whig Party, which was the leading party and a staunch supporter of capitalism, claimed that there was no need for a common ideology (socialism) for all Africa.

Chief Enahoro of the Yuroba Tribe in Nigeria strongly attacked the proposed Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. He said,

It would not be realistic to expect French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, the
Cameroons, Togoland, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gambia, and the Federation of Nigeria, with a total population of over sixty million, to 'adhere' to a union predetermined by Ghana and Guinea with a population of six million and in the formulation of which union their leaders have not been consulted.³²

He also stated, "We believe that it is not necessary to await the attainment of independence by the various States of West Africa before coming together to discuss the basis and form of the West Africa Federation."³³ The Juvento leader praised Ghana for the conference but criticized its current policies. Here, the spokesman implied that the former British Togoland, now integrated with Ghana, should be reunited with French Togoland. This and other statements which might have caused an uproar escaped criticism. Most of the delegates were in the dark, due to early unsuccessful efforts to give direct translation from the platform. Versions were circulated in French and English at the end of the conference.

One of the main disagreements at this conference was the question of non-violence for the struggle of Africa's freedom. It became clear right at the onset of the conference that the concept of "non-violence" did not have a mass appeal. Precisely because in the Cameroons as well as Algeria where armed protest continued against French rule, sentiments were high. The conference was undoubtedly divided into those who firmly believed in the use of violence as a solution for the African problems and those
who would use it only as the last resort. Tom Mboya spent some time explaining to the delegates that the wording should not be taken literally for if one was hit, one could hit back.

At the end of the six-day conference, resolutions and recommendations were made on the conference agenda. On the question of colonialism and imperialism, the conference called on the British government to dissolve the Central African Federation and to end the "present state of emergency" in Kenya. Delegates rejected Portugal's claim that its colonies comprise part of metropolitan Portugal and demanded immediate independence for these countries. Focusing on South Africa and its "Apartheid Policy," the conference called upon the independent African states to impose economic sanctions. A further recommendation was that all African countries which supplied South Africa with migrant labor should organize such labor for their own use and thus withhold it from South African industry which has become the instrument of oppression. This resolution was specifically included to control labor from Nyasaland (now Malawi) which was a big supplier. The resolution added further that the permanent secretariat to be established should endeavor to give financial aid to "any development plan that any country may have to initiate as a result of the diversion of its labor force."
The conference also recommended that the permanent secretariat set up a Bureau of Information as "a depot from which the liberatory journals in Africa would be circulated." The United Nations was asked to "reconstitute the Committee on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa." The great powers were urged to rescind the League of Nations mandate on South West Africa (Namibia) and implement procedures granting its independence.

A resolution on the future of Africa suggested that neighboring states must first amalgamate themselves into groups and that linguistics, cultural and religious divisions and national sovereignty should be subordinate to the interests of Pan-African unity. The resolution emphasized that such conglomerates should only take place between independent states governed by Africans on the basis of a popular referendum.

According to the resolution, the ideals of Pan-Africanism should be promoted through the mass media and regional conferences. The resolution apportioned countries according to regions: North, West, East, Central, and Southern Africa. However, it stipulated that the existence of the latter three had to wait until the indigenous Africans were in charge of their governments. On the issues of tribalism, religious separatism, and traditional institutions, the resolution stated that "some of the
African traditional institutions especially chieftancy, did not conform to the demands of democracy, because they had shown their reactionary character and support of colonialism.

The All African Peoples Conference was established as a permanent organization with the headquarters and secretariat in Accra. This was an important milestone in Nkrumah's bid for leadership of Africa, making Ghana a key center of the continent's efforts to gain independence and self-determination. The objective of the institution was to promote an understanding and unity among peoples of Africa, to see the end of colonialism and imperialism and to mobilize world opinion against the denial of the majority of Black South Africans to political and human rights. Its membership was opened to all African national and political organizations and National Federations of Labor which subscribed to the aims and objectives of the conference. The conference would meet at least once every year. The Secretary General would be elected to office for three years. April 15 was designated as Africa's Freedom Day. The next conference was to be held in Tunisia.

In his address at the closing session, Nkrumah remarked, "The conference had laid the foundation for the African community and a bridge had been built between the freedom fighters throughout the continent." The desire of freedom and unity had been strengthened between the
African states. He continued, "The conference had helped us to discover the source of our weakness that was the divisions within our own ranks...we had a clear vision of the future and we should now march on forward in a solid phalanx." Chairman Mboya insisted that "action against South Africa would continue relentlessly until the people of South Africa achieve a rightful place in modern African society." The impact of the Conference was that the delegates from the East, Central, and South would return home encouraged and inspired by what they had heard and seen in the politically more advanced West. Inevitably, all those who attended the Accra Conference became members.

The resolution which called for functional cooperation in the areas of interterritorial research institutions, military organizations and transport systems was a slap in the face to Ghana, precisely because these functional entities already existed in British West Africa. It was Ghana who first pulled away from all such institutions except the West African Examination Council and helped to dismantle them as colonial institutions.

The All Africans Peoples Conference formulated a new philosophy of Pan-Africanism which must be rigorously pursued by all the colonial territories in Africa. The program called for the following:
1) Political freedom, i.e. complete and absolute independence from the control of any foreign government.

2) Democratic freedom, i.e. freedom from political tyranny and the establishment of democracy where sovereignty is embedded in the broad masses of the people.

3) Social reconstruction, i.e. freedom from poverty and economic exploitation and the improvement of social and economic conditions of the people.

The elaborate program expounded at this historic conference called upon every country in Africa to make available all resources: physical, mental, economic, and political "to unscramble the whole colonial egg."42 This called for mass organization of labor and youth, and eradication of political illiteracy.

Nkrumah's own knowledge and experience in classical theory of organization convinced him that for the nationalist organizations to survive in a turbulent colonial environment they must import energy from outside in the form of money, knowledge, and manpower. They must also get feedback to evaluate their performance and to make necessary adjustments. The All African Peoples Conference had stressed the need for an effective organization. Such an organization would need funding. Money was needed to promulgate the spirit of nationalism into the masses
through mass media. Money was also needed to educate the people and to rally the citizenry at large to support the movement and to counteract any imperialist forces within and outside especially during the election times. The nationalist movements needed political direction in most of these colonial territories, so they wouldn't deviate from their cause. However, these resources were unavailable. Without any external assistance, the nationalist movements in most of these countries would collapse. It was imperative that Ghana, which had taken upon itself a leadership role, must come to the aid of these people. Nkrumah's goal was to provide them with financial assistance, political leadership, and moral support from within and outside the continent. This role was not limited to colonial territories alone but to any other independent African states which might be struggling for viability for a variety of reasons, so they would not fall back into the hands of neo-colonialists.

It is my deep conviction that all peoples wish to be free, and that the desire for freedom is rooted in the soul of every one of us. A people long subjected to foreign domination however does not always find it easy to translate that wish into action. Under arbitrary rule, people are apt to become lethargic; their senses are dulled. Fear becomes the dominant force in their lives; fear of breaking the law, fear of the punitive measures which might result from an unsuccessful attempt to break loose from their shackles. Those who lead the struggle for freedom must break through this apathy and fear. They must give active expression to the universal longing to be free. They must
strengthen the peoples' faith in themselves and encourage them to take part in the freedom struggle.  

Nkrumah's goals concerning African liberation took four forms:

1) Financial Assistance
2) Propaganda
3) Political Activities in International Organizations
4) Various Clandestine Activities

Financial Assistance

Financial assistance by the Ghana government to the liberation movements in Africa began immediately after independence and it took two forms. One was overt in the form of scholarships, loans, and contributions to various countries such as Guinea and Mali and organizations such as the Casablanca Powers and the O.A.U. The second form was covert as monies were funneled to national liberation movements and organizations and to various political parties, which might or might not have been the dominant party of a particular country. Since this financial aid was not usually published, little can be said about it.

In the 1963 and 1964 academic session, the Ghanaian government gave 100 scholarships for secondary schools and university education to students for various colonial territories in Africa. In addition to this, Ghana was one of the fourteen United Nations member states providing by
1963 special scholarships for students from Portuguese territories. John Gunther observed that in Mozambique, "Out of the 6 million Africans only 5,000 were in primary schools, 73 in secondary schools and 42 in industrial training classes." Portuguese officials had boasted that white rule would last longer in the colonial territories because education had been deliberately held back. At the Educational Ministry at Lourenco Marques, an official went on to say, "Frankly we did not want many educated natives, until they have an appropriate social background. They have no place to go. They become dissatisfied. What we want here is a stable society, a stable state. So we must move very, very slowly."

Another example was the interest-free loan of ten million pounds sterling to Guinea when it became completely independent of the French community in October 1958. Guinea found itself in a great financial crisis. "The budget had never been balanced before without a French subsidy of about five million pounds sterling." Almost all French technical assistance and advisors were also withdrawn. To help Guinea out of its predicament, Nkrumah immediately invited Sekou Touré to Accra in a special chartered Ghanaian plane. Sekou Touré received two million of the ten million pounds sterling immediately. He also received the technical and administrative Ghanaian assistance which Guinea badly needed. In addition to this,
Sekou Touré left Accra with a declaration of a Ghana-Guinea Union.

This sudden agreement raised profound comments in the country. In Accra, Dr. Kofi Busia, the leader of The United Party, criticized the proposal, especially the loan of ten million pounds. He noted emphatically "to lend money to a person who could not possibly repay except in the very distant future is to create a condition not for friendship but for resentment and enmity." The Ghanaian government also donated a total amount of 27,710 pounds sterling as a grant to offset some of the expenses for the first A.A.P.C. Three years later in 1961, when Mali joined the Ghana-Guinea Union, Ghana gave Mali a loan of four million pounds sterling to salvage its economy.

At the formation of the O.A.U. at Addis Ababa in 1963, Ghana, having been excluded from the Liberation Committee of nine, refused to pay its contribution to the Liberation Committee on the grounds that "the frequent and persistent reports from freedom fighters about the shortcomings of aid and facilities for training offered to them, make it impossible for the Government of Ghana to turn over its contribution to this Committee until a reorganization has taken place for more effective and positive action." However, Ghana resumed payment in 1965 to avoid embarrassment when the O.A.U. was held in Accra.
Covertly, according to Scott Thompson, Ghana gave Foncha's Cameroons National Democratic Party (K.N.D.P.) in the British Cameroons probably 10,000 pounds sterling for his election campaign in January 1959. Ghana also gave Kamusu Banda (A.N.C.- Nyasaland) ten thousand pounds in April 1959. Ghanaians, such as Kodzo Botsio, had stated that "We had financed every party. Every election. They all looked to us!"

**Propaganda**

**Psychological Warfare**

Another technique employed by the Ghanaian leaders to liberate the African continent was the psychological war of words and nerves against the colonial powers. The words: colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, and racism were used repeatedly by the Ghanaian leaders to harass the colonial powers in slurred speeches inside and outside the continent. These terms became associated with something evil, abominable or even anathema in the ears of almost every African. The stigma thus created was used as a scapegoat to divert attention from most domestic problems and to ascribe the causes of these problems to acts of imperialists, colonialists, racists, and neo-colonialists.

Nkrumah blamed imperialist and colonialist agents for the bombing attempts on his life at Kulungugu. He said that Ghana had become "the butt of colonialist and imperialist hatred," because of its role, "in the
struggle to end colonialism and imperialism..." He warned,

countrymen this bomb was not aimed simply at me, Kwame Nkrumah, but through me at Ghana and Africa as far as I am concerned, I am happy and acknowledge that death can never extinguish the flame which I have carried will continue to burn and will be born aloft to give life, hope and guidance to the people."

Nkrumah made a similar remark during the dockworkers' strike, saying that external enemies were behind the strike. The question was, Who were these enemies? Nkrumah explained that "when we in Ghana speak of imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, we do not necessarily refer to or earmark at any government or country. Our stand is against the system.""

It could be said with certainty that this technique worked. Soon this method of the Ghanaian leaders was adopted by all the African leaders in their public speeches and deliberations. Some ultimate consequences of this war of words and nerves were these: (1) It generated in the natives hatred against colonial rule and thus helped to mobilize them behind the nationalist movement; and (2) the harassment of the colonial powers was enough to make them realize the seriousness of the nationalist drive and to consider the granting of independence to the subjugated peoples.

By the same token, some of the accusations against the imperialists diverted the nationalist leaders from their
responsibilities of nation-building by finding objective solutions to domestic problems. The imperialists were always there as scapegoats. This might have created a paranoid schizophrenia in the masses in that they found it impossible to hold their leaders accountable for certain basic domestic problems. The gravity of the situation was that in the African countries the opposition parties were also regarded as agents of imperialism and neo-colonialism. The argument was that the institutionalized disorder so characteristic of Western politics was absolutely contrary to African tradition. The African tradition of unanimity had to be rehabilitated because it was a more efficient and more appropriate way of conducting public affairs.

Claude Ake has described this behavior of the African elites as "defensive radicalism," which he defined as "an attempt at mystification. It is the assumption of a radical posture and the use of this posture as a cover for containing revolutionary pressures and for maintaining the status quo." There has not been a single African country which at some time has not fallen prey to "defensive radicalism."

Political Education

For a long time, Nkrumah had cherished the idea that political freedom in Africa could be won only by political education and this is what he instilled vividly to the gathering at the A.A.P.C. However, "in Africa, the nature
of the freedom struggle has varied according to the background conditions against which it has had to operate and the position of the international scene at a given time." Despite his own acknowledgement, Nkrumah insisted that the tactics adopted by the C.P.P., namely civil disobedience, strikes, and boycotts, would be applicable to all other African states. Political education would first socialize the people and help mobilize them to participate in the nationalist movement. Political education took two forms. The first was conferences of the various vanguard organizations of the nationalist movements heard in Accra after the A.A.P.C. such as The Freedom Fighters and the All African Women's Conference. The main purpose of these conferences was to educate the delegates on the tactics of the C.P.P. to win independence for Ghana. A second purpose was to evaluate the strength of the nationalist forces as well as that of the "enemy" and if necessary, to reorganize new strategy in order to carry the struggle further to victory. These conferences gave an opportunity for the Freedom Fighters to examine the form which imperialism has taken and whatever "mask" it has put on precisely because imperialism has undergone a kind of change expanding its economic arms in an everwidening circle (neocolonialism).

In all these conferences, the negative impact of tribalism was stressed because "it provided one of the
happiest hunting grounds for the colonialist and neo-colonialist enemies of African independence and unity...the colonialists...are quick to seize on tribal differences to pit one group against the other." This was demonstrated in the Congo. It was imperative for all the various political groupings to forge a common front against the enemy. This could only be accomplished by unity among the leaders and the creation of a nationwide firmly united political organization.

At the Freedom Fighters Conference at Accra in June 1962, Nkrumah reiterated the point that Africans should not accept the white South African argument that the land they occupy now was originally no man's land. Neither should they accept the Central African Federation where seven million Africans are subject to 300,000 Europeans who were "determined to extend the arrogant assumptions of racial superiority." At the end of this conference, an appeal was made to the United Nations demanding that a session should be devoted to the problem of colonialism and a firm declaration for the withdrawal of the colonial powers from Africa by December 31, 1962.

There is no doubt that little could be achieved by periodic conferences of these kinds. A more frequent form of political education was through the media. The Bureau of African Affairs established a chain of newspapers and periodicals to promulgate the cause of African liberation
and unity. Such newspapers were The Spark, Voice of Africa, Freedom Fighters Weekly, Pan-Africanist Review, and the Bulletin on African Affairs. The role of these publications was to hammer home the message of full self-government and the need to organize for victory. In late 1965, The Spark started to publish some of its issues in Portuguese.

Although the majority of the masses could only be reached through the newspapers, this communication channel was limited due to the high degree of illiteracy. Nonetheless, the people could be reached by the spoken word. Thus in 1961, Ghana opened its external broadcasting station, through which the Voice of Africa could be heard throughout the world. In addition to these publications, Nkrumah published a number of books on African liberation, unity, and neo-colonialism. Such publications included I Speak of Freedom, Africa Must Unite, and Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism.

Parallel with these endeavors, a further effort was made by the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in Ghana to instill into the masses what Dennis Austin described as a "rudiment of a crude ideology" called Nkrumahism. Here seminars were held for many students, party activists, refugees, and freedom fighters from other African countries. The Nigerian Socialist Group, formed in Accra by a small group of trade union members, called upon "all
Nigerians to withdraw their support from the Bala administration because Nigeria required a Lenin, a Mao Tse-Tung, a Fidel Castro and a Nkrumah." Olajide Aluko had stated that the Nigerian government leaders believed that the visit of Chief Awolowo, then the leader of the opposition in the House of Representatives in Nigeria, to Ghana in mid-1961 had profound influence on Awolowo's ideological orientation towards socialism. Leading members of different opposition groups were also given ideological training at the Institute. Samuel Ikoku, one of the eminent Nigerian opposition leaders, wanted in Nigeria for treason, took refuge in Ghana and was made a professor at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute. The overall impact of political education was to provide a guideline for political leadership for newly emerging African states.

But what was Nkrumahism? Its definition could be derived from Nkrumah's own address called "The Guide To Party Action" which was delivered to the fifth seminar:

Let us not forget that Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action. The party (C.P.P.) has defined the social purpose and is committed to socialism and to the ideology of Nkrumahism...When you talk of Nkrumahism, you mean the name or term given to consistent ideological policies followed and taught by Nkrumah. These are contained in his speeches and his theoretical writings, a state of ideas and principles. It must influence all education in some form and indeed all thinking and action. Within this ideology there should be a full scale intellectual, educational, and organizational attack on all aspects of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism.
The Evening News of Ghana, too, had described Nkrumahism as "a complex political and social philosophy which is still in gestation so long as the Leader continues to add to the principles by words and deeds."^63

**Political Activities in International Organizations**

**Ghana and The Commonwealth**

So far Ghana had been waging the liberation war on the African continent itself either alone or in concert with the other African states through propaganda (verbal attack) against colonialism and imperialism in all its forms, the holding of two nationalist conferences, and providing moral, financial, and physical aid to the nationalists and freedom fighters. All these endeavors were very much calculated by the Ghanaian leaders for the non-liberated territories in Africa to follow the "liberation torch" lit in Ghana in 1957. Outside Africa, Ghana made use of the International Governmental Organization, namely the British Commonwealth, the United Nations, non-aligned nations, and all liberal forces which share the same view that colonialism and imperialism had run their course in the 20th century and should be abolished immediately. Thus Ghana began to rally support wherever it could be found to force the imperial powers "to let my people go." With the exception of the British Commonwealth Conferences of Prime Ministers, the anti-colonial crusade by Nkrumah was
extremely militant and vigorous. Violent verbal attacks and accusations were launched against imperialism and racism and a plea to end colonialism in Africa.

Ghana joined the Commonwealth immediately after independence in 1957. As the first independent country in Africa aside from South Africa to be a member of this exclusive club, Ghana became an ambassador and spokesman for the rest of Africa still under British rule. Apparently this gave Ghana added influence among Commonwealth members to convince Great Britain to end its colonial rule. It was a difficult undertaking requiring careful diplomacy.

First, "it is a truism of Commonwealth conventions that members do not interfere in domestic affairs of other member states. Indeed they do not discuss them, unless invited to do so." Second, Lord Humes, who was the Secretary for the Commonwealth, laid down three criteria in 1956 which would have to be met before independence could be considered to any territory. These were 1) the establishment of political institutions and administrative machinery capable of ensuring both the personal and political liberties subscribed to by Commonwealth members in general and efficiency in using these institutions and machinery, 2) the development of the economy of the territory sufficient for it to be viable and stable, and 3) the creation of forces adequate to ensure external defense
and internal security. All these implied that Ghana could not display any militancy or hastily applied direct pressure on other people for independence unless they met all these criteria which meant that the bulk of the work must be done at home.

After the 1960 Annual Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which was held in London, Nkrumah made a speech in Dublin, Ireland. In his address to the members of the United Nations Association of Ireland during which the South African Apartheid Policy and the fate of Namibia were among their discussions, Nkrumah put a condition of Ghana's continued membership in the Commonwealth. He said, in case the mission of the United Nations Secretariat should fail in its factfinding mission to Namibia and to terminate South Africa's U.N. mandate on the territory, "It will be extremely embarassing to Ghana to remain indefinitely in the Commonwealth with a Government that recognizes and practices apartheid and racial discrimination." 65

On his return from the Conference, Nkrumah stated that the survival of the Commonwealth depended on the degree of its ability and preparedness to adapt to its new multi-racial character. "The South African policy of Apartheid and its continued blatant repression and suppression of the vast majority of Africans in South Africa is contrary to the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth." 66 The bottom line was that Ghana demanded a radical change.
Either South Africa would annul its current racial policies or Ghana with its sister states would initiate a social, diplomatic, political and economic boycott. Ghana began a complete boycott of South African goods, ships, and airlines on August 1, 1960, and called upon other members to do the same. The boycott was extended to the N.A.T.O. powers, who by trade, economic, military, and political links tried to encourage South Africa and the Portuguese in Africa.

What prompted these actions were certain statements by Harold Macmillan, the Conservative Prime Minister of Great Britain, during the course of his official factfinding tour of Africa in 1960. He condemned South Africa's policy of Apartheid and was impressed with the speed and efficiency with which new nations in Africa were progressing. Macmillan's statement, "the winds of change is blowing through Africa," bore testimony to this nationalist revolution. His statement on economic boycotts and sanctions of South Africa were discouraging to the Ghanaian leaders and for that matter the rest of the states. "I certainly do believe that in refusing to deal with people just because you dislike the way they manage their internal affairs at home, boycott will never get you anywhere," Macmillan said,

It has never been the practice of any government in the United Kingdom including the Labor Government to undertake or to support a campaign of this kind designed to influence the
The question most African leaders asked Britain was this: What alternatives existed, other than boycott, to solve the situation in South Africa without the use of coercion or violence? Nkrumah had apprised Macmillan when he was in Ghana that Nkrumah's major preoccupation was to liberate the African countries from colonialism. Nkrumah urged the Commonwealth to adjust to the new political situation in Africa.

Nkrumah saw Ghana's role in the Commonwealth on a much higher plane when he stated,

We believe that the evolving forum of the Commonwealth is an institution which can work profoundly for a peace and international cooperation. It is the only organic world wide association of peoples in which race, religion, nationality and culture are all transcended by a common sense of fellowship. It provides a unique forum in which men of different cultures and approach can sit down together and see what can be done to lessen the tensions and to create the economic and social well-being of themselves and their neighbors.

Because of South Africa's racial policies, Ghana and other Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth opposed South Africa's reapplication to membership in 1961.

In 1959, Queen Elizabeth invited Nkrumah to become a member of the Privy Council. This was the first time the government of an African nation had been so honored. It was a recognition of the progress which Ghana had made in its Commonwealth relationships, since it became

internal policies of another Commonwealth country.
independent. Ghana also became a member of the Commonwealth Constitutional Committee on constitutional development with particular reference to the future of other smaller dependent territories. It used these unique positions effectively to influence Britain on key political issues and to bring about constitutional development towards independence for its sister countries in Africa.

At the 1964 Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, there was a suggestion by Ghana to set up a Commonwealth Secretariat. This was the first time in the life of the Commonwealth where any permanent centralized machinery would be adopted. There was even talk of Commonwealth conciliation machinery. The questions were: Would such innovation keep the Commonwealth together? Would it create conflict and division of loyalty between the African members of the Commonwealth and the O.A.U.? It is evident that the African states in the Commonwealth would try to secure agreement on issues which concerned them the most. Such were the questions of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and even the Portuguese territories. Portugal came into the scene just because of the Commonwealth members in N.A.T.O.

The United Nations As A Liberating Agent

Since becoming the eighty-first member of the United Nations on March 8, 1957, Ghana has played an increasingly active role in the affairs of the United Nations especially
so far as African liberation is concerned, rallying the support of the World Council against colonialism, imperialism, and racial discrimination. Ghana also sponsored Togoland's membership in the United Nations and supported Guinea's membership. It proposed the establishment of an economic commission for Africa and supported the proposal for a convention to support the U. N. Declaration of Human Rights.

During the early stages of Ghana's independence, Mr. Daniel Chapman, Ghana's permanent representative at the United Nations, took the initiative following the resolutions passed at the Conference of Independent African States in Accra to call the representatives of these states together to work out ways and means whereby Africa's voice could be heard more effectively in the United Nation's discussions. Some of the important policies to be pursued at the United Nations were: cooperation with the United Nations and adherence to its principles, independence for the dependent countries in Africa, avoidance of discrimination and racism in Africa in particular apartheid, and free contribution to world peace and security.

In August 1959, the top representatives of the nine African states met in Monrovia to set up policies to be followed up by the African states at the 1959 floor meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The most
important of the issues were the Algerian problem, the French atomic test in the Sahara, the Cameroons elections, Apartheid in South Africa, and the future and fate of South West Africa (now Namibia) then under the U.N. mandate of South Africa. Mr. Y. D. Turkson, the Ghanaian executive secretary of the group, said the emphasis was placed on discussions not on votes. "This was the most effective machinery Africa has ever had."72

During the 13th session of the United Nations, Ghana never voted in opposition to the majority of the members of the group. However during the 14th, 15th, and 16th sessions, Ghana voted in opposition to the majority of the members 6.4 percent, 7.1 percent, and 5.2 percent of the roll calls respectively. In the 14th session, Ghana opposed procedures for elections to the Trusteeship Council. In the 15th session, Ghana opposed several African issues: acceptance of the credentials of representatives of President Kasavubu; specific issues related to the Congo, such as the roles of the O.N.U.C., the U.N. Secretary General, and the Congo internal situation; procedural questions on the admission of Mauritania to the United Nations; and the resolution on the future of the Cameroons. In the 16th session, Ghana did not oppose the majority of the members on any African issues.73

Ghana's chief contribution towards African liberation in the United Nations was its leadership in bringing
together the nine African states to form an African bloc. This bloc worked on common problems and served a common interest. In this way, Africa was open to the rest of the world so that better understanding could be built between the various races.

One of the most visible contributions of Ghana to African liberation was its involvement in the Congo Crisis and this was channeled through the United Nations. At the beginning and throughout the Crisis, Ghana was one of the first to offer African troops to the United Nations contingent if a world police force were established. There was a breakdown of political, military, and economic structure in the Congo, an independent African state. This breakdown did not only inject crisis in the Congo and the independent African nations but brought as well the possibility of East-West conflict and the superpower rivalry into the African continent. This was something which the African leaders did not want at the time when they were trying desperately to exercise political control over their own respective countries and the continent as a whole. Nkrumah took advantage of the Congo Crisis to address the first session of the United Nations on African liberation, in 1960. The visit was also calculated to coincide with similar visits to the United Nations by seven other top world leaders whose actions and decisions unquestionably guided the destiny of the world. The same
occasion also marked the admission of 13 new African countries into the United Nations. The African countries now numbered 24. In his address to the United Nations, Nkrumah called the attention of the General Assembly to the impact of African awakening upon the modern world which called out for the freedom of Africa. "Africa wants her freedom. Africa must be free." He appealed to the United Nations to call upon all nations and their colonies in Africa to grant complete independence to the colonies still under their control. "As long as a single foot of African soil remains under foreign domination the world shall know no peace....In my view possession of colonies is now quite incompatible with membership in the United Nations." After this appeal he suggested that in the future a permanent seat should be created for Africa on the Security Council "in view not only of the growing number of African members in the United Nations but also an increase of importance of the African continent in world affairs." The earlier speeches of the leaders of the two superpowers, Eisenhower and Khrushchev, both of whom opposed colonialism, lent support to Nkrumah's plea.

The implication of his speech was that events both inside and outside the United Nations in the 1960s clearly indicated that colonialism and Apartheid directly affected the maintenance of peace and security. The colonial question became linked with racial discrimination and
Apartheid based on legal and political interpretations of the United Nations Charter by the Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The 1960s also witnessed several actions by the United Nations under Chapter 7 of the Charter, which dealt with enforcement measures.

This action on the part of the United Nations was motivated by the fact that the greater part of the continent was in a state of political unrest. There was a direct confrontation between the African nationalist movement waging guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa against Portugal, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. There was also a manifest defiance by these white controlled regimes of the United Nations resolutions which called upon them to establish democratic majority rule and to dismantle colonialism. What added to the gravity of the situation was that in 1960, the three regimes coordinated policies to frustrate the mandatory sanction/voluntary embargo imposed or called for by the Security Council and the General Assembly on arms supplies, diplomatic relations, and international assistance. These regimes also coordinated their military policies against the African guerrillas. The African revolutionary nationalism championed by Ghana was a response to development of an entente between the three white controlled regimes of Portugal, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the resolution of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and people (U.N. Resolution 15-XIV) of December 14, 1960. This step revolutionized the United Nations approach to decolonization. Mr. Alex Quayson Sackey of Ghana, who later became the President of the General Assembly, described the resolutions as the Magna Carta of colonial people. The African delegates and the governments hitherto considered this declaration of the General Assembly as a second charter and not merely a resolution. It was a charter for all enslaved people in that the right of selfdetermination had become a universal right of all people and of all nations. By virtue of this right, they could determine their political status and freely pursue their social and cultural developments. Nkrumah argued at the 1961 non-aligned conference at Belgrade that with the strict application of the General Assembly resolution it would be possible to eliminate colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa by December 1962. He then called upon the United Nations to organize a plebiscite in all colonial territories based on universal adult suffrage and the principle of one man one vote. To this effect, a draft resolution co-sponsored by Ghana and Morocco and supported by the African delegation rejecting Portugal's claim that its colonies in Africa were part of
metropolitan Portugal, was introduced to the 182nd meeting of the Security Council.

This view, however, was not shared by all members of the African states. Nigeria, for example, believed that the colonial powers should prepare their people for ultimate self-government within the shortest possible time with no fixed date. Mr. Jaja Wachuku, its federal minister of foreign affairs, stated that Nigeria favored 1970 as the final date for ending colonialism in Africa based on Nigeria's own experience because there was a need for adequate preparation by the colonial rulers before the granting of independence. He felt the tragedy in the Congo was due primarily to inadequate preparation and that this situation should not be allowed to occur anywhere else.

Various Clandestine Activities

The Freedom Fighters

Nkrumah's Bureau of African Affairs was responsible for training "activists" to work with nationalist movements and political parties in the dependent territories. These activists were people who shared the same Pan-African ideas of Nkrumah and were very much dedicated to the African liberation movement. They were nominated by the African Affairs Committee chaired by Nkrumah himself and were comprised of party fanatics and the Party's wing organizations, namely, The Trade Union Congress, the Ghana
Farmers' Council, the Council of Ghana Women, and representatives of the African Affairs Secretariat.

The training of the "activists" was also under Nkrumah's personal surveillance. Their main job was to infiltrate nationalist organizations where they were assigned with C.P.P. tactics. They also collected and disseminated information (liberation strategies and guerrilla tactics) to and from the Bureau. In this way, they also served as the channel through which funds and material aid were distributed to the Freedom Fighters in these territories. The Bureau was a center for training of Freedom Fighters from every part of Africa. At a number of secret training camps, recruits were taught to use a variety of arms and explosives.

In addition to the paramilitary training, the Freedom Fighters also received a thorough political education. Every fighter was made to know who the enemy was and why he was fighting. The key motive of the war was to be free from colonial bondage and to build a socialist society under a union government of Africa.

The latter made it easy to understand why most of the experts hired to train the Freedom Fighters were from the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China. The struggle was against colonialism and imperialism in all its forms and the goal was to build the United socialist states of the African continent. The Soviets and the Chinese
having done it themselves were willing to promote a similar revolution in Africa. Freedom Fighters mostly from Portuguese territories and the Republic of South Africa found their way to the Bureau in Accra.

One clandestine activity of the Bureau, however, was exposed when the Nkrumah regime was overthrown in 1966. For some years, Nkrumah had also been using the Bureau to train political dissidents and splinter groups from other African states to overthrow or subvert their own lawfully constituted governments. This subversion was aimed at governments which did not share the same political philosophy as Nkrumah.

The subversive activities of the Bureau had been known to many of the West African leaders long before they were exposed by the military regime which succeeded Nkrumah. In the early part of 1963, Nigeria and Niger linked the Bureau with treason plots in their respective countries. President Tubman of Liberia had charged that Ghana's Bureau was behind the recent attempt on his life as well as a plot to kill President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. "It was also widely believed throughout Africa that the killers of Togo's President Sylvanus Olympio were rewarded by Kwame Nkrumah." Newsweek magazine bluntly put it this way:

President Kwame Nkrumah has fashioned himself the supreme arbiter of who is a good colonial stooge...the Bureau of African Affairs in reality is a school for continental subversion
designed to accelerate what Nkrumah regards as the inevitable Pan-African tide of history.\textsuperscript{78} For many years, subversion in independent Africa had become a vital part of Ghana's covert African policy. Ghana had begun to perceive some of the African leaders as imperialist and neo-colonialist stooges. Thus to Nkrumah, 'subversion' had a subjective sense, and activities were usually 'subversive' only when their ends conflicted with those using the term; only those that had colonial interests to defend considered aid to the African nationalists as subversive.\textsuperscript{79}

Ghana had also provided political asylum for many exiles from the Cameroons, South Africa, Angola, the Ivory Coast, Togoland, and other areas where certain individuals had been persecuted for political activities. When colonial administrators were doing the persecuting, asylum was generally looked upon with favor by other African peoples. However, it was considered a violation of their interest and interference in internal affairs of these countries in cases where African leaders were doing the persecuting. This would ultimately be an increasing source of conflict in the coming years.

\textbf{Ghana and the Congo Crisis}

Four days after its independence on June 30, 1960, the Republic of the Congo plunged into a deep political and military crisis. This crisis which had a profound impact on the activities of the United Nations and African
political thought progressed in three stages. First, it began with the mutiny of the Force Publique (the Congolese Army), followed by an attempt of the Katanga Province to secede from the republic. A dispute between the Prime Minister, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, and the President, Joseph Kasavubu, followed. This virtually brought the country to a state of anarchy, whereupon the military under Mobutu, the chief of staff, took over. The gravity of the situation was intensified by metropolitan Belgian troops who went into action on Congolese soil, on the pretext that they were needed to protect the lives of Belgian nationals in the Congo. This was contrary to a peace treaty signed between Belgium and the Congo on the 29th of June 1960. However, once the Belgian troops arrived, they undertook duties which were more likely to endanger Belgian nationals than to protect them. It was apparent that the Belgian government was acting in its own imperialist and capitalist interests.

The government of the Congo, regarding the unsolicited action of the Belgian troops as an act of aggression, requested United Nations military intervention. In this request, they warned that if assistance was not sent without delay, they would be obliged to ask the Bandung Treaty powers for help. The Congolese government had also asked Ghana for military help. President Nkrumah informed Dag Hammarskjold of the Congolese request, adding that
Ghana as an independent state was ready and willing to send troops. Nkrumah also expressed the view that the present situation in the Congo should be solved primarily through the efforts of the independent African states within the framework of the United Nations machinery. "Intervention by powers outside the African continent, in view of the government of Ghana, is likely to increase rather than lessen tension." Ghana felt that the situation in the Congo was one capable of peaceful and quick solution if rival outside powers did not interfere as a means of serving their own particular interests. Nkrumah also wrote to Patrice Lumumba pledging, "I am willing and anxious to help you in any way I can, even to the extent of sending a battalion of my own army as a part of the United Nations Organization should as you deem this necessary."

It is important, at this point, to examine Nkrumah's interest and in particular Ghana's heavy involvement in the Congo Crisis. Why did the Congolese government appeal to Ghana for help, when it had already appealed to the United Nations? It is highly convincing that given the anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, and anti-neo-colonialist attitude of Nkrumah and his party leaders in Ghana, the Ghanaian government perceived the intrusion of the Belgian troops in the Congo as a clear cut neo-colonialist activity calculated to Balkanize the Congo Republic and to undermine the integrity of the African states. From the very
beginning of the Congo Crisis, the Ghanaian leaders felt that as an African country, Ghana must come to the aid of another African country in distress.

If we allow the independence of the Congo to be compromised in any way by the imperialist and capitalist forces, we shall expose the sovereignty and independence of all Africa to grave risk. The struggle of the Congo is therefore our struggle.\textsuperscript{82}

The foremost task, Nkrumah declared, was "to rid Africa of colonialism and all its forms."\textsuperscript{83}

Another insight to Ghana's heavy involvement was that it was a pioneering pilot state in tropical Africa where its leaders had a perception of the oneness of Africa. This viewpoint justified the application of Ghana's experiences and solutions to the rest of Africa. The conviction rested on the basic similarity which the Ghanaians perceived to exist between the trends of national movements in Ghana and other African territories. For example, in both Ghana and the Congo, the main obstacles to independence were tribalism and more specifically choosing between a unitary form of government, federation, or secession. In this way, Katanga was equated to Ashanti and M.N.C. (Congolese Nationalist Movement) with the C.P.P., while the Abako and other parties running against the M.N.C. were linked to a number of regional and tribal parties in Ghana prior to independence. In this respect, the tactics adopted by the C.P.P. could then be applied in
the Congo. This is an important key to the understanding of Ghana's official role in the Congo Crisis.

Ghana's response to the call of the Congo was quick and prompt. On the eve of the first U. N. Security Council meeting on the Congo, the Ghanaian government invited the Belgian ambassador in Accra to get in touch with its own government and to inform the Ghanaian government of the honest position of Belgium. The Belgian government replied that it intended to evacuate its troops from the Congo. In spite of these various assurances, Belgian troops remained in Katanga.

Shortly thereafter, a small advance troop of Ghanaian officers and men headed by the Chief of the Defense Staff, Major General H. Alexander, arrived in Leopoldville to assess the situation. Regular contingents of Ghanaian troops followed. By late July, the Ghanaian troops, which numbered 2340, were the largest single contingency in the United Nations force (O.N.U.C.), which then totaled 8396 officers and men. Senior Ghanaian ministers and officials including a medical team visited and revisited the Congo in quick succession during the following months. The large number of Ghanaian troops was in conformity with the view of the Ghanaian leaders that the O.N.U.C. should predominantly be an African affair. The great powers excluded from this operation provided air transport.
The Ghanaian president quickly warned Lumumba and Kasavubu to exercise restraint and to be very cautious when they had previously delivered an ultimatum from Stanleyville stating that if Belgian troops were not out of the Congo by July 19, they would appeal to the Soviet Union for help. There were several reasons for Ghana's attitude on this issue. First, Soviet aid, however little, would furnish colonial and Western powers with an excuse and chance to go to the aid of Tshombe. Finally, it would be incompatible with Ghana's own policy of non-alignment.

The Ghanaian government was becoming disgusted with the United Nations after Tshombe announced that the U.N. troops "would have to fight their way in," Hammarskjöld conceded to most of the conditions laid down by the secessionist regime. Tshombe demanded among other conditions that the United Nations would not include communist troops in its contingent and "for good measures, he made it clear that he included in that category troops from Ghana and Guinea." Following this announcement, Nkrumah quickly wrote to Tshombe in the interest of African solidarity and unity and in the interest of peace and security in the Congo and Katanga in particular I appeal to you to assist in the peaceful entry of the United Nations troops. I am prepared to use my influence, if this is generally acceptable, to ensure that Ghana troops form the greater part of the contingent and you know you can rely on them to maintain order.
In spite of other correspondence between the two, Nkrumah could not persuade Tshombe to alter his course of secession. It was quite clear that without Belgian support, Tshombe could never have maintained his position.

While these exchanges were going on, Lumumba was making a desperate tour of the United States and various African countries trying to explain the true situation in the Congo and the necessity to suppress Katanga's secession. In Accra, Lumumba and President Nkrumah issued a joint communique condemning the actions of the Belgian government. They warned also that in the event the United Nations failed to effect a total and unconditional withdrawal of Belgian troops, they along with the independent African states would enlist the support of any nation to compel a speedy withdrawal of the Belgian troops. The government of Ghana supported wholeheartedly the United Nations intervention in the Congo. The only thing that was wrong with the intervention was that "it was too late and it was acting too slowly." The very precarious condition in which Nkrumah found the United Nations prompted him to state

under these circumstances, I would not be so presumptuous as to put forward a Monroe Doctrine for Africa. I must say however that the great powers of the world should realize that very often African questions can be settled by African states.

Subsequently, Nkrumah wrote to Lumumba to ensure that the Force Publique and the people of the Congo cooperate
effectively with the Ghanaian army to maintain law and order. Suppression of Katanga's secession in the view of the Ghanaian government was an integral part of the duties of the O.N.U.C. aside from insuring the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo. Thus Nkrumah persistently urged Lumumba to work with rather than against the O.N.U.C. and not to push the O.N.U.C. out of the Congo.

A rift which developed between the already shaky alliance of Lumumba and Kasavubu resulted in the dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba from office by President Kasavubu. Kasavubu justified his action as necessary to restore internal peace and freedom. The revocation was perfect and legal by virtue of the perogatives according to the fundamental law. Kasavubu stated also that on several occasions Lumumba had acted without consulting him on matters which were of vital importance to the security of the state. He cited such examples as acceptance of airplanes and trucks from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in addition to a number of war materials he had received from countries behind the Iron Curtain.

At this juncture, Kasavubu asked Joseph Ileo to form the new government. Ileo's government was formed on September 11th but was not confirmed by the Congolese Parliament. The next day, Lumumba and his supporters reciprocated by dismissing Kasavubu from his office. Subsequently, Andrew Cordier, the top United Nations
official in Leopoldville, ordered the closure of major
airfields throughout the Congo and the sealing off of radio
stations in Leopoldville using United Nations troops. For
all practical purposes, there was no government in the
Congo. The only hope for the Congo was for these two
leaders to come together. Ghanaian officials and diplomats
from other African countries tried in vain to bring Lumumba
and Kasavubu together. Nkrumah continued to send messages
to Lumumba urging him to use constraint in the circum-
stances and warned him that his position would be
prejudiced by any action which might be misconstrued as
"irresponsible."

The most embarrassing situation for Ghana in this
political struggle between Lumumba and Kasavubu was the
fact that Ghanaian troops in the United Nations contingent
were used to deny Lumumba access to Radio Leopoldville.
Lumumba immediately protested to Ghana against the hostile
and unfriendly attitude of the Ghanaian soldiers and
threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Ghana.

One would ask whether the Ghanaian government were to
be blamed under such circumstances when its troops were
under the command of U.N. forces? The answer was no, but
Lumumba's diplomacy worked. Consequently, Nkrumah
protested vehemently to Hammarskjold about the embarrassing
situation of Ghanaian troops in the Congo. Ghanaian troops
were a cat's paw against Lumumba preventing him from using
his own radio station at the time when Radio Brazaville, controlled by France, and Radio Elizabethville, controlled by Belgium, were broadcasting violent propaganda against Lumumba's legitimate government. Nkrumah warned that if this situation continued, Ghana would withdraw its troops and reserve the right to place them entirely at the disposal of Lumumba's government. The tide had changed against Ghana. This was enough for the Ghanaian government to reconsider its policy on the O.N.U.C. and the Congo in general.

Colonel Mobutu, chief of staff of the Congolese national army, took advantage of the political split and staged a coup. Later persuaded by his colleagues, he allied with President Kasavubu. The ease and speed with which this alliance was formed was perceived in Ghana simply as two stages of a single imperialist-sponsored coup against Lumumba and his N.M.C.

Ghana's support of Lumumba and its persistent refusal to have anything to do with Mobutu made Ghanaian diplomats, soldiers, and politicians extremely unpopular and unwanted as the Mobutu-Kasavubu alliance consolidated itself in Leopoldville. Ghanaian diplomats were charged with interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo by using their diplomatic facilities to transmit messages favoring Lumumba abroad.
Two important events followed which led to the collapse of Ghana's radical policy in the Congo. The Ghanaian embassy was attacked and its diplomats were asked to leave the country. This was followed by the recognition and seating of a Kasavubu nominee in the United Nations General Assembly as an official representative of the Congo. The Ghanaians perceived the recognition of Kasavubu's nominee as a clear attempt by the Western powers to impose their will upon the Congo. On December 1960, Lumumba was apprehended by Mobutu's soldiers.

On December 4th, the Ghanaian government broke off diplomatic relations with the Belgian government asking the Belgian ambassador to leave the country within 48 hours, which he did. Ghana's reason for the break of diplomatic ties was that the Belgian government was responsible for the recent growing political unrest in the Congo. Soon after John Kennedy's inauguration as President of the United States in January 1961, Nkrumah personally wrote to him requesting Kennedy to intervene on Lumumba's behalf and warned that

the reputation of the United States could be irretrievably damaged in Africa if your powerful nation sits by and watches one of your close military allies - Belgium - which is after all dependent on the United States for its defense and to a considerable measure of its economic existence, crumpling up democracy in Africa.  

By this time, Lumumba had already been killed but his death had not been announced.
From the time of Lumumba's arrest, Nkrumah mounted his criticism of the O.N.U.C. in the local papers and on radio broadcasts. Nkrumah's criticism was that the O.N.U.C., under the guise of non-partisan status, had allowed the Belgians to reinfilitrate the Congo on a large scale and had allowed Mobutu and his followers to suppress the country's political institutions. The Ghanaian government presented a long proposal to the United Nations in which it called for the following:

1. Reactivation of Congolese national institutions
2. The O.N.U.C. should immediately subdue and disarm the A.N.C. factions.
3. All political prisoners must be set free, particularly Lumumba and his colleagues.
4. The Congo must be cleared of Belgian saboteurs.

The essence of Nkrumah's proposal was complete Africanization of military and civilian operations in the Congo in order to free them from Western control until national institutions in the country were fully reactivated. This meant a virtual or complete U.N. trusteeship over the Congo, to be administered in fact by independent African states with the help of nonaligned states in Asia. During this cooling-off period, the colonial presence in the country was to be uprooted, foreign Western intervention eliminated, and the forces of genuine nationalism allowed to recover and reassert
themselves. The Ghanaian solution, both because of its long-range objectives and its short-term methods, was completely ignored.

The main concern, however, of the U.N. officers in charge in the Congo was to check the fighting between the different armed factions and to restore some discipline among the Congolese soldiers. For the Congolese civilian, the O.N.U.C. was to restore essential services and to establish some form of quasi-administration. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1961, Nkrumah firmly stood his ground in the face of great pressure from his colleagues that they should all withdraw their troops from the O.N.U.C. Nkrumah's point of view was that a unilateral withdrawal of troops by the radical states would simply give the imperialists an opportunity for direct military intervention on the side of their protege. The withdrawal of troops from the O.N.U.C. by the radical African states left Ghana alone to play the radical role in the affairs of the Congo.

For example, when the United Nations announced that it would appoint experts to assist the Congolese central government to draw a federal constitution, President Nkrumah, called upon Cyril Adoula, the confirmed Prime Minister of the Congo who replaced Lumumba, to oppose resolutely what Nkrumah described as the imposition of the federal constitution on the Congo. His view was that such
a step would constitute a backward move for the Congo because it would militate severely against all stability, progress, and prosperity. He said; "Emergent African states need strong unitary governments capable of exercising a central authority for the mobilization of the national effort and the co-ordination of reconstruction and progress."  

The Foreign Ministers of the Casablanca states all met in Accra and came out with proposals which in many respects were addenda to that of Ghana. Some of the proposals of the Casablanca states were incorporated by the U. N. Security Council in the new mandate for O.N.U.C. Later, this new mandate was reinforced by another strong resolution of the Security Council.  

U.N. troops were used in September 1961 to exclude Belgian and other military aid, assistance, and mercenaries from Katanga. In December 1962, Katanga's secession was completely suppressed. These developments which further served to undermine the radical Congolese national forces in favor of the moderates soon clashed with Nkrumah's conception of the O.N.U.C. This was a classical example of misconceptions of political actors in the international system. The radical programs which were proposed by Nkrumah were based upon a number of unrelated and untested assumptions about Congolese nationalism. The assumptions were based upon uncritical applications of Ghana's own
experience in its nationalist struggles. They did not take into account the social, political, and cultural differences between Ghana and the Congo.

Unlike Ghana, the anti-colonial movements in the Congo lasted just for three years and ended abruptly without a transitional period. The first true nationalist organization (N.M.C.) of Patrice Lumumba appeared on the Congolese scene in October 1958. The other smaller parties which came into existence in 1959 were in fact mere political labels attached to already existing ethnic, tribal, or regional groupings organized to contest general elections. Thus the main handicaps for the nationalist movements were lack of ideology, organization, and experienced leadership. Conditions were highly inconducive for any sustained political activity and stable government. The sudden relinquishing of political powers of the country to these inexperienced leaders put the country into a mess.

In spite of the shortcomings and the failure of Ghana's policy in the Congo, its leaders still held the views of the dangers of neocolonialism and balkanization in Africa. The interests of foreign businesses as well as policies connected with the cold war dominated the Congo and prevented early action by the United Nations to nip the situation in the bud. Similarly, if at that time, the independent African states were united or at least had a joint higher command and a common foreign policy, an
African solution might have been found and the Congo might have been able to work out its own destiny. To the Ghanaian leaders at the time, it was a valuable lesson in that it demonstrated the imperative need for unity for the defense of the independent states of Africa.

The radical nationalist movement in Ghana did not fade away after the attainment of independence. The Ghanaian leaders felt that the country's independence was incomplete as long as there were external forces on the African continent likely to foment hostilities. The growing harshness of the Apartheid system, the Algerian war, French atomic tests in the Sahara, the Congo Crisis, the Angolan revolt, the disturbances in Central Africa, and the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith's minority white regime in Southern Rhodesia all justified Ghana's radical Pan-African stance.

The two Accra conferences organized and sponsored by Ghana to work out strategy for liberation movements in Africa promoted a feeling of unity among the people of Africa. The conferences helped to inculcate pride in the people in African values and resulted in immediate political and social revolution throughout the continent. By supporting the nationalist movements in Africa financially, morally and physically, Ghana formally took its place on the world's stage as the leader of Africa's
emancipation. The Congo Crisis alone demonstrated that Ghana could not always maintain its initiative and manipulations among the African states; nevertheless, it could claim to be the initiator of the new Pan-African movement in Africa.


4. The United Arab Republic (Egypt) did not participate in the Conference because it had no Ambassador to Britain at the time due to the Suez Canal Crisis.

5. United Arab Republic, Morocco, Sudan, Libya, and Tunisia.


10. *Ibid*.


17. *Ibid*.


20. *Ibid*.


25. Ibid., p. 3.

26. Ibid., p. 4.

27. Ibid., p. 5.

28. Ibid., p. 4.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 4.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 5.

38. Ibid., p. 7.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., p. 7.


42. Ibid., Introduction, p. XVIII.


46. Ibid.

47. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 68.

48. Ibid., p. 70.


51. Ibid., p. 67.


53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.


59. Ibid., p. 6.


63. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 63.


68. Ibid., p. 124.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ghana, Liberia, Guinea, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.


75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.


78. Ibid.

79. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 66.


81. Ibid., p. 20.


83. Ibid.


CHAPTER 3

TOWARDS AFRICAN LIBERATION AFTER KWAME NKRUMAH

GRADUAL CONSERVATIVE STAGE

The 24th of February 1966 was a day that would go into the political history of Ghana and Africa. This date was the turning point of Ghana's leadership and militant role in African liberation and unity. Kwame Nkrumah, until then the unchallenged President of Ghana, who held the dream of a totally liberated Africa under a single government, was removed from office by a military coup d'état.

To some observers inside and outside Ghana, this was incredible, given the immense power Nkrumah had acquired for himself through constitutional reforms from the time Ghana became a republic in 1960 up to the time he was overthrown. Within this period he exercised virtually unfettered control over Ghana's domestic and foreign policy. The republican constitution and the referendum in 1964 made him an absolute dictator over all Ghana. He was the founder and guardian of the Convention Peoples' Party which ruled over Ghana. Kwame Nkrumah was the party. The party was Kwame Nkrumah.1 One of his cabinet leaders bluntly put it this way, "We all are at best a small star shining only through the grace of Kwame Nkrumah, our
Political Central Sun and Author of the Ghanaian Revolution.²

The military junta which took over power on the 24th of February gave the following reason for overthrowing Nkrumah:

This act had been necessitated by the political and economic situation in the country. The concentration of power in the hands of one man has led to the abuse of individual rights and liberty. Power had been exercised by the former President capriciously. The operation of the laws had been suspended to the advantage of his favorites and he had been running the country as if it were his own personal property. The economic situation in the country was in such a chaotic condition that unless something is done about it now the whole economic system will collapse. In fact the country is in the brink of national bankruptcy...With your co-operation we shall reverse the present trend.³

To the educated and the politically conscious Ghanaians, the takeover was no surprise. For some years, there had been a cry among these groups for a general political and economic reform of the country. The common day-to-day phrase was "when the about turn would be announced." Whoever was to make this announcement was uncertain. For all intents and purposes, this group of people was looking upon the military to intervene in the political, economic, and social scheme of things since all civilian uprisings were bound to be suppressed forcefully by the regime. Apparently the coup d'etat, which was
hailed by most Ghanaians, was a reaction to intolerable political corruption, economic irresponsibility and mismanagement. There were shortages of food and other essential commodities. Personal interest and the alleged interest of a single party were permitted to disrupt and delay the course of the country's development. Very often businessmen willing to invest heavily in the economic development of the country were driven away by the lack of confidence in the honesty and effectiveness of the Nkrumah regime. What happened in Ghana was not a new thing. History is filled with examples of what happened in Ghana, where people are forced to resort to whatever means lie at their disposal to overthrow an unpopular government whenever peaceful and constitutional means fail.

The military junta called the National Liberation Council (N.L.C.) made it clear to the nation that whatever form the future Constitution of Ghana takes, the National Liberation Council will ensure that the people of Ghana are never subjected to the kind of tyranny and oppression Nkrumah imposed on them.  

There is a very important question to be asked here. How did the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah affect Ghana's policy and role in Africa? In a statement issued on the 9th of March 1966, the N.L.C. made it clear that it was opposed to colonialism and was determined to fight for final eradication of racial discrimination all over the world.

The National Liberation Council wishes to make known its determination to use all the means at
its command, including the experience of its members who served in the Congo operations, and have always been ready to be at the disposal of the United Nations to ensure the liberation of the remaining colonial territories in Africa in the shortest possible time.5

It also pledged to abide by and to support all the resolutions in the O.A.U. charter and the United Nations and to continue its membership in the British Commonwealth. The Chairman of the N.L.C., Lieutenant-General Ankrah, in an interview on the eve of his first summit conference at Addis Ababa, argued that because Ghana was the first independent African country to obtain independence from colonial rule, it had an important role to play in the processes of decolonization and the establishment of an egalitarian world community. Ghana intended to play this role vigorously despite the disposal of Kwame Nkrumah.

Lieutenant-General Joseph Ankrah further stated that

...the National Liberation Council will not be involved in the subversive projects cherished by the ousted regime nor would it be prone to meddle in every international crisis.6

The N.L.C. accused Nkrumah of propagating the policy of nonalignment and in fact, they were correct but in practice this was not the case. Nkrumah was flirting openly with the East (Soviet Union) and he was engaged in subversion across the continent in almost every country seeking to remove Heads of State who did not toe his line. Others he sought to bring under his influence through bribery and other means. In short, Nkrumah's non-alignment was based on blackmail and subservience to certain powers...
building personal powers at home, and a flimsy prestige abroad. 7

The N.L.C. was seriously opposed to these subversive activities which undermined the constructive actions taken by Ghana in the early days of the liberation movement, leading to bitterness and mistrust among the African leaders.

Immediately after the coup d'etat, the N.L.C. repatriated refugees and this was done with firm guarantees from their respective governments that they would be given a fair trial. In the case of political refugees, the N.L.C. honored the international convention for refugees. Eighty of these people from the Cameroons and Fernando Po, a Spanish island country south of Nigeria, who were placed under protective custody after the 24th of February revolution, were released and granted political asylum in consultation with the representatives of the United Nations High Commission on refugees in Ghana. However, the condition which was attached to their stay was that if the refugees decided to stay in Ghana, the Red Cross and the United Nations should be responsible for their resettlement. They were also made to understand that they could go to any country of their choice or stay in Ghana provided they cease to participate in any subversive activities since it was a firm policy of the N.L.C. that Ghana shall no longer harbor any elements of subversion against her sister States. Nor shall we seek to interfere in the domestic affairs by
dictating to them any form of ideology that we may think will speed the wheels of African revolution since no one country or group can claim to have the right answers to African problems. 8

The policy of the N.L.C. was to work closely and in harmony with the other African states and through the institutions of the O.A.U.

It was true that some of the freedom fighters left Ghana after the coup but those who left were not forced to do so. One argument which could be advanced in support of their departure was that they felt embarrassed and had lost all trust in the N.L.C. by the mere fact that they, the freedom fighters, and their secret training camps were exposed to the world. The N.L.C. suggested the following reasons for their action: 1) The camps were being used primarily for the subversion of other independent African states. 2) The camps had not been established with the knowledge or approval of the O.A.U. 3) The camps were a source of danger to the new regime. The N.L.C. stated further that if the O.A.U. were to confirm that it was appropriate to have training for the genuine freedom fighters in Accra then the Ghana government was prepared to reconsider the proposition.

One might well ask why Nkrumah continued to maintain these camps when the O.A.U.'s Liberation Committee had established an official camp in the Congo. It could be speculated that Nkrumah deliberately maintained these camps
just because he felt the freedom fighters, located in the Congolese camps, were not given proper training and supplies due to their imperialist instructors. The other viewpoint, which was shared by the N.L.C., was that he was using it for subversion of other members of the O.A.U. The N.L.C. had stated earlier that it would continue to support actively the institutions of the O.A.U. which would quicken the arrival of the total liberation of Africa from foreign domination. The N.L.C. maintained

that the question of the total liberation of Africa is not a matter for debate, for it was through it alone that every African can hope to realize his full potential and contribute as a free man towards the development of this continent and the peace of the world.  

With this course of action in mind, the N.L.C. gradually turned away from the militant war of words, used by Nkrumah and his regime against the imperialists, and resorted to concerted diplomacy at international conferences whereby Ghana could put pressure on colonial powers. The common day-to-day words of Nkrumah, neo-colonialism and imperialism, gradually disappeared from the vocabulary of the N.L.C. This is understandable precisely because heavy reliance on the concept of neo-colonialism as preached by Nkrumah had led the new regime nowhere. Nkrumah's notion was that economic dependence upon any industrial country in either the East or the West would lead to neocolonialism. Nkrumah knew such a handout would demand payment. The price was silence
(keeping your mouth shut.) Nkrumah refused to pay this price. He continued to verbally attack the colonial powers (the Western countries) and encouraged the other African countries to do so. Therefore Ghana was unable to receive economic aid, the capital which it now so badly needed to restore the battered economy.

One should also not overlook the fact that the same imperialist powers from the West were the first to come to the rescue of the post-Nkrumah Ghana by means of financial aid, loans, and resettlement of its debts with overseas creditors. Now, the N.L.C. was very cautious in attacking these powers on the colonial issue, choosing not to use them as a scapegoat for any domestic disorder to justify any claim for their support for African liberation. To put it in another way, the N.L.C. was paying the price that Nkrumah refused to pay.

Ghana's financial aid to the African freedom fighters was channelled through the Liberation Committee of the O.A.U. In this way, Ghana began to contribute to the O.A.U. Liberation Committee Fund which during Nkrumah's regime was in arrears. Material and physical support to the liberation movement took the form of technical assistance and scholarship programs to the newly emerged independent states and those still languishing under colonial rule with no political strings attached.
Most of these endeavors were in the form of unilateral assistance rather than multilateral aid. For example, a year after the N.L.C. took office, the ruling military junta as a matter of urgency, pledged moral and material support to Lesotho, the former British territory of Botswana, in the form of technical assistance in the field of education, social welfare and community development. The N.L.C. also offered a number of scholarships to students of Lesotho to study at institutions of higher education and technology in Ghana.

Instead of political education on a continental scale through various conferences, a number of political publications such as The Spark as well as ideological education at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, the new regime focused more on the rights of the individual or group in a democratic society, such as freedoms of speech, expression, petition, and religion. The N.L.C. believed that within the transition period of this present government a nationwide campaign for civic education was vitally needed to give especially to every Ghanaian a better opportunity of playing an effective role in the government of the country. Civic education would sensitize the people to their civil rights and their responsibilities as well as the limitation of the powers of the government to which all Ghanaians look forward.
In short, what the N.L.C. did in Ghana was to establish a properly organized democratic society in which the respect for basic human rights would be upheld firmly and where a citizen would enjoy the fullest opportunity for a useful and creative life. The endeavours of the N.L.C. were measures to rehabilitate society from the vicissitude of autocracy to an open society -- a society which is unfettered and allows for a free marketplace of ideas and traditional values. Consequently such magazines as The Spark, l'Etincelle, and The African World published by the Publicity Secretary for the dissemination of political doctrines of the ex-President were discontinued. There were several reasons for this: 1) their operational costs were very expensive; 2) there was no record of issues printed, production expenditures nor procedures were available for scrutinization; and 3) there was no control of how much money was spent once it left the President's office. Sales of The Spark were negligible and the l'Etincelle was distributed free. By far the most important issues of the African liberation drive with which the N.L.C. became preoccupied were the South Rhodesian question, following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.), and the fate of South West Africa, now called Namibia. Southern Rhodesia, originally a British colony, acquired full internal self-government in 1923. Consequently, it was not considered a
non-self-governing territory by the United Nations from 1946 to 1962 when the United Kingdom required the special community of 17 to examine the status of the territory.

Paradoxically, the Southern Rhodesian question was not a colonial matter. The crux of the problem was racial since there were 5 million blacks and 225 thousand whites. The latter, the minority whites, were the rulers of the country and did not give equal rights and opportunities to the African majority. Under the 1923 Constitution, there was a 15 member legislative assembly which in fact was all white. A new constitution in 1961 changed the membership to 65 and established a highly complex electoral system aimed at securing 15 seats for the Africans under which Africans had in principle a right to vote. However the exercise of this right was conditioned by certain finances, property, or educational qualifications and very few Africans at that time met the requirements. To the Africans and the O.A.U.; the 1961 Constitution was undemocratic and nothing short of introducing universal adult suffrage would satisfy the aspiration of the Africans. In reality for what the African majority in South Rhodesia was aiming was not real independence but a constitution based on the principle of one man one vote.

The British government had constantly maintained that Southern Rhodesia had full internal self-government and that the solution to the problem remained in the local
government's jurisdiction. Second, the British constitutional parties had no power to abrogate the constitution. Under the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, a subcommittee of the United Nations went to London for talks in the Spring of 1962. The talks did not satisfy the African viewpoint, so in both June and October 1962, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which stated that Southern Rhodesia was not a self-governing territory within the meaning of Chapter 11 of the U.N. Charter. The 1962 resolution called upon the United Kingdom to suspend immediately the 1961 Constitution and to hold a new constitutional convention to guarantee universal adult suffrage. However, the resolutions were not followed up by the United Kingdom. The subcommittee of the special committee went to London again in 1963. The report was that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a matter of immediate concern for the United Kingdom government. When this report was presented to the Security Council, it was vetoed by the United Kingdom.

The N.L.C.'s attitude to the Rhodesian issue was that the British government must be responsible for removing the illegal regime of Ian Smith and that immediate and positive action should be taken to bring this about. Since limited economic sanctions had failed, sanctions should be mandatory in accordance with Chapter 11 of the United Nations Charter. South Africa and Portugal should also be
stopped from assisting Ian Smith. From the N.L.C.'s viewpoint, the Rhodesian question was not an issue for compromise.

At the U.N. Special Committee on Colonialism in New York, Ghana vehemently urged that Britain should solve the problem of Southern Rhodesia and sanctions against it should be made mandatory and rigidly applied. The Ghanaian government felt that the Rhodesian problem had been so neglected by Britain that the solution had become more difficult. According to Mr. W.W.K. Vanderpuye, the Ghana delegate to the U.N. Special Committee, the Rhodesian case was a clear indication that Britain was making fine distinctions between its various decolonization policies, by picking and choosing, by jockeying and by favoritism, and by aiding and abetting her kith and kin.\textsuperscript{10}

This had led to an international collusion involving several countries to frustrate the efforts by the United Nations to bring Smith's illegal regime to respect the rights of the African majority.\textsuperscript{11}

Under those circumstances, the rebellion was bound to continue.

There were two main areas of conflict in South Africa. The first was the system of Apartheid which had been declared by the United Nations as a crime against humanity. Apartheid is an institutionalized racism which denied the black majority in South Africa a voice in their
own government and an equal opportunity in all economic spheres.

The policy of Apartheid practiced by the South African government dates back to the early 1940s. Apartheid, a South African word meaning "separateness," was first used on the 28th of March 1943 in the Capetown newspaper, the Die Burger, to refer to the policy of the nationalist party. It was later declared by the architect of "Apartheid," Dr. Mallan, in his address to the South African parliament on the 25th of January 1944 as a policy, "to ensure the safety of the white race and of Christian civilization."12

The solution to the South African problem mandated by the United Nations General Assembly and the O.A.U. was a total boycott of South Africa, including such measures as diplomatic isolation of South Africa, closing of ports to all vessels flying a South African flag, the boycott of all South African goods, and refraining from exporting goods including all arms and ammunition to South Africa.

The problem associated with the white minority regime in South Africa was its firm hold on South West Africa, now Namibia, which was a German territory prior to World War I. It became a mandate territory of the League of Nations under South Africa. When the United Nations was established in 1945, all these mandatory territories became trust territories under the United Nations supervision.
However, South Africa refused to enter into a trusteeship agreement with the United Nations. South Africa's argument was that with the demise of the old League of Nations, the mandate had lapsed. Consequently, the South African government felt free to take action it thought was in its best interest and was not under any obligation to submit a yearly report on the territory to the United Nations. In 1953 the United Nations set up a South West African Committee which was to exercise the function carried out by the mandatory powers of the League of Nations. A special United Nations Good Offices Committee appointed in 1957, which among other things discussed with the government of South Africa the possibility of partitioning the territory, was likewise unsuccessful in solving the problem.

Meanwhile, social unrest in this territory had increased due to political awareness after World War II. This had been demonstrated by numerous petitioners appearing before the United Nations General Assembly. The chief complaint was against the application of apartheid. In response to these complaints, in 1960 the United Nations General Assembly authorized the committee on South West Africa to go and investigate a situation in the territory. The committee could not accomplish its work because South Africa denied the Committee permission to land. The ineffectiveness of the United Nations in this particular incident was shocking to the African states. In 1961, the
Committee went on another mission to Africa where it was able to gather information on the condition in the territory from refugees and petitioners from neighboring countries.

While solutions to the Rhodesian problem were being sought, Ian Smith, its Prime Minister, unilaterally declared Southern Rhodesia independent from Britain in November 1965. Britain failed to take action when Ian Smith issued his Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Because of Britain's lack of action, Ghana severed its ties with Britain. Lieutenant-General Ankrah argued that the resolution at the O.A.U., for all African countries to break off diplomatic ties with Britain, was not implemented by a majority of the African states. In all, only nine countries honored the resolution. In order to put more pressure on Britain on colonial issues in Southern Africa, the N.L.C. felt that it would be better to maintain a relationship with Britain. Consequently, Ghana reestablished diplomatic ties with Britain.

The South West Africa question had been one of the main issues which has engendered intensive debate at the United Nations. In an address to the 22nd preliminary session of the United Nations, the chairman of the Ghanaian delegation, A. M. Akwei, attacked the various objections raised by South Africa in relationship to the request by the U.N. to relinquish his mandate over Namibia. He called
the attention of the session to the blatant violation of all decency and human rights.

The essence of South Africa's administration in South West Africa was the very negation of the basic right of the indigenous people to life, liberty and security, which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sought to safeguard. ¹³

He also called the attention of the session to the apartheid policies which were practiced in Namibia.

The African thus had become a cheap economic commodity that can be sold to the European industries... forced labor and slavery which prevailed in South West Africa...The white child was educated to prepare him to dominate and rule while the African child is brought up under a false psychological indoctrination which is designed to teach him that his human spirit had no value and that the essence of his being is servitude. ¹⁴

The Ghana delegation then called upon the Security Council to wake up and do something positive for the implementation of resolution 2145.

The Council should not only exist to restore peace only when it had been broken...[the Council] must serve both as a radar and the nerve center of the Organization's activities in maintaining international peace and security. ¹⁵

He warned also that the South African Apartheid regime should not be allowed to pursue its present course of annexing the territory of South West Africa and oppressing its people. There was also a proposal to reorganize the O.A.U. to make it more effective and to place the African countries in the position to deal more precisely with the question of Apartheid. Ghana supported the solution of the
committee and the United Nations to take over the administration of South West Africa. On this South African question, the Commonwealth and the African countries were pledged to such a course of action. African countries might have to pressure Britain to define more effective means to attain this end. In all such issues concerning African liberation at any of these international organizations which is available to Ghana "we always cast our vote on the side of what is just." 16

Ghana's policy in Africa did not change much under the Progress Party of Dr. Kofi Busia, the civilian regime which took over from the N.L.C. in 1969. There was a great deal of continuity of policy though at this time it was carried out at a very low profile. The most reasonable explanation for this continuity was due to the fact that most of the members who held the key positions in this government including Dr. Busia himself were either advisors or members of the political committee set up by the N.L.C. Because the C.P.P. was disbanded and its members were forbidden to hold public office, the opposition party in the ousted regime, the United Party, was for all intents and purposes a shadow government under the N.L.C.

The major departure from the policies of previous governments was Busia's total opposition to the use of force for the liberation of the remaining colonial territories in Africa. Secondly, the regime became a
strong apostle of "dialogue" with South Africa initiated by Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and backed by some of the Francophone West African countries. The diplomacy of "dialogue" embodied the establishment of diplomatic relations, trade missions, exchange of delegations with South Africa, including a peace mission to the white South African government, to encourage them to enter into a "dialogue" with their own blacks to end Apartheid. When he took office, Dr. Busia expressed his view on the policy of Apartheid practiced in South Africa, with this statement, "I do not agree with the South African policy of apartheid. It is contrary to all experience; it is philosophically indefensible and can be demonstrated to be such." Mr. Victor Owusu, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, also stated categorically that Ghana's policy towards South Africa had not been changed and would be pursued even more vigorously. To this effect, a national committee on Apartheid was set up by the government to educate the public on the evils of Apartheid and to advise the government on additional measures to be taken which would contribute to the dismantlement of "Apartheid" in South Africa.

In spite of all the assurances to the public, it was a "dialogue" with the white South African government to which Busia's government ultimately assented. In 1971, with the overwhelming majority he enjoyed in parliament (105 out of 140) Busia was able to push through the policy of
"dialogue." The government believed that mutual contact between the independent African states and the white minority regime in South Africa would eventually clear the way for the white minority regime to abandon Apartheid. 

"...You do not make progress by refusing to talk to someone with whom you do not agree. Two stupidities are not going to make us right."

The content of the proposal of "dialogue" involved the establishment of diplomatic relations, trading missions, and exchange of delegations with South Africa and a peace mission to urge the South African whites to enter into "dialogue" with their own blacks. The arguments brought forth in support of "dialogue" with South Africa were the following: 1) the armed struggle of the national liberation movement had failed to achieve its goals; 2) the African states did not possess the necessary military and economic resources to challenge South Africa decisively; 3) a trade embargo was certain to fail; 4) some of the African countries like Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho could not afford to cease trading with South Africa because they heavily depended economically on South Africa for their survival; and 5) Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and the United States would not cut economic ties with South Africa. Hence "dialogue" with South Africa would encourage moderate white opinion and other big business pressure groups to make peace with the black
majority and gradually change the political system. The three militant terms of Nkrumah's regime, imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, gave way to the term "dialogue" as part of the day-to-day vocabulary for the average Ghanaian, who used it in a loose and indiscriminate fashion without any regard or sensitivity for its real purpose.

Among the well informed citizens, dialogue with South Africa was ludicrous. Major-General N. A. Aferi who was then Ghana's high commissioner in Lagos stated later that he nearly resigned his post out of embarrassment over the policy.

I didn't see how I could defend dialogue. Even though as an envoy you are constantly putting a polish on things, on dialogue my position became more and more difficult. If there had been no coup, I would have left within six months.19

At the 1971 Foreign Minister's Conference of the O.A.U., due to African pressures and the unpopularity of Ghana's own policy at home, the new Ghana foreign minister, William Ofori-Atta, abandoned "dialogue" and supported a committee of which Ghana was a member to formulate a declaration against the policy of "dialogue."

The Declaration rejected Dialogue with South Africa, describing it as a maneuver by South Africa and its allies to divide African States, confuse world opinion, relieve South Africa from international ostracism and isolation, and obtain an acceptance of the status quo in South Africa.20
The committee reaffirmed its commitment to the O.A.U. Charter realizing that the Lusaka Manifesto was the only basis for an answer to the problem of Apartheid. The declaration further stipulated that if there were any "dialogue" at all it should be between the minority regime and the black majority in South Africa. Consequently "no Member-States of the O.A.U. should initiate or engage in activity that would undermine or abrogate the solemn undertakings of the O.A.U. Charter."  

Unfortunately the Busia government did not stay in power long enough after the O.A.U. Conference in June 1971 for any observation to be made on how these policies of the O.A.U. would have been implemented by the Ghana government. A military coup d'etat removed Busia and his Progress Party from office on January 13, 1972. To observers both at home and abroad who had been following Busia's political career in Ghana on colonial issues in Africa from colonial days until his self-exile to the Netherlands during Nkrumah's regime in 1961, his endorsement of "dialogue" raised a number of questions. Why did the man who had endorsed the use of violence by the defunct National Liberation Movement in Ghana now oppose similar action to liberate the Portuguese territories in Africa, Apartheid in South Africa, and white rule in Rhodesia? Why would this same person who had resorted to violence to overthrow the C.P.P. government when all constitutional avenues failed now
endorse "dialogue" with South Africa instead of supporting an armed struggle?

A plausible explanation was that Dr. Busia was so committed to basic democratic principles and motivated by economic rewards from the West that he abandoned the non-alignment policy of Ghana and adopted a strong pro-West stand. He was able to persuade Great Britain to reschedule payment of Ghana's medium-term debts. In addition Britain offered Ghana $2.4 million as an interest free loan. France also gave Ghana over $7 million and the United States was also willing to give financial aid to Ghana pending details of the aid it required. West Germany did likewise. These Western powers had a vested economic interest in South Africa, and for a long time had opposed mandatory economic sanctions and armed struggle against South Africa or Rhodesia. Consequently, Busia had to dance to their tune in order to get the financial aid to restore the battered economy.

For a long time, he had refused to approach the Eastern bloc for any economic or technological assistance due to his strong dislike of communism. This heavy reliance on the West had been described by Colonel I. K. Acheampong, the leader of the military junta who overthrew the Progress Party in 1972, as "sycophantic fraternization" with the West. An explanation of this obsession was that ideologically the former two civilian leaders, namely
Nkrumah and Busia, were diametrically opposed to each other in such a way that they were at opposite ends of the political spectrum. Hence, whether they agreed on a policy or not, their mechanics were different. For example, while Nkrumah was flirting with the East, Busia was flirting with the West.

In spite of all Busia's allegiance to the West, his government was unable to solve Ghana's economic problems. At the heart of the problem was the fall of the price of cocoa from 330 pounds per ton in 1970 to 230 pounds per ton in 1971. Ghana's short term debt stood at 82 million pounds, for imports received and not yet paid for. The arrears in paying dividends on profits and investments amounted to 24.5 million pounds. Medium term debts contracted under Nkrumah's regime were about 155 million pounds to be repaid by 1980. Long term debts amounted to 150 million pounds. Debt servicing alone amounted to 27 million pounds and was due to rise in the years ahead because no payments were being made. Busia's attempt to stimulate the economy by devaluing the cedi as much as 49% from 2 cedi per pound to 4.37 did not help. Unemployment soared and in an effort to solve this problem, Busia implemented the Alien Compliance Order. Ironically, this very act was one of the major contributing factors towards his downfall.
The first military regime (N.L.C.) had set a pattern which would be followed by the military from then on. The soldiers had tasted political power and they liked it. Henceforth they would never hesitate to seize power from a civilian government at any available opportunity. Nevertheless, these military regimes must secure the authority on a more solid ground than popular enthusiastic support for their intervention. They should realize that the support from the civilian population was often an expression of immense relief from being burdened by an unpopular civilian government rather than support for military rule. Ghana was a very political society and sectional interests were bound to be asserted once the political process was restarted. The soldiers and their new administrators (civilian and military) had somehow to learn the skills of the politicians which they despised in order to succeed and this task would sometimes not be easy.

On January 13, 1972, a second military junta led by Colonel Acheampong took over the reins of government while Busia was out of the country for medical treatment. The reasons for the takeover were similar to those given by the N.L.C. against Nkrumah, i.e. economic mismanagement, corruption, unemployment, and the unpopular Alien Compliance Order. Colonel Acheampong remarked at the first anniversary of the takeover that the coup "was not a revolution of one man, by one man, for one man: We came as
a modest band of brothers and comrades." He felt that the coup clearly symbolized "the emergence of a new generation of Ghanaians who were ready and eager to face the problems of their society and to solve them."

In other words, after the January 13, 1972 revolution, the average Ghanaian became an ideal citizen, energetic and willing to carry out the objectives of the new revolution to the end in all spheres of endeavors. Clearly the statement had something to do with the two previous civilian regimes. Ghanaian citizens had been alarmingly aware of the power of the first president who had claimed himself to be the "The Messiah," "The Redeemer," and the founder of the state of Ghana. Not only did Nkrumah make these claims but also did his sycophants and some of his close associates. The authoritarian way by which he ruled the country gave a shining testimony to the power which he had attained. The abuse of this power and the oppression which the people were subjected to left scars which were deeply engraved in the minds of all Ghanaians. To the second regime, the statement implied that the disqualification of the C.P.P. members from active political service did not automatically mean that the first revolution led by the N.L.C. was staged purposely on its behalf. The name, National Redemption Council, chosen by the second military regime, was a definite indication that the country, having been liberated from the clutches of Nkrumah's
authoritarianism, had fallen back into a similar predicament under Kofi Busia. Hence, the country had to be redeemed once again from civilian authoritarianism and economic mismanagement. In a special message to the armed forces, Colonel Acheampong pleaded with them to be "modest, honest, approachable, understanding, courteous, and sympathetic to the civilian population." The military regime understood very well that the country was totally divided into three camps: Nkrumahites, Busiaites, and the uncommitted. To be able to accomplish any number of things, he had to unite these three factions. This led him to state that he would not hand over the administration of the country to a civilian until the economy of the country was soundly restored. "For the meantime, we have to put an end to politics...we need not think it is useful to discuss politics."

At this point, the N.R.C. embarked upon two major programs. The first was to unite the Nkrumahites and the Busiaites under its aegis by placing some of them in key positions in its administration and to rehabilitate some of the sincere party followers who had gotten into difficulty not of their making. Thus the N.R.C. had to repeal the N.L.C. decree under which a number of ministers in the Nkrumah regime and C.P.P. activists were disqualified from holding public office for a period of 10 years. One activist in both regimes described this move as "... the
first time, it had been possible to bring fire and petrol together without causing an explosion." Another political sycophant stated:

"We have fought each other many times, slapped ourselves many times and even planned more vicious things against each other many times, and I could not have seen us all sitting together and smiling to one another."

The second venture was a proposal for a union government comprising both military and civilian command structures. The main objective of this union, the soldiers claimed, would be to ensure peace, stability, and unity. They argued further that "Ghana as a nation should be able to evolve a system of Government that would not only ensure peace and harmony for her people but also be emulated by others." Joseph Appiah, a former strong opponent of Nkrumah and now in the administration of the N.R.C., described this union government as "a continuation of the search for the form of Government that would be best suited for Ghana." His argument was that the party form of government was introduced into the country as an adjunct of colonial rule.

In our country from ancient times ours was a government by discussion. We never had opposition parties. We met, however small the town or village, to discuss and throw out ideas and in the end arrived at a consensus. This was our form of Government - a Government by deliberation and consensus.

Unfortunately for the soldiers the civilians rejected this proposal. They viewed the whole situation as a form of
crypto-military regime where ultimately the soldiers would be dominant.

Some of Colonel Acheampong's ideas, which were part of his principles and goals, were embodied in a 19 page statement called The Charter of Redemption. The Charter defined the domestic and foreign policy of the new regime. The basic policy on Africa, stated the N.R.C., would strive vigorously for African liberation and for a union government of Africa. It denounced all forms of imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, and "oppression of man by man." The Charter further stated that Ghana would defend African interests everywhere. "All countries and men opposed to colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism were Ghana's friends." The Charter was founded on some of the basic attitudes, beliefs, and values which the N.R.C. wanted to instill into the populace. It had been described by West Africa weekly magazine as "a document very much in the mainstream of African nationalism depending heavily on words like patriotism, revolution, regeneration, unity and, of course, self-reliance." The N.R.C. had insisted on the policy of self-reliance with the belief that "it is Ghanaians themselves who can and must produce the wealth of the nation." Put another way, "the hands are for working not begging." Thus with the launching of "Operation Feed Yourself," embodied in the policy of self-reliance, Ghana was able to reduce its
imports by some 14%. There was also an increase in export earnings of $113 million cedi and the balance of payments problem showed a downward trend. The last budgetary deficit was wiped out.

With the domestic problems under control, Ghana's focus was shifted to African liberation. For the first time since the overthrow of Nkrumah, Colonel Acheampong lighted the Liberation Flame at Independence Square (formerly Black Star Square) to symbolize the reincarnation of Ghana's leading militant role in African liberation. Ghana had thus returned to the militant approach of the first five years of independence. The first foreign affairs commissioner immediately after the coup expressed succinctly "we were unhappy to see Ghana in such obscurity." To bring back the old spirit of Ghana and to reestablish Ghana's credentials in Africa, the annual African liberation day celebration on the 25th of May was filled with various social and political activities. These included militant anti-colonial speeches and public fundraising for the freedom fighters. At one time there was launching of a book containing some key speeches of Nkrumah. All these activities were expressions of desire by the new regime to continue to give oppressed people in Africa every assistance in their legitimate struggle for freedom and dignity. Some streets in Accra were named after African nationalists, such as Roberto and Sobukwe.
Streets, in honor of Holden Roberto and Mangeliso Sobukwe respectively.

With the enlargement of the O.A.U.'s Liberation Committee from 12 to 17, Ghana was elected to its membership at the O.A.U. Conference of Heads of State at Rabat in 1972. This was the time when the continued existence of the O.A.U. Liberation Committee was in question. For a long time, there had been a misunderstanding and hard feelings about the membership of the Liberation Committee. Many countries not included on the Committee were resentful because of their exclusion from this chosen organization. Ghana was a primary example of this sentiment and protested with its refusal to pay its dues to the O.A.U.'s Liberation Committee. What added to the vigor of the policy of the military regime was the fact that the Liberation Committee of the O.A.U. held its 21st session in Ghana in 1973 from the 8th to the 12th of January. This was the first meeting in Ghana of any agency of the O.A.U. since the fall of Nkrumah in 1966.

In his address to the session, Colonel Acheampong rejected "dialogue" which he said can only lead to "confusion of thought and dissipation of efforts which tended to offer strength and consolidation to the enemy."

He then called upon the African leaders to bury their differences and direct all their energies and thoughts to armed resolution for the liberation of the continent. He
concluded his speech with a warning that "every white man in Africa who subscribed to the outmoded and untenable doctrine of white supremacy was an aggressor." 49

At the end of the five day conference, the O.A.U. Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa issued a 27 point declaration called the Accra Declaration of African Liberation. The Declaration strongly upheld the idea that liberation of the remaining colonial territories in Southern Africa could only be achieved through an armed struggle. The Declaration also endorsed the notion that the freedom fighters should be equipped with more adequate resources.

The holding of the conference in Ghana and especially the naming of the reaffirmation of the policy of armed struggle as the Accra Declaration was a positive indication that Ghana had returned to respectability in the African liberation struggle and was a spiritual home of the African freedom fighters. Consequently Ghana donated to the Liberation Committee $380,000 50 besides its annual contribution. After the conference, a delegation headed by Major Kwame Baah of Ghana was sent on a mission to visit members of the O.A.U. states to offer more assistance to the liberation movement and to resettle their bills of contribution.

On the Rhodesian question, the N.R.C. attitude did not vary substantially from that of the N.L.C. It called on
Britain to use force to break down the Ian Smith regime
adding that Ghana would withdraw from the Commonwealth if
no specific action was taken by Britain. Remarkably, this
threat of withdrawal from the Commonwealth had been
expressed by both military regimes but was never
implemented. A point which needs to be stressed was that
Ghana valued its membership in the Commonwealth as a
multi-racial family of independent nations. No matter
which regime was in power, the Commonwealth was looked upon
as one of the bedrocks of world peace. Even if the
colonial issue did not arise, it was not unusual for there
to be crises from time to time where there were such
powerful nations with different interests involved.
Ultimately, looking objectively at realities, Ghana would
be the loser.

What conclusions can be drawn from this chapter
concerning Ghana's role in Africa after the fall of
Nkrumah? Obviously Ghana's policies in Africa declined
gradually from militancy to pacifism, and then returned
to militancy. The moderate position taken by the N.L.C was
due to the fact that the regime put priority on restoring
the economy and putting the country into order. Busia's
regime depended heavily on the West (imperialists and
neo-colonialists) for the country's economic salvation, so
it took a compromised position with the imperialists. The
second military regime, because of its policy of
self-reliance, and indiscriminate acceptance of aid was able to pursue independent African policy without any outside interference. The sources of its policies in Africa were also based upon the fact that it unified the various opposing factions in the country and thereby captured the best human resources to formulate policies which the people supported. The moderate policies of the N.L.C. did not accomplish much for Ghana in the African liberation movement, likewise the compromising policies of Busia's regime. The only alternative left for Ghana was to return to the militant role under Nkrumah. This move should not be viewed with surprise taking into account that Colonel Acheampong was a former student of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute.

The overthrow of Nkrumah's regime marked the end of the compulsive, radical, and militant leadership role of Ghana in the African liberation movement. In light of strong economic and political pressures at home, the N.L.C. took a moderate stand in this respect, working within the guiding principles of the O.A.U. and its Liberation Committee. The second civilian regime under Busia took a very conservative attitude to support a policy of "Dialogue" with the white minority regime in South Africa on the grounds that the paramilitary guerilla action had accomplished nothing. Furthermore, no African state was prepared to risk a joint military action against South
Africa. As a reaction against this passive role of Ghana in African affairs under Busia's regime, the N.R.C dramatically revised Ghana's policy in Africa. Of necessity, it reverted to the old radical and militant policy of Nkrumah to rebuild Ghana's tarnished image in Africa. In recognition of its contribution and dedication to Africa's liberation from colonial rule, imperialism, and racism, Ghana was elected as a member of the O.A.U. Liberation Committee in 1972. This gesture was an indication that Ghana had returned to respectability in the African liberation struggle.


14. Ibid.
16. Ibid.

18. Ibid.


20. Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest For Unity, p. 118.

21. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 5848.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
Uhuru Na Imoja. This simple Swahilli phrase meaning freedom and unity has two important implications in African political thought. In its parochial sense, it was an appeal to the various tribal and ethnic groups constituting the new nation states created by European colonial rule to maintain the status quo by sticking together. The cry was a response to the phenomenon "retribalization" which started to emerge prior to and after independence. Despite the adverse effect of colonial rule on the natives, colonial domination had at least been able to unify the various tribal groups together in a well defined territory. The withdrawal of colonial rule created a centrifugal force which revitalized various tribal sentiments doomed to destroy the integrity of the new nation states unless something was done about it.

In response to the threatened disintegration, many African leaders desired some form of African unity among their various states. For some time the nature of this unity was a topic of much discussion without any one clear-cut definition of the nature of the unity. There
were some who took African unity to mean political integration of the entire continent, others at regional levels in the form of federation and yet still a third group who favored a loose form of co-operation of the member states holding the view that "we are all Africans and share the same certain things in common." The formation of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963 sealed up what the majority of the African states desired.

In West Africa, the whole idea of unity dated back to the first quarter of the twentieth century with the formation of the National Congress of British West Africa. The ultimate goal of the National Congress was that one day the four British colonies in West Africa would emerge as a federated state. The idea of West African Federation was held up by some of the students who participated in the Fifth Pan-African Congress. Some of those who became members of the West African National Secretariat formed a group called "The Circle" under the chairmanship of Kwame Nkrumah. The aim of this organization was 1) to maintain the circle as a revolutionary vanguard of the struggle for West African unity and national independence and 2) to support the All West African National Congress in its struggle to create and maintain a union of an African socialist republic.

Nkrumah's meeting with the African deputies in the French National Assembly in Paris to hold a West African
National Conference in Lagos in 1948 and his effort to contact other nationalist leaders in their home countries were directed towards this very goal. As he himself had stated in his book, *Africa Must Unite*, it was Nkrumah's intention to use the Gold Coast as a starting-off point for African independence and unity.

Thus one of the aims of his revolutionary Conventions Peoples' Party was "to support the demand for West African Federation."² Nkrumah from his early political career in the Gold Coast wanted to make Ghana the spearhead of African renaissance by bringing into being the original idea conceived by J. E. Casely-Hayford and other founders of the National Congress of British West Africa. Ghana at this time had a better chance of maintaining the leadership role since it was the first Black African country to obtain independence. Consequently, Nkrumah did not hesitate to enter into union with Guinea in 1958 to form the nucleus of the proposed West African Federation. Mali later joined the union in 1961.

With the outbreak of the Congo Crisis, Nkrumah shifted his attention from the West African Federation and began to focus more on the union of the entire African continent. This was due to his dissatisfaction with how the United Nations had handled the Congo Crisis. He argued that if the African countries at that time were united or at least had a joint African high command, an African solution could
have been found to nip the crisis in the bud. He called for the formation of the African Common Market and an African High Command. All these institutions Nkrumah insisted should come under the central political control of a union government of Africa. He strongly opposed all gradual steps towards African unity channelled through economic, social, and cultural co-operation (functional integration). His strong conviction was that "African unity is above all a political kingdom which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa would come only within the political kingdom not the other way around."\(^3\)

Addressing the Parliament of Ghana on the Congo Crisis in July 1960, Dr. Nkrumah stated:

> A loose confederation of economic co-operation is deceptively time delaying...a loose economic co-operation means a screen behind which detractors, imperialist and colonialist, protagonists, and African puppet leaders hide to operate and weaken the concept of any effort to realise African unity and independence.\(^4\)

In his eyes a balkanized Africa was vulnerable to political and economic damnation. A united Africa thus became the primary policy goal of Dr. Nkrumah. A clause in the Ghanaian Republican Constitution of 1960 allowed for the country to surrender part or all of its sovereignty in the interest of African unity. The preeminence of politics in Nkrumah's thinking rested on the assumption that the underdevelopment of Africa was the consequence of politics.
This was true not only during the period preceding independence but also after independence. This thinking was best illustrated by the often quoted injunction inscribed at the base of Nkrumah's statue in Accra. "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto it." This concept was fundamental. The quest for the political kingdom represented not only a normative statement but also symbolized the propensity to view imperial realities as a result of political struggle. This unique approach served as a springboard for explanations and policy alternatives for Ghanaian and African problems. Nkrumah's statement, "everywhere men and women are beginning to search consciously for political means to solve their problems and advance their hopes" confirmed his ideology. Nkrumah had argued forcefully that African industrial and economic advancement was contingent upon the destruction of the artificial boundaries created by the colonial powers.

To the frustration and the disappointment of Kwame Nkrumah, his colleagues of the Casablanca states, some of whom had the same conditional surrender of sovereignty clause in their constitutions, failed to support Ghana's call for political union of the African states at the first O.A.U. Conference at Addis Ababa in 1963. The majority opinion of the conference favored a moderate approach to African unity. A view which was held by the Lagos Charter
maintained that African unity could only be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation. Although Nkrumah failed at his first attempt to win support for his cause, he never gave up the idea but relentlessly submitted it to be placed on the agenda at each subsequent assembly of the O.A.U. heads of states until his ouster in 1966.

This chapter will examine some attempts of political unification initiated by Ghana prior to the formation of the O.A.U. Some of the major questions to be discussed here are: What was the nature and working operation of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union? Why did the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union fail? What was the impact of the failure of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union upon the rest of the African states? Why did not any of the remaining African countries join the union? Why did the thirty-one heads of states who met at Addis Ababa in 1963 reject Ghana's proposal for a federation of the African states and choose instead a loose form of cooperation among the independent African states? Was the rejection of the political union due to differences in the ideological or political philosophies of the leaders or was it due to cultural differences inherited from the colonial rule?

Past Attempts At Unification

The new concept of African unity was not embodied in the original Pan-African idea of Marcus Garvey and W.E.B.
DuBois. After World War II, the new concept of African unity became a dominant theme in Pan-African thought. The new concept was that "we are all Africans" and share a common problem - a problem of colonial domination and economic exploitation. Consequently, the new nationalists found a common platform to unite forces in order to liberate the continent from colonial domination. The Conference of Independent African States held in Accra in April 1958 was directed toward this goal. At this time the concept of African unity loomed large in the minds of these nationalists and leaders. The break came with the pronouncement of the Ghana-Guinea Union prior to the All African Peoples Conference in Accra in December of the same year. It should be noted that it was at the All African Peoples Conference that the new concepts of the Pan-African movement were formulated. Even then nothing specifically was said about a continental union government or a loose form of cooperation. What was stressed were regional groupings among the African States. To Nkrumah however, there was a single goal - a continental union government of Africa. He had once remarked

There are those who maintain that Africa can not unite because we lack the three necessary ingredients for unity: a common race, culture, and language. Yet in spite of this, I am convinced that the forces making for unity far outweigh those which divide us. In meeting fellow Africans from all parts of the continent I am constantly impressed by how much we have in common. It is not just our colonial past or the fact that we have aims in common. It is
something which goes far deeper. I can best describe it as a sense of oneness and that we are Africans. In practical terms, this deep rooted unity has shown itself in the development of Pan-Africanism and more recently in the projection of what has been called The African Personality in world affairs.  

The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union

To everyone's surprise, on the 23rd of November 1958, Prime Ministers Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Touré of Guinea came out with the following declaration:

Inspired by the example of the thirteen American colonies, the tendencies of the countries of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to organize a rational manner and the declaration at the Accra Conference, we the Prime Ministers of Ghana and Guinea, on behalf of our respective governments and subject to the ratification of our respective national assemblies, have agreed to constitute our two states as the nucleus of a Union of West African States.

Nkrumah and Touré agreed that the first step in implementing this decision would be to adopt a union flag and to harmonize defense, foreign and economic policies and develop closer contact between the two states. Subsequently a constitution would be drawn up to this effect. The two Prime Ministers stated that this declaration was not designed in any way to prejudice the present and future relationship of Ghana and the British Commonwealth or Guinea and the French Community. They then appealed to the governments of the independent African states and leaders of territories in Africa still under foreign rule, to "support us in our action adding," in the
same spirit we would welcome adherence to this union of other West African States." An agreement was also reached to exchange resident ministers who would be regarded as cabinet members to the countries to which they were accredited.

On April 23, 1959, Nkrumah returned Touré's visit to learn more about the country with which he had now become politically integrated by the proposed union. While in Conakry, Touré and Nkrumah issued a lengthy declaration and announced the charter of the union. Under the proposed union, each member would keep control of its own armed forces and diplomatic affairs but the heads of member states would determine common policy on matters of defense. There would be a union Economic Council with equal representation of member countries and a union bank to issue and back the respective currency of member states. Ghana, however, would remain in the British Commonwealth. Nkrumah and Touré agreed that trade relationships should be promoted and practical facilities should be made available immediately in the two countries. Direct air and sea communications, including direct postal services and direct radio and telegraphic services, would be established. The communique included an exchange of teachers, technicians, youth visits, and radio programs common to all.
The question is whether the content of the charter implied a political union, or a functional integration. Political integration means

a processes whereby nations forego desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other seeking instead joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs.¹⁰

In another form, it is "the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center."¹¹ On the other hand, "Functionalism is based upon the hypothesis that national loyalties can be diffused and redirected in a framework for international cooperation in place of national competition and war."¹²

In light of the different theories of integration, what was the nature of the union? From the time of the November 23rd joint declaration by Sekou Touré and Kwame Nkrumah up to May 1, 1959, when a communique was issued on the charter of the Ghana-Guinea Union, several different interpretations of the union had been given by the Guinea leaders. In an interview with the press a few days after the Conakry communique, Sekou Touré emphasized that "the union does not mean fusion or merger"¹³ and of the Union of Independent African States "conceived first as a close association or alliance."¹⁴ Indeed Sekou Touré had repeatedly compared Guinea's relationship to the Anglo-American alliance.
As a matter of fact, one of his high ranking cabinet members had made previous statements to that effect. Diallo Telli, at a press conference both in London and in New York immediately after the Accra declaration, repeatedly denied the intention to federate Guinea and Ghana and likened the Accra agreement to no more than "a close alliance which might perhaps lead to a confederation of independent sovereign states?" 15

Diallo Telli also stated in London that "one does not leave a monetary zone as one leaves a house." 16 Guinea was a part of the French monetary zone - an area where the same currency unit is used and backed by the mother country, i.e. the paid sterling for the British colonies and the franc for the French colonies. Consequently, an agreement reached by a Guinea delegation in Paris indicated that Guinea would likely remain in the French zone thus making a close tie with Ghana impossible. To most statesmen in the French West African zone, it was believed that the surrender of the sovereignty clause in Guinea's constitution was drawn up particularly with an eye on the federation of French West Africa, which had been Sekou Touré's and most of the French West African leaders' aim for so long. This did not mean that Guinea's voting no to the Loi Cadre as a member of the French Community excluded it from the French West African Community. Apparently in light of these statements there existed a different
interpretation of the Ghana-Guinea declaration by Ghana and by Guinea. One had only to count the days to the failure of the Ghana-Guinea Union unless a common platform was reached.

What then were the forces that contributed to this original commitment of the Ghana-Guinea Union? There were three important forces which came into play: 1) Ideologically, the two leaders shared the same radical Pan-African background and ideas. 2) Economically, Guinea wanted money badly and Ghana had it to give. 3) Politically, both countries were the first former colonies, one of Britain and the other of France, to gain independence.

In addition, Touré was in competition with some of the leading political actors like Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Senghor in the Francophone countries in West Africa. The dominant party, the R.D.A. in these countries had also expelled Touré's branch. Consequently, there was a power struggle for leadership between these French African statesmen in the Francophone zone. Nkrumah's motives were obvious to most of the African leaders. He wanted the union badly for both economic and political reasons and and he also had a personal ambition to be its first President. The whole deal with Guinea thus seemed to be a bargain.

One should bear in mind that political systems gain and attain cohesiveness because of widely shared values
among the members and general agreement about the framework of the system. These two propositions are in turn based upon the general agreement and the solutions to the problems the political system is called upon to solve.

The pronouncement by the two premiers took everybody both at home and abroad by surprise. In Accra, Dr. Busia, Prime Minister of the second civilian government, didn't hesitate to express his disapproval. He stated categorically that if the United Party came to power, "it would disregard the Ghana-Guinea declaration for the simple reason that it would be likely to hamper rather than promote co-operation."

Some of the leading politicians in West Africa, especially in Nigeria, expressed similar resentment of the declaration. Neither the Nigerian Federal Prime Minister Alhaji Abubaka Balewa nor Prime Minister Obafeemi Awolowo of the western region of Nigeria regarded the suggestion of West African federation or union as having any immediate practical importance. A few days earlier, before Sekou Touré's party arrived in Ghana, his delegation had visited Liberia during which President Tubman was reported to have stated in his annual message to the Liberian National Assembly that

there are some African states however that seem to favor and argue for federation of Africa; others for United States of Africa and still others who advocate for the United States of West Africa. But we advocate for that type of West African unity and solidarity and particularly
based upon treaties and conventions of friendship, amity, navigation, trade and other alliances on the bases of mutual respect and equal consideration for all.\textsuperscript{19}

The declaration was also reportedly taken by the French and the British governments as a surprise. A spokesman from the British Commonwealth Relations Office termed it as "fast work." The conservative \textit{London Times} in an editorial charged Ghana of doing "ill service to the society of the Commonwealth by signing it so precipitantly."\textsuperscript{20} The reason for such precipitous action was the fact that Guinea needed money desperately and Ghana needed the union to embark on its crusade of unity.

In spite of all these controversies both at home and abroad, Kwame Nkrumah persistently defended the proposed union to the Ghana National Assembly with a deep sense of pride. He stated:

\begin{quote}
This New Africa of ours is emerging into a world of great combination a world where the strong and the weak are pushed aside unless they unite their forces. Our African edifice though we still have to draw the plan for it must have solid foundation.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

Ghana's Prime Minister went on further to explain that the union "was the first check to the process of disintegration in West Africa which has been going on for years."\textsuperscript{22} In the same speech, Nkrumah outlined his conception of the union between the two countries and said that they could work towards a constitutional framework which would make it possible for them to be united in the matters of common
interest; however, domestic matters would be separated. He cited the American constitution and spoke of federation. He also called the attention of the members of the National Assembly to the surrender clause in Guinea's constitution.

However much explanation Kwame Nkrumah could give to the joint declaration, there remained a great deal of ambiguity in his interpretation. It was evident from the negative reaction at home and abroad that a strong centrifugal force had been generated among some of the African leaders which was bound to challenge Ghana's leadership role in West Africa and the approach to African unity in the ensuing years. A close examination of the contents of this charter did not in any way indicate any substantial political union or economic integration. The best way one can describe this type of relationship would be a loose form of cooperation.

Nonetheless, to Nkrumah, a political union was evident. The first step towards African political union had been taken by Ghana and Guinea. It is important, though, to note that this association was unique in that it was a first move made by two former European colonies, one French and the other English, to close the divisions forced upon them by different colonial rulers. As such, it might have served as an example for other dependent countries in Africa to follow upon the attainment of independence.
Subsequent to the outbreak of the Congo Crisis, Kwame Nkrumah, Modibo Keita of Mali, and Sekou Touré of Guinea met at Conakry for talks on unity. Following this summit conference, a special committee met in Accra from the 12th to the 18th of January 1961 to formulate proposals for a Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. A further series of meetings took place between the three heads of states in Accra where they agreed upon a charter for the union which might be ratified by their respective parliaments. This union, supposedly to form the nucleus of the United States of Africa, was called The Union of African States and allowed for other African states to join the union.

The charter provided for a quarterly conference between the three heads of states of the union with the host country presiding. These conferences were followed by meetings of official representatives from the different countries to discuss methods of implementation of the decisions reached by the triumvirate. Articles 3 and 4, which contained the aims and activities of the union, did not depart significantly from previous declarations of Ghana and Guinea. A section of the article went on to state that "to harmonize domestic and foreign policy of its members so that their activities may prove one effective and could contribute more worthily to safeguard in the peace of the world." Article 4 also called for the organization of a system of joint defense, which would make
it possible to mobilize all the means of defense at the
disposal of the states in favor of any state of the union
which may become the victim of aggression. It could be
argued that these clauses were added to the charter because
of the Congo Crisis which the three leaders and indeed most
African leaders perceived to be a product of Belgian
aggression and neo-colonialist activities. As a matter of
fact, most of the provisions called for in Article 4 did
eexist at one time in British West Africa, i. e. the West
African Airways Corporation, the West African Frontier
Force and the West African Cocoa Research Institute. These
common directives relating to economic planning, functional
structures which had been inherited from the colonial
powers, were dismantled either out of the sheer
narrow-mindedness of Ghana's leaders out of a lack of fore­
sight. Instead these structures or institutions could have
been rehabilitated to meet the post-independence demands
thereby serving as a strong base for functional integration
in West Africa. Now that the aspirations of the leaders of
the emerging independent African states were for African
unity, much energy, resources, and time had to be invested
in trying to put these functional structures together
again. However, this was not achieved, because of
individual national pride and identity.

When the news of this union was received in Nigeria,
T. O. Benson, its federal minister of communication
commented: "The latest acts of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali are an open attempt to present us as disunited."\textsuperscript{25} The West African Pilot of Eastern Nigeria also wrote

in pursuance of cold war tactics in Africa, a struggle for leadership has already developed. Until recently, it was a tournament between Nasser and Nkrumah. Africa today contains many stars and meteorites all striving to seek a position of eminence.\textsuperscript{26}

It is easy to pass popular resolutions if there is no way to implement them, however, it is not easy to draw up a detailed program when there is every intention of carrying it out.

The charter of the union made few demands as each state was expected to

preserve its own individuality and structure again. The member states or federation will decide in common what portion of sovereignty should be surrendered to the union in the full interest of the African community.\textsuperscript{27}

Clearly, no great significant surrender of sovereignty was envisaged nor was any given up thereafter. This ruled out any political union.

Equally, there was no common institution or bureaucratic machinery set up to implement decisions arrived at by either the quarterly meetings of the three heads of states simultaneously in the respective countries. This ruled out any functional integration. According to the original agreement, each resident minister was to be a member of the cabinet of the host country to which he was accredited. However, most of Guinea's decisions were made
by the central committee\textsuperscript{28} of the Parti Democratique de Guinee, Guinea's ruling party, of which the Ghanaian resident minister was not a member. The exchange of privileges therefore could not be put on a reciprocal basis in the view of the Ghanaian secretariat. Guinea's resident minister in Ghana did not receive in advance the papers pertaining to the agenda to be discussed at Ghana's cabinet meeting. He was also obligated to surrender his papers when leaving these meetings. One should bear in mind, though, that adding to the shortcomings of the union originating from the charter there were other intrinsic factors such as the egocentrism exemplified in the style of leadership of these presidents and societal factors. President Sekou Touré had emerged as a potential leader of all French West Africa and therefore was a likely rival of Nkrumah rather than a docile junior partner. He would not subordinate himself and Guinea any further than necessary.

Other economic and societal factors within the two states made the consummation of the union unfeasible. The projected union presented a number of obstacles. First, the territories were not geographically adjacent. Second, the language of Ghana was English, while the language of Guinea was French. Third, Ghana was in a strong financial position, whereas Guinea had a persistent annual deficit which had been offset by French subsidies. Fourth, Ghana was a member of the British Commonwealth while Guinea
wished to maintain its relationship with the French community and to stay in the French zone. Fifth, in the economic sphere these countries were competing rather than supporting each other. For example, each country was relying on the development of bauxite and hydro resources (electricity and irrigation) for its economic progress. Sixth, there were social discrepancies between the two, for Ghana was far more advanced in the standards of education and in social and political advancement.

All these points supported the theory that the Ghana-Guinea Union was an alliance rather than a system of political or functional integration. George F. Liska and William R. Riker in their work on coalitions have stated that alliances or coalitions tend to be disbanded once they have achieved their objective because they were formed essentially "against, and only derivatively for, someone or something." Although a "sense of community" may have reinforced alliances or coalitions, it seldom brought them into existence. In forming alliances to achieve some desired objective, decision makers weigh a cost and reward of the alignment. The decision to join an alliance was based upon the perception of reward in excess of cost. To no one's surprise, after many twists and turns on a bumpy road, Sekou Touré unilaterally declared the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union null and void in 1963.
The Sanniquellie Conference

In July 1959, Presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, William Tubman of Liberia, and Sekou Touré of Guinea met at Sanniquellie in Liberia to discuss the whole question of African emancipation and unity as well as to work out practical solutions to these problems. Much talk had been going on for a while about these issues among many African leaders, particularly in West Africa since the two Accra conferences in 1958. With the declaration of the Ghana-Guinea Union, however, the question of African unity had become increasingly controversial. Mallam Thomas Sulley of the Nigerian federal government remarked that rapid advance towards African unity seemed impossible and urged that those African leaders who were hastily agitating for it must be realistic. Continuing, he stated: "Though Pan-Africanism was 'the only solution to our problems in Africa,' a Union of African States was 'premature. Nigeria proposes no more than an Organization of African States.'" It could be said with some certainty that the issue of unity was the dominant factor which motivated Tubman to call this conference.

At the end of the conference, the declaration of principles stated that the name of the organization of these three heads of state would be "The Community of Independent African States." Members of this community would retain their own national identity and constitutional
structure and each member of the community would agree not to interfere in the internal affairs of any other member. The overall general policy of the community would be to build up a

free and prosperous African community for the benefit of its people and the peoples of the world. Such policy would be founded on the maintenance of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations on the basis of equality and reciprocity with all the states of the world that would adopt positions compatible with African interest and dignity.33

The policy involved setting up a scientific, economic, cultural and research council. African culture, which was one of the essential elements for the struggle against colonialism, was referred to in the communique as an imperative national duty and the three leaders agreed to rehabilitate and to accommodate current political and economic trends in Africa. The adopted motto was "Independence and Unity."34 The community would also have a flag and an anthem. Membership of the community was declared open to all independent African states and federations. The three leaders expressed their views and made resolutions on specific topics in Africa and world affairs. The resolution called for free elections in the French Cameroons under the supervision of the United Nations. The French Cameroons was due to achieve independence in January 1960. They also supported the inclusion of the Algerian question on the agenda in the United Nations General Assembly and as at all African
gatherings condemned "Apartheid." On South West Africa, the communique remarked that "it was a Trust Territory which the United Nations could not relinquish its responsibilities to South Africa."\(^{35}\) The final communique issued at the Sanniquellie Conference did not differ in any respect from the resolutions passed at the two Accra Conferences except for the use of the phraseology "Community of Independent African States" instead of "Union of African States" which had been used earlier.

In the Sanniquellie Conference, Nkrumah and Touré were obliged to accept a new Pan-African political network. It sensitized them to other views held by some leaders on the concept of African unity. The Ghanaian Times bluntly put it this way: "The general aspect of the Ghana-Guinea declaration is now merged with the new idea of a Community of Independent African States."\(^{36}\)

At the initial stages of independence, the idea of community seemed to be more attractive than merger for the simple reason that the newly independent countries would like to breathe a little of their hard won freedom. Cunning as he was, Nkrumah sensed this and was not prepared to upset any conference to that effect. Hence his agreement to postpone the conference of heads of independent African states in Liberia at the last moment was a clear manifestation of his opposition to any other form of union aside from a political one.
Two schools of thought on the concept of African unity seemed to be emerging. One school, of which the ideal of a Ghana-Guinea Union served as an example, was the union of the entire continent of Africa under a single government. The other approach would involve a loose association or a community of African States. Which of these would dominate the African political scene in the future was a question to be answered as more and more territories in Africa gained their independence. The three leaders who met at Sanniquellie agreed to call a conference in 1960 of all the independent states to work for the creation of a community of African states rather than a single African government. This endeavor if successfully carried out would eventually lead to some form of unity for the continent.

Unification With The Congo

To promote his goal of continental unity, Nkrumah even took advantage of the Congo Crisis. He justified Ghana's heavy involvement with an unpublished Ghana-Congo agreement, which was signed between Patrice Lumumba and Kwame Nkrumah on the 8th of August 1960. This provided for the union of Ghana and the Congo on the pattern of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. For the first time in all the unions proposed by Ghana with other African states, this union called for a federal parliament and a federal head of state. The capital of the proposed union would be
Leopoldville. Whether this agreement was arrived at in consultation with Guinea and Mali can not be ascertained. However, since the unpublished document was signed only by Nkrumah and Lumumba, it implied that the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was in disarray.

Prelude to Addis Ababa

The impact of the Congo Crisis on African political thought was indeed profound. It put the "evangelical" preaching of African unity to a simple test and found the African leaders completely divided on the concept of unity. By the middle of 1961, contemporaneously with the outbreak of the Congo Crisis, three distinct political blocs had emerged in Africa. These were the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group, and the Brazzaville Twelve.

The name Casablanca Group of which Ghana was a member was used to describe the participants at the Conference in Casablanca which met from the 3rd to the 7th of January 1961. Delegations from Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Egypt were led by their respective heads of state and Ceylon's ambassador in Cairo was in attendance as an observer. The central theme of the discussion was the failure of the O.N.U.C. to deal effectively with the Congo Crisis. Eight other countries from Africa and Asia were invited but did not attend.

The Brazzaville Twelve included the French community states which gathered at Brazzaville in December 1960 under
the name Organization Commune Africaine et Malagache (O.C.A.M.) They were a subset of the Monrovia Group which consisted of all the independent African states with the exception of the Casablanca Group. Whereas the Brazzaville and Monrovian groups supported Kasavubu's consolidation of power in the Congo, the Casablanca delegates saw the assassination of Lumumba as an act of imperialism or at least a "manifestation of neo-colonialism." By taking such a position, the Brazzaville and Monrovian groups were accused of dancing to the tune of their former colonial masters.

Among the members of the Casablanca Group, a common platform existed on economic, cultural, and educational affairs as well as an agreement for the establishment of an African high command. The desire for unity was adopted without any formal decisions on political versus functional cooperation. These members of the Casablanca Group called for the withdrawal of African troops serving under France in Algeria and approved the enlistment of volunteers, an army for national liberation. Another decision involved boycotting South African goods. This decision had been and would continue to be problematic for some countries to fully implement because of their geo-economic condition which bound them to South Africa.

The Casablanca Conference ended with the publication of the African Charter of Casablanca. The charter, among
other things, called for the establishment of a permanent African consultative Assembly and three permanent functional committees. It ended by appealing to all African states to associate themselves with "our common action for the consolidation of liberty in Africa and for building up on its unity and security."  

The six original sponsors of the Monrovia Conference were Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Liberia, Cameroons, and Togo. However, Guinea and Mali later joined Ghana and the other members of the Casablanca Group to suggest a postponement and subsequently they boycotted the Monrovia Conference. The reason given by the three heads of states (Ghana, Guinea, and Mali) for postponing the conference was that the on-going Congo Crisis would allow only a few heads of state to attend. This excuse, however, was unfounded since 23 out of 26 countries had already agreed to attend the conference. In any case, Nigeria and Liberia insisted that the conference should go ahead as planned.

It was later thought among certain African political circles that Ghana's rejection to the Monrovia Conference was based on Nkrumah's feeling that the conference would only be an extension of the Sanniquellie Conference, which strayed from his concept of African unity. Nevertheless, Dr. Nkrumah and President Adbul Nasser of Egypt sent separate messages welcoming the idea of an All African Summit, but stated that the Casablanca Group Conference
held in January had discussed all the issues which the Monrovia Conference was due to examine and suggested a preliminary foreign ministers meeting to prepare a summit at a later date. Reactions to the communique in Accra were spontaneous. The Liberian Age described the communique as "a masterpiece of diplomatic double talk." The paper went on to state that the Casablanca Group wanted to postpone the summit to prepare themselves so that when necessary they could impose their own views on the African continent.38

There were several reasons for these divisions among the African states. One was the disagreement of the radical Casablanca states with the United Nations policy in the Congo, a policy which was upheld by the Monrovia group of states as well as the Brazzaville Twelve. A second was the support the Casablanca states gave to the Algerian independence struggles and the recognition of the Algerian provincial government which was accorded full membership to the Casablanca states. This position was strongly opposed by the Brazzaville Twelve who, because of their close link with France, regarded the Algerian conflict as a problem to be solved by France alone. Third, the relationship between Casablanca, Monrovia, and the Brazzaville states was further strained by the support the Casablanca states gave to Morocco for challenging the legitimacy of the independent state of Mauritania, a member of the Monrovia
group. When France granted independence to Mauritania on the 28th of December 1960, Morocco strongly protested, claiming that historically, Mauritania was a Moroccan territory. Fourth, the Brazzaville and the Monrovia groups maintained that African unity should be approached through economic cooperation while the Casablanca states preferred political unification.

Despite these basic differences in political thought, there was similarity in the fundamental aims of the three groups, particularly in the areas of decolonization, "Apartheid", the maintenance of world peace, and the urgent need for economic cooperation between the African states. The differences did not preclude continuing cooperation through diplomatic channels and reciprocal visits of heads of state from each group. For example, the Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubaka Tafawa Balewa visited Guinea in December 1961. Around the same time, the President of Mauritania visited Ghana as did President Abdula Osmanau of Somalia, who expressed a strong desire for African unity. Agreements reached during these visits became executive orders and were readily adopted by the governments.

There continued to be a burning desire on the part of the leaders of the independent African states to find a way to bring about the unity of the African continent. Led primarily by Sekou Touré of Guinea, a member of the Casablanca Group, and Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia,
a member of the Monrovia Group, the two leaders met in Asmara, Ethiopia, in June 1962 and decided to hold a summit conference of independent African heads of state. The conference was scheduled for May 23, 1963, but was preceded by a meeting of foreign ministers to prepare the agenda for the main event and to draw up a single African charter which would replace all the existing charters of Casablanca, Monrovia, and the union of Africa and Malagasy Groups.

It was hoped that the charter would be able to lay down broad principles to which all the African states could subscribe but in drawing up the charter three distinct major views developed. The first was a loose association of African states similar to the Organization of American States (O.A.S.), which was advocated by Liberia and other states such as Libya and Sudan. The second view, which was held by Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the East African countries as well as the countries of the Monrovia Group, claimed that due to the immense size of the continent and the poor state of its international communication system, there was a need to increase economic cooperation and to follow a step-by-step approach towards that end. Such regional organizations as North African groupings, West African groupings, East African groupings, and Central African groupings had been envisioned in resolutions passed at the All African Peoples' Conference in Accra in December 1958.
In this respect, regional groupings would be feasible where appreciable communications systems existed or could readily be established. This would be the first step toward continental economic cooperation. The third view, proposed by Ghana, was an organic unity of the entire continent in the form of political union. Since no agreement was reached on this issue, the foreign ministers deferred this question of the charter to the summit conference of the heads of states at Addis Ababa on the May 23, 1963. Since this was a very delicate issue, no foreign minister would like to deviate from the path his country had taken.

The Formation of The O.A.U.

Nkrumah At Addis Ababa

Nkrumah's preparation for the Addis Ababa conference was intensive. Prior to the conference, Nkrumah had sent a two-man delegation, consisting of Foreign Minister Kodzo Botsio and Professor Nana Kwabena Nketsia, the head of the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana, to the Central African Republic requesting that the government make its capital available for use as the seat of the proposed union government of Africa. The Ghana high commissioner in London, Kwesi Armah, was also allocated funds to organize student bodies of French and English speaking African countries in Europe behind Ghana's idea of an African continental union government. Like the various nationalist student organizations in Britain after World
War II, of which Nkrumah himself was an active participant and a leading figure, these organizations of intellectuals would put pressure on their respective governments to endorse Ghana's stand. Nkrumah himself went to Addis Ababa with approximately 100 delegates, consisting of ministers, politicians, diplomats, as well as military and security personnel. Ghana by all measures had the largest delegation, some of whom were sent several days before the conference opened to lobby for Ghana's cause. On the eve of the conference, the publicity secretariat made arrangements for Kodzo Botsio to launch Nkrumah's book, *Africa Must Unite*.

On his arrival at Addis Ababa on the 20th of May, Nkrumah told reporters that "our objective is African union now. There is no time to waste. We must unite now or perish." Presenting Ghana's proposal to the conference of head of state on May 24, 1963, Nkrumah cited the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union as examples to be emulated by the African states and as models for the African union government. He also referred to the political situation in South America stating

We have already reached the stage where we must unite or sink into that condition which made Latin America the unwilling and distressed prey of imperialism after one-and-a-half centuries of political independence....It is true that we are now throwing off the yoke of colonialism as fast as we can but our success in this direction is equally matched by the intense effort on the part
of imperialism to continue the exploitation of our resources by creating divisions among us.  

Nkrumah's proposal called for a committee of foreign ministers to work out a constitution for the union which would be ratified by a presidium of heads of governments and states. All these suggestions proposed a constitution similar to that of the United States of America. Nkrumah wanted to mold the African continent in the form of a vast United States of Africa ruled by a bicameral Congress and a strong presidency. Nkrumah likened the Addis Ababa meeting to the 1787 Constitutional Congress in Philadelphia whose delegates he said thought of themselves not as Virginians or Pennsylvanians but simply as Americans...we meet here today not as Ghanaians, Guineans, Egyptians, Algerians, Moroccans, Malians, Liberians, Congolese or Nigerians but as Africans.

The proposal also called for commissions to be set up to deal with 1) common economic and industrial programs, i.e. a common market, a common currency, an African monetary zone, an African central bank, and a continental communications system, 2) a common foreign policy and diplomacy, and 3) a common African citizenship and a defense system. Nkrumah stated

I am convinced that under such a proposal frontier disputes, economic difficulties, political disagreements among African states and neo-colonialism still hanging like the sword of Damocles over the independent African states can all be resolved within the framework of a union government of the African states."
He then called upon the leaders of the independent African states to agree to the establishment of the union of African states. He ended his plea passionately with this statement:

Let us return to our people of Africa not with empty hands and high-sounding resolutions but with the firm hope and assurance that at long last African unity has become a reality. We shall thus begin the triumphant march to the Kingdom of African Personality, and to the continent of prosperity and progress and of equality and justice and of work and happiness. This shall be our victory...Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands onto God. Africa must unite.\textsuperscript{43}

Despite this passionate plea by Nkrumah, Ghana's proposal for a continental union government was rejected by the majority of heads of state. The chief opponent of this proposal was Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria, who made it clear that

Nigeria's stand is that, if we want unity in Africa, we must first agree to certain essential things. The first is that African States must respect one another. There must be acceptance of equality by all the States. No matter whether they are big or small, they are all sovereign and their sovereignty is sovereignty.\textsuperscript{44}

Second, Balewa maintained that African unity could only be attained by taking practical steps toward economic, educational, and cultural cooperation, and thirdly, by getting "the Africans to understand themselves before embarking on more complicated and more difficult arrangement of political union."\textsuperscript{45} Fourth, Balewa concluded that African unity could not be achieved so long as African
countries continued to carry on subversive activities in other African countries.

At this time, Ghana and its few supporters were unwilling to give into a charter on African unity based upon functional integration and a step-by-step approach. Had it not been for the prompt intervention of Ben Bella of Algeria who turned the discussion from African unity to African liberation, Nkrumah would not have signed the charter. In the course of the debate, Ben Bella remarked that "the charter would be no value to us and speeches would be used against us if we did not first create a blood bank for those fighting for independence."46 This statement, endorsed by other leaders, was used to interpret the charter as an instrument for the liberation of Africa. Any leader who refused to sign this charter was automatically regarded as a traitor by the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments to the African liberation movement. Ultimately it was an Ethiopian drafted charter, which in many respects resembled the Lagos Charter of the Monrovia Group, which was accepted for discussion. The accepted charter of the O.A.U. indicated clearly that the majority of the African heads of state at the summit conference preferred a flexible form of cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural spheres to political integration of the entire continent.
After four days of deliberation, the delegates solemnly and unanimously adopted a draft charter for a loose "Organization of African Unity" to go into effect when ratified by two-thirds of the African nations. The scheme called for the gathering of heads of state every year, a permanent council of ministers with no real powers and a permanent secretariat. Pending ratification, a provisional secretariat would be set up in Addis Ababa. Under the plan, committees would be formed to mediate intra-African disputes, promote economic and social progress, and mount a joint defense which would be a common front against Africa's remaining vestige of colonialism and white supremacy.

Nkrumah's efforts were not altogether in vain. Article 2 Paragraph 2 of the charter could be traced back to the first conference of the independent African states in Accra in April 1958. "Independent African states should give all possible assistance to the dependent people in their struggle for selfdetermination and independence." Nkrumah's call for the formation of an African high command led to the establishment of a commission to study the feasibility of such an institution. The proposal also led to the establishment of a Council of Ministers with no legislative powers. They meet twice a year to consider proposals and to prepare agenda for the O.A.U. Summit.
Two important questions need to be examined. Why was Nkrumah so preoccupied with an outright establishment of an organic unity of the entire continent only, and why was he opposed to all forms of regional organization? The answers can be derived from his present and past proposals to African leaders. First, Nkrumah's view was that Africa united on the continental basis would increase the industrial and economic power of the African continent as a whole which had suffered a great setback under colonial rule.

Experts have estimated that the Congo Basin alone can produce enough food crop to satisfy the requirements of nearly half the population of the whole world and here we sit talking about regionalism, talking about gradualism, talking about step-by-step.48

Second, African unity may make the artificial boundaries, regional demarcations, and other differences (language, culture, religion, etc.) acquired from colonial rule obsolete.

In the united Africa, there would be no frontier claims between Ethiopia and Somalia, between Zanzibar and Kenya, between Guinea and Liberia, or between Ghana, Togoland, and the Ivory Coast because we will regard ourselves one great continental family of nations.49

Nkrumah was very much concerned not only about territorial balkanization but also regional balkanization of Africa. Third, a united Africa would allow the independent African countries to present a unified front to problems of Africa at international conferences of world powers.
Nkrumah was so committed to these ideas that he would not compromise. In spite of all the problems involved in the immediate surrender of sovereignty, what Nkrumah wanted was a continental "Union integrated by socialism without which our hard won independence may yet be perverted and negated by the neocolonialism." Nkrumah's thinking, which had a legitimate political, social, and cultural background, was that any delay in the formation of the union government would be dangerous since the delay would allow the existing national arrangements in Africa established by the imperialists to crystallize. It would also lead to an indigenous vested interest around the status quo. Once such interests, supported by imperialism and neocolonialism, became entrenched, the fight for African unity would become much more difficult and even violent. This had been demonstrated in many African countries, for example, Ghana, Nigeria, and the Congo by tribal resurgence (retribalization) immediately after the withdrawal of colonial rule.

The other side of the coin was that the majority of the African leaders felt that any talk of an African union government was premature and unrealistic. Some of the reasons had already been given by Tafawa Balewa in his speech at the first O.A.U. Conference. Other impediments to African unity included the diversity and size of the African continent, the personal ambitions of the various
African leaders, idolized by their followers, who did not want them to be obscured in a union continental government, and the unwillingness of the African states to relinquish their seats in the United Nations and other international bodies or to surrender their sovereignty to a continental union government.

So convinced was Nkrumah that he would be able to sell his idea to his colleagues in the struggle for African unity that he raised the question of union government at the second O.A.U. Conference in Cairo in 1964. Once again his proposal was rejected. In his frustration, he charged, that to say that the union government was premature and unrealistic was "to sacrifice Africa on the altar of neo-colonialism."\(^5\)

The summit conference of the heads of states and governments had become institutionalized. The first two conferences had been held in two of the older states on the continent, namely, Ethiopia and Egypt. Recognizing that the organization had no permanent headquarters, Nkrumah, immediately after the 1964 summit conference, offered Ghana as the host country for the third summit to be held in 1965. This was not the first time a conference of this nature had taken place in Ghana. Since 1957, Nkrumah had made use of conferences in the promotion of the African image. In all these conferences, he set the target of drawing the African states close to his ideas of unity.
But the 1965 O.A.U. conference was completely different from the previous ones. The number of independent African states since 1958 had increased to 35, compared to the eight which had met originally in Accra. Nkrumah wanted to do all in his power to win support for his ideas and to take concrete steps to make sure that Ghana's leadership role in African liberation and unity was not overshadowed by the formation of the O.A.U. "The arrangement of the O.A.U. Conference in Accra touched the high water mark in the administration of international conferences in Ghana." Although Ghana had facilities for housing the O.A.U. Conference, the state house, which was similar to the United States White House, was torn down and in its place a new state house was built next to a conference hall and a banquet hall to accommodate the heads of state. In less than ten months, the new statehouse nicknamed "Job 600," was completed and lavishly furnished for the conference. All government construction which had nothing to do with the conference was halted to divert all manpower and resources towards the completion of the buildings. Apart from concrete, water, timber, and labor, practically every component had to be ordered and flown into the country.

Nkrumah planned to offer the buildings after the conference to the O.A.U. Secretariat as its permanent residence, thereby making Accra the headquarters of the
organization. But the ambitious venture of Nkrumah was undercut by Emperor Haile Selassie before Nkrumah could make his offer in a grand style at the conference. A few days before the conference, news came that Haile Selassie had provided a building (African house) at Addis Ababa for the permanent home of the Secretariat. Michael Dei-Anang, the permanent secretary to the Ghanaian Cabinet and one of the chief administrators of the conference, stated that

there is sufficient evidence for the view that in Nkrumah's thinking the complex of buildings could provide accommodation for the headquarters of the 'union government of Africa,' if Ghana could maintain initiative on this.53

As far back as 1962, Nkrumah had been accused of attempting to make Accra the capital of Africa.

In terms of concrete achievements, the O.A.U. Conference in Accra was disappointing to Nkrumah and his followers for the simple reason that it failed to satisfy their grandiose ambitions. There were several reasons for the failure. First, his proposal for a full-time Executive Council of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments was rejected because most of the heads of state found this proposed Council would duplicate, and thus undermine, the work of the Council of Ministers and the administrative secretariat, thereby approaching the union government through the back door. Second, for the first time, in the two year history of the O.A.U., nine of Ghana's French West African neighbors boycotted the meeting on the grounds that
Ghana was engaged in subversive activities against them and harboring saboteurs within its borders. Obviously, any talk on African Unity was meaningless with approximately 25% of the membership absent. The conference, too, ended its deliberation with a strongly worded resolution against subversion by African states against one another. This was for all intents and purposes directed against Ghana because of the accusation of the absentees. Third, Nkrumah's attempt to make Accra the headquarters of the O.A.U. Secretariat had been foiled. Haile Selassie's Addis Ababa had become the permanent home of the secretariat. Undoubtedly, Nkrumah realized that his influence over the secretariat was limited.

Nkrumah's dedication towards African unity was so intense and his haste for it was so furious that on several occasions it made him overlook some of the objective realities of the problems which a continental union government would face. His hasty and unrealistic attitude led the Time magazine to write

Osagyeafo would be peddling his pet scheme for a bicamera all Africa parliament and other similar quickie approaches to a unified Africa. No one was likely to buy Nkrumah's scheme, however, for it has long been obvious to all of Africa that it is basically Nkrumah that Nkrumah wants to promote.54

The rejection of Nkrumah's union government should have called his attention to the fact that he had not succeeded in building up a broad base of support across the continent.
for his ideas without which there was no foundation for the superstructure of the continental union government. To Nkrumah and his fanatics, the realization of this goal depended upon the vehemence with which the cause could be advocated. Any time his proposal was rejected he had something different but positive to tell the people of Ghana. For example, on his arrival from the Cairo Summit Conference, Nkrumah remarked that "in Cairo the goal of freedom and unity of our continent which at our independence seemed like a dream has developed into a reality."\textsuperscript{55} He added

by this decision of the O.A.U. the first phase of our struggle for African freedom and unity is thus achieved, we now enter the second phase of the struggle namely the establishment of a union government of Africa.\textsuperscript{56}

In January 1965, he told the Ghana Parliament that 1965 would be a year of decision for Africa. The summit conference, to be held in Accra in September that year, he hoped would "see a continental union government for Africa."\textsuperscript{57} Directing his address to other African leaders, he said, "if we go fast, we shall surely achieve success. If we go slowly, we shall go to pieces and perish."\textsuperscript{58}

Nkrumah's problem with the other leaders in Africa was that aside from his compulsive nature and his power motivation, "it seemed that Nkrumah had blown the trumpet of unity too loud thereby deafening the other heads of
states." He had a dream and that dream must come true.

While a student in the United States in 1937, Nkrumah was said to have written

> every preparation that I am making here is for the interest of Africa. I have always dreamt of a United States of Africa. This may sound utopian and impossible nevertheless, it has been my dream.

Nkrumah felt that he had been destined by fate to lead Africa as Lenin led the Soviet Union or Mao Tse Tung led China into an era of greatness. However, Nkrumah failed to realize that the idea of setting up a continental government of Africa was remote from the political thinking of his colleagues in Africa.

**The African Common Market**

Although Nkrumah viewed the political union of the African continent as a prerequisite for its economic development, he had on several occasions called for the formation of an African Common Market to go hand in hand with his continental union government. Nkrumah felt that some half-hearted attempts at economic coorperation had been made but without a central political direction, nothing concrete would be accomplished.

Nkrumah agreed with Bethlehema that

> it is incorrect to say that poor countries have not developed, they have but their development has been skewed by their relationship with the West. Consequently, the problem of economic growth is not solved by revolution, i.e. by stimulating growth within the old economic structures and by intensifying the existing
relationship. Growth can only be obtained by opposite means, by smashing the old structures and severing the old relationship. Only then it is possible to achieve rational democratic control over economic inputs and outputs.61

The danger and fear of neo-colonialism already discussed also prompted the Ghanaian leaders to call for the establishment of the Common Market. Thus from the early days of Ghana's independence, Nkrumah had strongly supported the establishment of some form of economic cooperation and African community among the other independent African states. These attempts were reflected in the charter of the Ghana-Guinea Union in 1958, the Sanniquellie Conference in Liberia in 1959, and the charter of the Union of African States (U.A.S.) in 1961. In all subsequent gatherings aiming at the liberation of the continent in which Ghana participated, the call for such institutions was stressed on a Pan-African basis.

It was recognized that the fear of exploitation by neocolonialists probably could not be eradicated until development was far advanced, until the African economy had been diversified, and until the accumulation of indigenous African capital had begun. The call for the development of the African Common Market was also motivated by an exceedingly inequitable international economic order. This in turn resulted from the refusal of developed countries to pay for the prices of primary products of developing countries, while at the same time increasing the prices of
their own manufactured goods. Thus an African common market, using a common currency and operating an external trade policy, would be in the best interest of the whole of the African people. It would eliminate competition among the African states in their selling of their primary products to the world market. For example, although Ghana and Nigeria had been producing more than 50% of the world's cocoa, they could not influence the world price of cocoa because they were selling in competition with each other. The establishment of an African Common Market would guarantee a better price for the products of both countries and would also eliminate the difficulties of exchange. It would also attract to the African continent more investments, which in turn would promote the growth of a great industrial complex. It was believed that this might turn Africa into an economic giant comparable to the United States, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Great Britain, and the other industrial powers.

As early as 1960 during the Second All-African Peoples Conference in Tunis, Ghana called for the establishment of an African Common Market to combat the trade tariffs of Europe and recommended economic unity through the establishment of transfer companies to provide better links between the African countries. The Ghanaian delegate also called for the promotion of the All African Trade Union Federation (A.A.T.U.F.) divorced from both the
International Confederation of Free Trade Union (I.C.F.T.U.) and the World Federation of Trade Union (W.F.T.U.). These proposals were further developed in June 1960 during the Second Conference of the Independent African States in Addis Ababa. Ako Adjei, the foreign minister, proposed the formation of the Council of Economic Cooperation and Development to coordinate the economic policies of the independent African countries and the creation of an African custom union and an African development bank.

For all intents and purposes, most of the African leaders shared the same ideas with Ghana. In 1961, for example, even though the African states had been divided into groups because of the Congo Crisis, each group (Casablanca and Monrovia) sponsored a meeting of experts to consider detailed plans for some form of economic cooperation. Experts from the Casablanca Group who met at Conakry recommended ending custom barriers and preferential trade treatment over a five-year period starting January 1, 1962. They also proposed a Council of African Economic Unity, an African development bank, and the formation of joint air and shipping lines. The experts of the Monrovia Group which met at Dakar also discussed the possibility of an African development bank, the promotion of trade between the African countries by regional custom units, and the progressive establishment of common external tariffs,
exchange of economic information, the building up of a network of roads and railways to link the countries together as well as a joint air and shipping line.

Between late 1961 and 1962, when Britain made its first application to join the European Common Market, it offered to include the British Commonwealth countries in Africa under the Yaounde Agreement. This agreement provided an association of eighteen African states (fourteen former French African colonies, three Belgian colonies, and Somalia) with the European Common Market. The agreement signed in the Cameroons' capital in July 1963 was to be in force for five years. It was an appendix to the 1957 Rome Treaty which established the European Common Market. During this time, tariffs between the six European countries and the eighteen African countries were to be progressively abolished to create the Euro-African Free Trade Area. This view was shared by most of the African states in the Commonwealth, e.g. Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, etc. who rejected the assertion that African countries would suffer increased discrimination against their exports to the European market if they did not cooperate. Nkrumah said that this type of agreement was good for the Common Market itself and perhaps the colonial territories but would not benefit the independent African states.
Many Africans believed that trade had been too closely tied with Britain and Europe in the past and that anything which tended to institutionalize such trading patterns for a further period would restrict the African countries from developing trade with such areas as the communist bloc, the United States, and Japan and would also retard the growth of inter-African trade. On top of this was distrust of Paris and the conviction that France as a member of the E.E.C. still retained a tight hold upon the policies of its former dependencies. The implication was that "as long as the government of a less developed country remained in the hands of colonial administrators, their economics are to set a pattern determined by the interest not of the indigenous inhabitants but of national beneficiaries of the ruling countries." Association with the European Common Market was therefore seen by Nkrumah as a surrender of economic power to the former colonial masters.

When the O.A.U. held its first Heads of State meeting, Nkrumah called again for a common economic and industrial program for Africa, a common market for Africa, an African currency, an African common military zone, an African central bank and a continental communication system. He tied up all these proposals with a political union of the African states, a proposal which was rejected by the majority of the heads of state. As others have found in the past, it was quite easy for people to unite on a common
purpose to obtain independence. However, it is much more difficult to obtain unanimity among various nations which differ economically, politically, and socially, especially when their interests differ from the general interest. The general interest as expressed in the Charter of the O.A.U. was to promote some form of unity among the independent African states through economic, cultural, and technical co-operation. At this time most of the African leaders believed bilateral and multilateral economic and commercial arrangements between states, organized at regional levels and not at Pan-African levels, were to be preferred. Thus on the question of economic integration, the proposal ultimately endorsed by the Social and Economic Council of the O.A.U. in 1964 called, among other things, for the creation of free trade areas, joint external tariffs, an African payments union, an African trade union, and the harmonization of national development schemes.

Therefore Ghana was forced to rely upon bilateral and multilateral economic relationships with some of the African states. Examples of such relationships include the Customs Abolition Agreement with Upper Volta in June 1961 and trade and payments agreements with Benin on June 25, 1961. In his address to parliament in September 1962, Nkrumah complained that Ghana's trade with other African countries continued to be relatively small, confined largely to Upper Volta, Togo, and Nigeria, and limited to
livestock and fish from these countries. On the general trade picture a survey at the time showed that almost two-thirds of the total exports were going to Western Europe. Ghana's exports to Africa amounted to only about 5% and of these the U.A.R. alone accounts for about 70%. Meanwhile, close contact had been maintained with Guinea, Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, and Benin in an effort to achieve economic union in West Africa.

The African High Command

An African High Command involved the creation of a continental defense system comprising units of national armed forces from states under a central authority. The call for the formation of an African High Command can be traced back to the All African Peoples Conference. One of the resolutions which was not clearly defined was the proposal of an African legion to defend the hard-won political freedom of the African people. This resolution did not go further to elaborate the nature of this legion and how it could be organized. Since then nothing was mentioned by any of the African leaders, particularly Ghana, as to the establishment of such an organization until the outbreak of the Congo Crisis. Their dissatisfaction with how the Congo Crisis was handled by the O.N.U.C. prompted the Ghanaian leaders, in particular Kwame Nkrumah, to pressure the other independent African states to form a joint military organization synonymous to
N.A.T.O. or the Warsaw Pact Treaty for the defense of any African country against any act of aggression from within or outside.

At the first meeting of the Casablanca states held from the third to the fifth of January in 1961 in Casablanca, Ghana proposed the formation of such an organization which was embodied in the African charter of Casablanca. The charter called for, inter alia, the chiefs of staff of the independent African countries to meet periodically with a view to formulating a policy for a common defense of Africa. It also called upon all the independent African states to associate themselves with such a common action, for the consolidation of liberty in Africa. Accra was made the temporary headquarters of this miniature organization. In a joint communique between Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, and Modibo Keita issued simultaneously with the formation of the GhanaGuinea-Mali Union, these leaders pledged their loyalty to a high command for their proposed Union of African States.

Section 4 Article 7 of the Union of African States stated:

in order to safeguard their sovereignty the member state shall oppose any installation of foreign military bases on their soil; they shall jointly ensure the security of their country, their territorial integrity. Any aggression against one of the states shall be considered as an act of aggression of other states of the union. A common system of defense shall be organized in order to make it possible to secure a common defense of union states.
The Ghanaian leaders continued to press for a joint high command until the O.A.U. itself was formed. Nkrumah strongly held the view that the armed forces of foreign powers, especially the N.A.T.O. bases located at important strategic places in Africa, imposed a serious threat but not insurmountable obstacle in the African revolutionary struggle. However, the gravity of the situation must be assessed in conjunction with the forces of the white settler minority governments of Rhodesia and South Africa with imperialist forces in few remaining colonial territories.

Comparatively, the independent states of Africa were militarily underdeveloped. Unlike the imperialist and neo-colonialist states, they had no mutual defense system or unified plan for a joint action. This could be remedied with the formation of an African high command or central organization to plan effectively for defense of the continent. Without such an organization, no African country could hope to stand alone against overwhelming imperialist strength.

What the O.A.U. finally agreed upon was the formation of the O.A.U. Defense Commission to investigate further the feasibility of a joint African military and to report to the Commission its findings. For the time being bilateral and multilateral agreements were being made by many African states to defend their independence and sovereignty. Many
of the African leaders felt that a unified command with supranational authority was not appealing because it would mean the loss of sovereignty. At the time, it would also have been very expensive and unrealistic.

In light of this, the Ghana government had to modify its demand for a unified high command and suggested instead the formation of a small permanent military headquarters in the O.A.U. Secretariat, which would be charged with planning and liaison duties as well as be able to make recommendations to the Defense Commission for military emergencies. With the mutiny of the armed forces in Tanganyika (now the larger part of Tanzania) in 1964, the newly independent African state had to call upon Britain to restore order. The Ghanaian leaders once again used this incident to press further for the formation of a permanent military institution, i.e. continental armed forces. Their argument was that such an institution could intervene effectively in such cases as border disputes, coup d'états and mutinies throughout Africa.

The first argument was acceptable to the Council of Ministers which met in Lagos in 1964. However the other arguments raised a number of questions. For example, would the force be able to act without interfering in the domestic affairs of a state? Would it mean that an unpopular government could call upon the high command to suppress its own people or its own military in case of coup
d'etat? Moreover, how would the military operation be financed?

The use of the high command in certain domestic settings could impose a threat and suspicion among the African leaders. At the O.A.U. conference in Cairo in July 1964 the majority of the delegates rejected the formation of an African high command as premature. For the time being the whole idea was completely dead and buried.

Even in his self-exile in Guinea in the late 1960's, Kwame Nkrumah wrote a book, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*, in which he called for the formation of an all African Peoples Revolutionary Army which would be the vanguard of the joint military high command under central political control. This political body would be charged with planning an effective revolutionary warfare on a continental scale to end all forms of foreign exploitation. "The objective is peoples in revolt against the exploitation of Africa." In this respect, he called for the mobilization of the people under a plan in which all workers would receive military training. It was obvious that the type of revolution for which Nkrumah agitated was that of the Russian and Chinese order. This was a kind of game, which most of the African leaders were not prepared to play.

Soon the context in which President Nkrumah had maintained the leadership of African affairs would change
in quantity and quality. He had the advantage of being on the scene at first and establishing himself in the position of presumed undisputed leadership. However there were some African leaders who did not agree with him for personal or other reasons.

It was rather unfortunate that Nkrumah could not sell his concept of African Unity (political union) to the other African leaders partly because he failed to differentiate operational realities from the ideal. Perhaps too the zeal and the pressure without any compromise with which he pursued this policy in Africa made other leaders suspicious of his personal ambitions and ulterior motives. Nevertheless it could not be denied that Ghana under President Nkrumah had played a dynamic and symbolic role which had stimulated nationalist movements and the feeling of oneness among all the emerging African states. This feeling of oneness is expressed in what has been called African Personality "Ghanaian, Nigerian, or Congolese in character" in the international and domestic arena.

In the course of the nationalist movements and the struggle for independence in Africa, some form of unity had been advocated by the African leaders to foster closer cooperation among the independent African states. The form which this unity should take became a controversial issue as many African states attained independence in early 1960. These differences were reflected by the emergence of
two distinct ideological groups on the continent, i.e. the Casablanca and the Monrovia Groups. The Casablanca Group favored a strong union government of Africa, while the Monrovia Group advocated a loose form of association among the independent African states.

Ghana was the strongest advocate of the continental union government of Africa. Nkrumah was seeking a Pan-African state founded under the "African Personality" and fashioned after the Soviet or the United States model. Independence and unity were inseparable components of Nkrumah's African Policy. A unified Africa could be justified not only in terms of the "African Personality," but also in terms of economic necessity and cohesiveness. Nkrumah's conviction was that Africa's industrial and economic advancement were contingent on the destruction of the artificial boundaries created by the colonial powers. Nkrumah made an abortive attempt to implement this policy in Africa with the formation of the Ghana-Guinea Union in 1958 and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union in 1961. Given the immense size of the continent and its diverse cultural and social cleavages, Ghana's proposal was rejected by the majority of the African leaders as unrealistic and premature.

The founders of the O.A.U. made it clear that they preferred a loose organization based on voluntary cooperation, where the emphasis was on the moral, rather
than the legal force of the resolutions. In this respect, it could not be regarded as an effective supranational authority.
1. Nigeria, Gold Coast (Ghana), Sierra Leone, and Gambia.


9. Ibid.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 419.


14. Ibid.


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


21. Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, p. 69.


26. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 75.


41. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

42. Ibid., p. 2.


45. Ibid.


49. Nkrumah, "United We Stand," *Twelve Key Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah*, p. 3.


64. *Africa Diary* (July 15-21, 1961), p. 27.

CHAPTER 5

INTERTERRITORIAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND REGIONAL GROUPING

The National Liberation Council

The foreign policy of any country depends on an interplay of both domestic and external factors. Despite this fact, observers have seen minimal change in the foreign policies of nations which have undergone rapid revolutionary change. In nearly all cases, the new regime attacks the ways of the old. But in areas of foreign policy, there is a certain continuity. The field for variation is limited by considerations of national interest and this takes precedence over any long term ideological goals. The normal forces of real politics and particularized interest of nation-states become the major determinant of foreign policy.

This was precisely true for the National Liberation Council (N.L.C.) which replaced Nkrumah's regime in Ghana in 1966. Viewing the problem or question of African Unity against the background of the country's chaotic economic condition, and with the coming to power of the more pragmatic N.L.C. government, Ghana focused its attention on domestic matters and on problems with its immediate
neighbors. The most significant difference between Nkrumah's policy in Africa and that of the N.L.C. was the way in which policy decisions were made. Under the N.L.C., policy flowed from Ghana's own national concern, whereas under Nkrumah, policy stemmed from one man's ideas and personal ambition.

Consequently, the very desperate economic situation of 1966 necessitated the withdrawal of Ghana from the then current African extravaganza and moved the country towards a generally restrained professional type of diplomacy. Since then the conduct of foreign policy has been the reverse of Nkrumah's. As a result of this policy shift, the dream of Nkrumah's continental union government slipped into oblivion because no African leader took upon himself to be the spokesman of this "gospel." The most plausible explanation for this was that although some of the African leaders had been paying lip service to this doctrine, the majority believed in the gradual approach to unity through regional economic cooperation. Furthermore, the frequency of coups in Africa since 1966 forced most civilian governments to concentrate more on domestic problems in order to consolidate their regimes. Motivated by the realistic assessment of the new political environment in Africa, the N.L.C. began to cooperate with its immediate neighbors. The N.L.C. thus made the policy of "good neighborliness," accommodation, and friendship the corner-
stone of its African policy. The first step towards these objectives was the opening of its borders with Togoland, the Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta (now Burkina Fasso) all of which had been closed before the coup. The N.L.C. also worked to restore good relations with every state in West Africa except Guinea. The new regime also initiated discussions with its neighbors on economic cooperation and security matters. At the ceremony marking the opening of the Ghana-Togo border at Aflao, J.W.K. Harley, Vice Chairman of the N.L.C., remarked

The tempo of African Unity could be increased by the opening of frontiers and easy movements of people and goods between African countries. We must first of all live at peace with our neighbors before we can ever think of uniting all Africa. How can we achieve African Unity when we close our borders and erect wires around us and thereby engender ill feelings, hatred, and suspicions among our neighbors. After all we are truly one people our frontiers separate tribes, families and villages.'

It was ironic that Nkrumah, the champion of African Unity and one who had been bitterly opposed to Africa's colonial boundaries, could find nothing in common with his immediate neighbors. An obvious question arises. Why were these borders closed in the first place? Ghana's problem with its neighboring West African states was purely ideological. For some time, Nkrumah had been accusing their African leaders like Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria and Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast of betraying the African revolution because of their close ties with their
former colonial rulers. Under such circumstances, Nkrumah did not hesitate to use propaganda and subversion as an instrument of foreign policy against them. In return, Ghana's neighbors did not cease to accuse Nkrumah of subversion and interference in their internal affairs. As a case in point in October 1959, Nkrumah gave a remarkable series of speeches in former British Togoland stating that he would, "See to it that Togo became the seventh region of Ghana." Nkrumah told a large gathering that Togoland belonged to them by birth and by right. From then on, the two leaders exchanged insults regularly and diplomatic incidents multiplied.

William Scott Thompson has stated

Shortly before Togo's independence, Nkrumah directed General Alexander, his chief of staff, to conduct maneuvers at the border so as to frighten Olympio. Nkrumah also ordered him to draw up an invasion plan having allegedly found a draft constitution for Togoland including former British Togoland.

When the two leaders met in June 1960 to resolve their problems, Mr. Olympio suggested that the first practical step toward unity would be the way of economic union. To this, Nkrumah replied that economics implied politics. He thought that Ghana and Togo should form a political union. Such a union would not involve a surrender of sovereignty but a close cooperation in the matter of diplomatic relations, defense, and currency. To Olympio, the
difficulty lay in language and historical background. Political union, he thought, was a thing of the future.

The ongoing friction between Ghana and Togo about the border dispute offered a classic example of colonial demarcation calling for early revision along national lines. Togo, which was formerly a German territory, was divided in half, north to south, immediately after World War I and administered by Britain in the West and France in the East as a League of Nations mandate. Since the demarcation, British Togoland was administered as part of the Gold Coast (now Ghana). This narrow strip of land became part of Ghana by means of a United Nations plebiscite in 1956 just prior to independence in 1957. Thus, the crux of the problem was due to the irredentist nationalism of the Ewe tribe. Nkrumah wanted the Ghanaian frontiers to be shifted eastwards to incorporate present French Togoland. This would mean the disappearance of French Togo as an independent state. This desire had been met by similar demands from Lome that the Togo boundary should be extended westward to its original position in Ghana. This would imply the detachment from Ghana of its Ewe-speaking district. By 1961, each regime had started to accuse each other of harboring and actively supporting saboteurs. The conflict led Ghana to close its border, thus ending the free movement of goods and labor.
Nkrumah's policy with these neighbors helped to increase social and political distance between him and his fellow African leaders. Indeed the relations in the ensuing years were so strained that eight members of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache (O.C.A.M.) led by Houphouet-Boigny boycotted the Accra Summit of the O.A.U. in 1965. Using Nkrumah as a whipping boy in this case, the O.A.U. summit passed a declaration on subversion. Under this declaration, the O.A.U. members undertook not to tolerate subversion originating in their countries against another O.A.U. member state or to permit the use of their territories for any subversive activity from outside Africa against any member of the O.A.U.

Immediately after the coup, the N.L.C. published a book which spelled out in detail Nkrumah's plan to subvert some independent African states and ultimately to install himself as leader of a continental union government. The book, entitled Subversion in Africa, totalled ninety-one pages. It listed the secret military plot of Nkrumah against certain African states with the active support of the Soviet Union, The Peoples' Republic of China, The German Democratic Republic (East German), and other communist countries. The now defunct Bureau of African Affairs was to work through the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization and the All African Trade Union Federation. One of its principal target areas of subversion was the
headquarters of the O.C.A.M. Other states on the list were the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, Nigeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Gambia. In all these countries, secret agents were to penetrate the high offices of the President, the foreign ministry as well as the military and opposition parties. By this publication, the N.L.C. exposed Nkrumah's duplicity for posing as the champion of African Unity while sparing no effort to subvert those who disagreed with his ambitious policies. The N.L.C. believed that the most convincing evidence of Ghana's sincerity in promoting the cause of African Unity was "living in peace with our neighbors."

Economic cooperation between Ghana and its neighbors and the free movement of goods and people began to flourish when the borders were opened. For example, the N.L.C. successfully renegotiated with Togo and Dahomey for the purchase of power from Ghana's hydroelectric project. In Upper Volta (now Burkina Fasso), a joint commission was established to harmonize land transportation and communication systems to reinforce solidarity. An agreement was also signed with an Ivory Coast based research institute for a palm oil plantation in the western part of Ghana close to the Ivory Coast. In early 1967, the N.L.C. negotiated with Nigeria to form a consortium of their airlines to operate in West Africa. This early demonstration of close cooperation between neighboring
countries did not imply political union. Other reforms such as joint regulation of tariffs, minimal visa and travel requirements, and improved air, road, and telecommunications facilities could provide the valuable infrastructure for unity.

Once in power, General Ankrah, the chairman of the N.L.C. declared

We are firm believers in the O.A.U. and hold strongly to the view that it should lead us to the desired goal of African unity. We believe that the organization should maintain close and fruitful relations with all regional organizations in Africa.¹

Thus on returning from his first O.A.U. Conference, General Ankrah remarked that the O.A.U. should be a forum for African leaders to know one another and to appreciate their problems. General Ankrah stressed that the organization should not be used for advocating wide and impractical ideas.

"I have seen in the recent session of the Ministerial Council and the assembly of heads of states and governments great opportunity for improving relations among heads of states first on a regional and on a continental basis. This is the age of interdependence of nations and it would be the height of folly to ignore the logic of the situation."²

One important concern of the N.L.C. was that inside Africa, communication was so bad that trade among African states was almost impossible. What needed to be done, as suggested by the Economic Commission for Africa (E.C.A.), was for the African states to coordinate their efforts in
improving their communications systems. Such an effort surely would be beneficial. This was true because out of frustration, many African states began entering into close association with the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), in a bid to obtain a better price for their commodities. Though it helped to improve the economics of these countries, it was not the ultimate solution to the economic problems of Africa.

The N.L.C. in Ghana held the view that there were two schools of thought by which problems of African trade could be solved. One school favored a sub-regional approach; the other favored a regional one. To the N.L.C., both approaches were necessary. The decision, simply, rested on choosing a suitable approach at a given time. To avoid the unnecessary competition of Africans with Africans in the sale of similar goods outside Africa, the N.L.C. recommended that all African states should come together to form a cartel to create a united front. Under this plan, each commodity should be sold to the outside world through an African international marketing board. For example, all groundnut (peanuts) produced in Africa could be purchased only through a body in Gambia, cotton through a similar body in Cairo, cocoa through Accra etc. The location of the marketing body could be determined by that country's total output to the world market.
Thus at the first international trade fair, held in Accra in 1967, the new leaders made it clear that the main objectives of the fair were to promote trade among the African states and encourage new investments in Ghana and other developing nations in Africa. The ultimate goal of these endeavors was the establishment of an African Common Market.

This quest for economic cooperation among African states continued at the eighth session of the E.C.A. in Lagos in 1967. The leader of the Ghanaian delegation, Mr. E.N. Debrah, emphatically stated that

If we do not stop our quarrel now and peacefully, if we allow matters of vain prestige to divide us, if we chase after shadows and not substantial things, if we think only of our narrow intentions excluding everyone else's we shall forever remain poor.

He also called on developed nations to set up a development fund for Africa. He added

Assistance to Africa should come in three ways. First, assistance in acquiring new skills, second, sympathy towards the problems of Africa's economic development and third, to increase developing investments from outside mostly in the form of outright financial grants in terms at low interest.

The driving force behind the policy of the N.L.C. was that domestic markets in Africa were generally limited in size and in turn impaired the growth of African industries. Intra-African trade then was estimated to be less than five percent of the total African trade outside the continent. Even though there was a burning desire towards the creation
of a large intra-African free trade area, which would increase the benefits of all the participants, the political will was absent because of external influences. Centrifugal forces like the association with the European Common Market could be cited as an example. For some time, both the O.A.U. and the E.C.A. had been concerned with this free-trade issue, especially regarding how to remove customs barriers and to allow member countries preferential trade agreements. Immediately after the E.C.A. Conference in Lagos, the Ghana government took the initiative to invite ministers and plenipotentiaries of fourteen African states to work out articles of association for a West African Common Market. The articles were a transitional step toward cooperation between the member states. An interim council was set up to determine common economic areas by member states and the manner and degree of such development.

The resolution passed in Accra provided a framework for West African economic cooperation. Some essential features in these articles included: 1) The development and coordination of their economy especially in the areas of industry, agriculture, transport, communication, trade, power and natural resources; 2) Members were to achieve the maximum interchange of goods and services; and 3) Members were to eliminate gradually customs and other barriers to the expansion of trade as well as to negotiate current
payment transactions on capital movements. After much political flip-flopping among the West African states, the declaration establishing the West African Economic Community also known as E.C.O.W.A.S. was signed by all the member states in Monrovia in 1968. The declaration of such an intent by the fourteen West African states to establish such a community was a great achievement for N.L.C. policy in Africa precisely because this would have been impossible to realize under Nkrumah's regime without political compromise or constraint.

Busia's Regime

The sudden resignation in early 1969 of General Ankrah on bribery charges affected the popularity and credibility of the N.L.C. In less than one year, public opinion and extra pressure from the political community facilitated the handing over of power to a popularly elected civilian government on October 1, 1969. When the Progress Party under Dr. Kofi Busia came to power, many Ghanaians expected a continuity in Ghana's foreign policy especially with its neighboring West African states in both political and economic spheres. This expectation was based on the fact that most of the leaders of the ruling Progress Party were members of the Political Committee which served as the political arm of the National Liberation Council. In some circles, the political committee was regarded as the legislative council of the military regime. This body held
regular meetings with the N.L.C. filing memoranda on many subjects and offering advice on policy issues both domestic and foreign. They also form part of delegations of the military government on missions overseas. In this way, the machinery of autocratic decision under Nkrumah's regime was dismantled. This expectation of many Ghanaians was wrong. Barely twenty months after the protocol establishing the West African Regional Group was signed in Monrovia, Ghana took drastic measures through her business promotion act and the A.C.O. to expel aliens, mainly Africans from neighboring West African states. Busia's government had done nothing to its credit as far as African liberation and unity were concerned. As a matter of fact, rather than furthering the cause of African functional integration the regime left a big scar on the country by its support for "Dialogue" with the minority white regime in South Africa and its notorious Alien Compliance Order (A.C.O.).

Briefly stated, the Alien Compliance Order, which came into force on the 18th of November 1969, empowered the new government to expel all aliens who did not have an official Ghanaian resident permit. All aliens married to Ghanaians were to register with the immigration department as dependents. Also registered aliens doing petty trade in Ghana without a permit were to vacate their area of business by January 12, 1970, on the grounds that a resident permit did not confer on them the right to trade.
Resident aliens who wished to stay in business were to show tax clearances in order to be registered as legal aliens.

The Order expelling aliens "is not a nine day wonder...The Order for aliens without a resident permit to leave the country was irrevocable," stated the Deputy Secretary for the Ministry of Interior. Statistics indicating the number of aliens affected ranged from 2 to 2 1/2 million. Most of these people were from Nigeria, Togoland, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Niger. During the initial enforcement of the Order, refugee status was granted to Ibos from Nigeria living in Ghana but this was revoked later. The revocation was taken when the Ghana government was satisfied that the amnesty offered by General Gowon, the head of the federal military government in Nigeria, was well-intentioned and would be carried out. This meant Ibos returning home after that country's civil war would not be in danger.

It is easy to explain the reasons why various governments expel aliens and to assess the effect of their actions on the host country as well as on the displaced aliens. The basic underlying reason for using the A.C.O. was unquestionably economic, but there were sociological and political reasons as well. All three reasons were closely interrelated. In defending the A.C.O., Kwoku Baah, the Deputy Secretary for the Ministry of Interior, stated that:
There were 2.5 million aliens in Ghana, 75 percent of them are under fifteen; these people fill schools and hospitals but did not contribute to the economy... We cannot afford to feed other mouths when ours are not fed. We cannot cater to the interest of those who do not help up pay our debts.

Indicative of the problems of alien workers was the activity of private diamond digging in Ghana, which was largely a Nigerian occupation for many years until aliens were banned from the diamond areas in 1968. Ninety-seven percent of the diamonds smuggled out of the country had been taken by aliens. Sixty percent of the petty trade in Ghana was carried on by aliens, and this number had been growing. Public sentiment at both the national and local level was that the economic power of the country was being subverted by aliens and should not be tolerated. An editorial of The Star, the mouthpiece of the Progress Party, welcomed the Alien Compliance Order by stating, "the gaps in economic life must be filled very quickly by our own people, who must be willing to take up the lowly but surprisingly lucrative jobs left vacant by the aliens."

A further argument in support of the economy was that foreign exchange sent home by immigrants caused the country's foreign exchange available for imported food supply to dwindle for a rapidly growing population. The result was inflation, a higher cost of living, and social hardship for the indigenous people that in turn imposed a challenge to the stability of the government. Thus the
departure of aliens from Ghana would cut down inflation by reducing the demand for supplies of both local and imported food. Whether the last argument was true or false remained to be seen when most of the aliens had left. Any government seeking solutions to its economic and political problems would be tempted to find a temporary scapegoat in aliens. The Prime Minister, Dr. Kofi Busia, stated that "Our present political and economic situation makes the enforcement of immigration regulations necessary." 

Prolonged economic stagnation accompanied by a high rate of population growth naturally precipitates a lot of social problems within a society. The statistical data on aliens as criminals in Ghanaian society have an interesting history. In October 1969, an Accra judge appealed to the government of Ghana to restrict the entry of unskilled foreigners because they contributed to the high incidence of burglary and stealing in the country. The Star endorsed this statement in an editorial, "... for several years, Ghana has been a country which has been the haven for mendicants, riffraff, gangsters, and other misfits of her neighbors."

The Prime Minister, Dr. Busia, who was a reknowned sociologist, defended his policy with a statement that sociological research by himself and others showed that aliens in a community were specially prone to crime and in fact 90 percent of Ghana's major criminals were aliens. "No popular elected government official could
ignore the complaint that many aliens were in Ghana while many Ghanaians were unemployed.\(^{16}\) What posed more problems to the new regime and a threat to its stability was the number and energy of high school graduates who could not get a job. The other half of the country's unemployed and 70 per cent of the beggars were aliens. A sizable portion of the people with the highest incidence of fatal diseases were also not Ghanaians. Statistical figures revealed by the Ministerial Secretary for the Prime Minister indicated that about 90 percent of the prisoners in the country were not Ghanaians.\(^{17}\) From then on, the local newspapers became more assiduous in announcing the nationality of criminals. Soon the public assumed that the crimes could be eliminated if the aliens were forced to go.

In general, a regime feels insecure when faced with strong opposition at home and tensions with neighboring countries. This condition is often compounded by an extremely large number of illegal aliens. Much in politics, as in life, depends on chance. To Busia's government, which did not believe wholeheartedly in the euphoria of a United continental government, the expulsion of illegal aliens was a political move to safeguard the security of the state.

During the early period of independence and thereafter, long-term alien residents often participated in Ghanaian politics, primarily to keep a government in power
which would promote the ideological aspirations of African liberation and unity. This situation, the new government felt, should not be continued because of the conflict it generated in Ghanaian society. When these non-Ghanaians supported the government in power, opposition leaders complained about the aliens' right to vote. When aliens (resident or not) supported the opposition party, they stood the chance of being deported.

Because of the short notice given to illegal aliens to leave the country, the immediate effect was catastrophic. Police officers with truncheons questioned anybody in the streets they suspected of being an alien. There were pre-dawn raids in residential areas where aliens were known to live in large numbers. Unemployed young men often attacked aliens in the markets, streets, and public places questioning them and extorting money. A breakdown of law and order was inevitable. Some looted stores and stalls in the markets and even some went as far as to threaten legal residents with deportation orders. Illegal resident permits and fake passports became widespread. Dr. Busia explained why the short two week notice to obtain the necessary documents or face expulsion was given to illegal aliens. A longer delay would allow "unscrupulous treatment of aliens" by Ghanaians. Nevertheless, he assured the aliens with proper documents full protection under the law. Unfortunately these assurances never materialized. Within
the two-week period, almost 25,000 aliens (Nigerians) were granted resident visas, while 170,000 were forced to leave the country.\(^9\)

Public reaction to the A.C.O. was mixed. Though there was no strong objection to government action controlling the influx of aliens, the short-time factor and the method of enforcement were considered inhumane. Many Ghanaians who worked and lived with foreigners spoke well of them. They did not see any difference between a Ghanaian worker and one from any other African state. Cocoa farmers, in particular, started to complain that alien labor was far cheaper than local labor. One Ashanti farmer was reported to have declared that one alien worker was worth six Ghanaians.\(^{20}\) The immediate short-term effect of the A.C.O. was the elimination of some of the social and economic problems. There was less crowding in urban areas and in hospitals. For instance, patient intake in hospitals was reduced by 40 percent.\(^{21}\) Many jobs left by aliens became available for Ghanaians. Many business enterprises left by the aliens were taken up by local people. But essential commodities soon were in short supply. Prices soared as Ghanaian traders tried to get rich quickly. The overall impact was that businessmen who were able to purchase businesses from departing aliens were getting wealthier as the average Ghanaian became poorer. The departure of the aliens did not solve all the unemployment problems because
there were certain jobs, such as conservancy (the cleaning of public toilets), done by aliens and which unemployed Ghanaians were unwilling to do. For a brief period, there was a severe food shortage both in the border areas and urban centers. This shortage was precipitated by two primary factors: 1) alien farm workers which constituted the cheap labor force had left; and 2) transportation to convey food from farm areas to urban areas was lacking. This latter problem arose because vehicles were diverted to carry aliens to the borders. Due to the fast-paced and sweeping manner in which the A.C.O. was carried out, it became more expensive to the Ghanaian government than was anticipated. For instance, two hundred thousand cedis (two hundred thousand dollars) were spent to set up refugee camps and medical facilities at the Ghana-Togo border for aliens enroute to Benin, Togo, and Nigeria.22

By far, the most serious and unanticipated political and social implication of the A.C.O. was a nationwide upsurge of tribalism. One cause of this problem was the pre-existing boundaries which artificially divided tribesmen and villages into separate states. In the villages along these borders, no birth certificates or documentation of citizenship were kept. Consequently, the government in its attempt to enforce the A.C.O. could not refute the claims of aliens from across the borders that they were Ghanaians. This was a highly sensitive tribal
issue and subsequently tribal sentiment rose sharply along border regions. This is particularly true of the Ewe tribe living at the country's eastern border; likewise the Sanwii, the Nzimas, and the Aowins at the western border with the Ivory Coast. What made the situation more problematic was that the opposition party in the Ghana national legislature won a greater number of seats in this region. The opposition leader, K.A. Gbedemah, himself an Ewe, was disqualified from parliament because of his prominent position in Nkrumah's regime. The majority of Ewes interpreted all these events as forms of officially endorsed tribalism.

The Alien Compliance Order was in no way welcomed by the neighboring states. It evoked bad feelings toward Ghanaians all over Africa. It tended also to be a great setback to the proposed West African Economic Community (E.C.O.W.A.S.) in which citizens all over West Africa could travel from one sister state to the other without a passport. Under the plan, they could also engage in any lawful economic endeavour without having to obtain a resident permit.

At the initial stages of the enforcement of the Order when Ibos living in Ghana were given refugee status, public opinion in Nigeria was extremely hostile. This gesture was perceived by Nigerians as a clear demonstration of Ghana's support for secessionist Biafra. This in turn
meant that Ghana was in favor of the disintegration of the Nigerian federation. Viewed from a wider perspective, the action taken by Ghana demonstrated the lack of Pan-African sentiment of the new regime. One might ask whether the Ghanaian government should be blamed for taking such legal action against illegal aliens in the interest of African unity?

For some time, however, the Alien Compliance Order was not seriously enforced on Africans. In July 1969, all embassies were given nine months to register their nationals and to provide them with documents for obtaining work permits. When the compliance order was finally issued on November 18th, having been on the shelf for sometime, only a few Africans had the necessary papers. In a legal sense, it could be said that Ghanaians and other nationals outside the country had no objection to the A.C.O. The loss of sympathy for the government combined with the negative reactions which ensued after the implementation of the A.C.O. were due to the concomitant social and economic disorganization. All in all, the A.C.O. was not as effective as has been anticipated. The ineffectiveness was due primarily to three things: the constant presence of illegal aliens, soaring prices of scarce commodities; and the negligible effect on unemployment.

The Nigerian government had to fly emergency passports to its citizens. Nigerian ships were also diverted to
Ghana to carry stranded Nigerians back home. As itinerants passed through its territory to their homelands, the Togo government temporarily closed its border with Ghana for fear of an outbreak of an epidemic disease, shortages of food, and starvation. The Ivory Coast had the same fears as Togo. The fear was that some of these illegal aliens would settle on its soil. It should be recalled that deportation itself in West Africa was not a new phenomenon. It was, however, the spontaneous mass exodus of aliens which made the Ghanaian experience unique.

During the colonial period, deportation occurred in West Africa occasionally. But it occurred more frequently after independence, mostly because of political and social reasons. The economic factor was the latest addition. Pre-independence political and economic stability coupled with the values of traditional African society made aliens more welcome than in post-independence modernizing society. The A.C.O. was a major example of recent disturbing trends in West Africa. These disturbing trends had to do with political, economic, and social problems of the country concerned. For example, the Ivory Coast repatriated numerous Togolese, Dahomeans (now people of Benin), and Nigerians in 1958. In 1964, Nigeria expelled Dahomean citizens during a border dispute between the two countries. Nigerians, too, had to leave the Cameroons in 1967 and the Ivory Coast in 1968, to mention a few. All these
examples were obstacles to African Unity. It also helped to explain the lack of genuine interest in Pan-Africanism.

Ceteris paribus, the expulsion of aliens, would no doubt continue to be used in West Africa as a means of solving political, economic, and social problems despite the rhetoric of African Unity. In spite of all these negative gestures towards African Unity, the Busia regime was able to establish cordial relations with Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. In May 1970, a five-year treaty of friendship and understanding was signed between Ghana and the Ivory Coast, which among other things, committed the two leaders to consult each other on basic domestic and foreign policy issues. This agreement was not surprising because the two traditional West African leaders were known to dance to the tune of neo-colonialism. They also shared a common ideological understanding and a strong anti-Nkrumah stance.

The National Redemption Council

So far, the policy of "Dialogue" with the Apartheid regime of South Africa and the Alien Compliance Order were the legacies of Busia's regime to African liberation and unity. The second military junta, The National Redemption Council, which ousted these traditional rulers and politicians, was very impatient with the regime's poor economic performance and the low profile of Ghana's image in African affairs. The N.R.C. as a modernizing military
regime wanted to expand the economy, to integrate the population, and to bring the country back to respectability in Africa. Their actions were based on nationalistic and paternalistic ideologies. The focus was to bring the country up to date by subordinating tribal, class, and personal interests to the interests of the state and of Africa. To do this, the N.R.C. had to destroy old structures and features of the previous regimes that were not in accordance with their own preferences. The way to achieve this goal was to mobilize all productive forces within the society behind them. This was not an easy task, but the new regime was committed to it.

When the N.R.C. took office on January 13, 1972, there was unemployment on a large scale. About 44 percent of all able-bodied persons were unemployed and the high inflation rate remained unchecked. The country's balance of payment problem, amounting to 65.1 million pounds sterling in 1971, had increased by another 100 million pounds by 1972 due to the country's short-term liabilities. In addition to this economic dilemma, there were other social problems. An upsurge of tribalism and of conflict among various political factions inherited from the two previous civilian regimes had to be resolved. Needless to say, all these domestic factors has an impact on the conduct of a successful foreign policy, especially in Africa.
To redress the economic situation, the N.R.C. imposed fiscal controls of foreign and import exchange. Other measures included revaluation of the currency (cedi) to about 6 percent. The regime also refused to pay back the sum of 35 million pounds Ghana owed to four British firms on the grounds that it was improperly contracted. The purposes to which the loans were granted were to Ghana's disadvantage. The N.R.C., however, had to modify this stand by sending official delegations to many Western capitals to explain this policy and to arrange for rescheduling of the debts. This was to assure the creditor governments that Ghana was still interested in extending mutual economic relations. In Ghana, a more practical step to cut down the importation of food and other essential items was the policy of self-reliance through "Operation Feed Yourself." Initially, these measures had a positive impact on the economy.

In practice, however, the economic formula in Ghana was self-reliance, which took the form of individual incentive or entrepreneurship. The corrupt form of this incentive was locally known as "Kalabule." People started to hoard essential commodities later to sell them at higher prices in order to make money quickly. The result was a very high inflation.

The next task was to unite the various factions (Nkrumahites and Busiaites) within the society and to
suppress all tribal sentiments. The military regime accomplished this by openly appealing to the citizenry at large to bury all differences among them—both social and political—in order to rebuild the country. A more pragmatic step was to co-opt able civilians with clean slates from all previous regimes to key management positions in the new administration. The N.R.C. went as far as to propose a union government composed of military, civilians, and the police force, but this proposal was rejected in a national referendum. This was one of the major factors which led to the downfall of the regime. In an editorial entitled "Who Must Rule Ghana," the Daily Graphic stated that "since the N.R.C. took power, order has been restored in national deliberations....tribalism, though yet to be completely eliminated, is no more the rule and is resented by all."30

Having solved most of the country's domestic problems, the N.R.C. embarked upon a vigorous and militant Pan-African policy. The introduction to the Charter of Redemption published by the N.R.C. on its first anniversary stated, "It would strive vigorously for African Unity and the realization of a continental union government of Africa."31 The regime expressed the view that a continental union government was essential for Africa because as the new leader said, "balkanized African countries would be preyed upon by foreign exploiters so
long as they remained small and unviable entities."

Though this thinking was similar to that of Nkrumah, the approach was different. The quest by the N.R.C. was more pragmatic than ideological. It was not a blind obsession as in the case of Nkrumah's government. (The union government of Africa as advocated by the N.R.C. did not imply an immediate surrender of sovereignty.)

Ideologically, it was not associated with the doctrine of socialist states of Africa. It was true that the chairman of the N.R.C. was fond of using socialist phrases such as "capturing the commanding heights of the economy." Ghana's policy was based on the gradual and functional approach to unity, beginning first with subregional economic cooperation.

Like all military regimes which came to power in Africa, the N.R.C. was convinced that African countries could quickly advance their social and economic well being by mutual cooperation with neighboring states. This conviction stemmed from the economic problems that they came to inherit when they took power from civilian governments. The N.R.C. was also concerned about the worsening of the terms of trade between the developed countries outside Africa and the developing countries in Africa. Adding to this problem was the slow rate of growth of the African economy and the widening economic gap between the rich and the poor countries. In view of these
conditions, the priority of the N.R.C. in the concept of African Unity was the establishment of a West African Economic Community already co-signed by the N.L.C. in 1968. To ensure African unity and development, "we must rely on our African neighbors...Our unity must begin by setting up regional unions." The focus of this policy was Ghana's immediate surrounding neighbors: the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (Burkina Fasso), and Togo as well as Nigeria. It opened the country's borders to these states for mutual cooperation in political, economic, and cultural matters. Official delegations were also sent to other West African states for discussions on bilateral matters and as a background for the formation of the proposed West African Economic Community.

One by one, negotiations for mutual cooperation with each of these countries ensued. A joint Ghana-Togo commission for cooperation was formed to promote bilateral trade and to intensify efforts to end the smuggling of goods across their common borders. Experts from these two countries were also to work together in various fields for the realization of the proposed West African Economic Community. Relations with Upper Volta followed the same pattern as with Togo. The two countries agreed on a joint action to control animal pests at the common border and to combat communicable diseases. An agreement was also signed for the extradition and tracking of criminals in each
country. Several efforts were also made to improve air transport, road, and telecommunication systems between Ghana and its landlocked neighbor. Acting as a champion of African Unity as during the early years of Nkrumah's regime, the N.R.C. did not hesitate to speed the movements of goods to drought-stricken Upper Volta in 1974. Special orders were given to Ghanaian port authorities to handle expeditiously all food items and other gifts intended for Upper Volta. This was done by waiving and reducing some of the port charges on these items. It should be noted that as a landlocked country, Upper Volta received most exported goods through Ghanaian ports. This warm hand of friendship and solidarity was extended to the Ivory Coast as well. Although President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast granted Dr. Busia asylum when Busia was ousted by the N.R.C., this gesture did not generate any animosity between the two countries, as it had in the case with Guinea when Nkrumah was overthrown. Houphouet-Boigny acknowledged the coup as purely an internal affair of Ghana. The N.R.C. in turn honored the friendship treaty signed with the Ivory Coast by the Busia regime.

The N.R.C. also established contact with Guinea with the intent of normalizing relations which had been severed in 1966. In these negotiations, Major General Nathan Aferi categorically expressed that the N.R.C. would not use the ten million pounds loan which Guinea owed Ghana as a
bargaining chip, although "in our present economic difficulty the repayment of this amount would come naturally as a big relief."\textsuperscript{35}

To recapitulate, it was during Nkrumah's regime that a union government was formed between Ghana and Guinea. This union remained only on paper until it became defunct in early 1963. When the first military coup occurred, Nkrumah took refuge in Guinea. President Sekou Touré of Guinea not only provided Nkrumah and his entourage with accommodations but made Nkrumah a joint president of Guinea. President Sekou Touré also allowed Nkrumah to use Guinea's mass media to publish and broadcast denunciations of the military regime (N.L.C.) from Conakry. The deposed president also was allowed by Guinean banks to withdraw money from the coffers of the Ghanaian embassy in Guinea. What made the situation even more complicated were the threats from Touré to use the Guinea army to restore Nkrumah as the President of Ghana.

Until then, the two countries had been on bad terms with each other. Action and reaction ensued. In response to the denial of exit permits to its citizens, coupled with Guinea's refusal to pay back its debt in 1966, Ghana held the Guinea delegation to the O.A.U. Ministerial Conference at Addis Ababa hostage as it traveled enroute through Accra. The hostage dispute was solved by the O.A.U. putting diplomatic pressure on Ghana.
On a continental level, the N.R.C. pledged loyalty to the charter of the O.A.U. and agreed to cooperate fully with the organization. It participated actively in all deliberations of the O.A.U. siding with the majority opinion and proposals in most cases. Unlike Nkrumah's regime, whenever the N.R.C. found itself the minority, it showed no ambivalent or hostile feelings towards the majority. Throughout the lifespan of the N.R.C., it did not make any attempt to impose its opinion or will on the O.A.U. These military leaders also took keen interest in African continental unity by helping to promote economic and social services in independent African countries where manpower skills were needed. In 1973, for example, 82 Ghanaian teachers were sent to Uganda to help alleviate the shortage of teachers in that sister country. Ugandan students were also awarded scholarships to further their education in Ghana, especially in the allied health services such as nursing. Ghanaian professionals (doctors and professors) were also recruited by many English-speaking countries in East Africa specifically Tanzania and Zambia as a form of technical assistance. The N.R.C. vehemently condemned Dr. Busia's A.C.O. as anti-African and revised it in order to allow people who could contribute to the prosperity of the country to return. These gestures were clear indications that Ghana
was prepared to share whatever it had with other African states in order to promote unity.

It should be recalled that the majority of the founding fathers of the O.A.U. believed that African unity could be achieved only through regional economic groupings. Ghana soon found itself isolated from its neighboring West African states because of its insistence on the continental union government and especially by its use of subversion to accomplish this goal. Consequently, the three regimes which followed Nkrumah had to abandon this policy goal and begin to press for multilateral economic cooperation with its neighbors would lead to an economic community of the West African States. For some time, these efforts were thwarted by the massive expulsion of aliens from Ghana by the Busia regime. The economic cooperation between the West African states was given prominence in the African policy of the N.R.C. by the establishment of joint commission with Ghana's neighbors in economic, scientific, and cultural areas. This cooperation led to the formation of the Economic Community of West African States, at least on paper, in 1975.\(^\text{37}\)

Before making any assessment on the declaration and the charter establishing the Economic Community of the West African States (E.C.O.W.A.S.) three important questions are critical: First, what were the motivating factors underlying the establishment of the E.C.O.W.A.S.; second,
what were the background conditions based upon the European experience (E.E.C.) and in the light of the neo-functionalist theorists which act as centripetal or centrifugal forces for or against the community; and third, would the successful operation of the economic community spill over to a federation of the West African states?

At the initial stages of the Pan African movement, some of the African leaders, particularly Nkrumah of Ghana, who aspired to a continental union government of Africa, strongly opposed all regional groupings or organizations in Africa. Nkrumah's reason was that such regional groupings in Africa would lead to a large scale balkanization of the African states, which in turn was likely to expose some of these regions to the grip of neocolonialism. Another fear was that larger political and economic regions might feel strong enough to go it alone and forget about the whole idea of African Unity. Such accusations were specifically directed against the Organization Commune Africaine et Malagache, a regional organization of the French-speaking West African states and Malagasy, which had potential advantage and access to the E.E.C. Nkrumah expressed the same negative feelings to the Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central African (PAFMECA.) At the formation of the O.A.U., however, confidence was placed on regional economic groupings as the stepping stone towards African unity. Such practical steps, as anticipated by the African
leaders, would speed up the creation of regional common markets like the E.E.C. Despite this emphasis on economic cooperation among the African states, efforts toward economic groupings had been minimal. At the same time, Africa's economic conditions continued to worsen. According to Adebayo Adedeji, Secretary General of the Economic Commission of Africa, annual per capita income between 1960 and 1975 rose in only nine countries and in 14 countries, fell to less than $100. The external economic position had also been weakened by Africa's indebtedness, which grew from 7 billion to a staggering 28 billion dollars within those 15 years. Servicing those debts took up more than one fifth of Africa's total exports. Prices for African commodities, even after they were raised, could not keep up with the constant prices of manufactured goods imported from industrialized countries. The result was that the trade terms of Africa had worsened by almost 15 percent between 1973 and 1975.38

These encounters between African countries and the rich industrialized nations, especially between 1966 and 1976, seriously affected Africa's economy in the new international economic order. What added to the gravity of the situation was the collapse of the U.N.C.T.A.D. common fund conference in Geneva in March 1976 and the meager results of the U.N.C.T.A.D. 4 in Nairobi in June the same year. All these events demonstrated clearly that the
industrialized countries had not yet changed their economic policies of pursuing their own interest, at the expense of their weaker partners. In Africa, the poor economic performance of many states precipitated a number of military coups between 1966 and 1976 (six alone in 1966) and more in West Africa. The chaotic economic situation in African contrasted sharply with Africa's position as potentially one of the richest continents in the world in terms of natural resources, which had not been fully explored.

The economic situation of the African states called for drastic reforms, both in the internal and external policy in and among the African states. For a long time, the priority of national interest over those of Africa as a whole had been the main weakness of African states, in their relations with each other and with the industrialized countries. The new military leaders had taken up the challenge to reverse the downward trend of the economies of their respective countries, and Africa in general, by changing the status quo created by rival political leaders. In West Africa, for instance, the nonassociated members of the E.E.C. wanted the West African associates to reverse the preferences they had granted to the E.E.C. countries and to abolish their tariff and nontariff barriers in order to promote intraWest African trade.
African nationalists had thought about regional groupings on the continent as far back as 1958 during the All Africans' Peoples Conference in Accra. At that time, the politically advanced West African states were the most vociferous advocates of such regional organizations, but actions had been hard to take because of national interest and rivalry among the leaders. Among the new generation of West African leaders, interdependence was the only solution to the economic woes.

Interdependence in world politics refers to a situation characterized by a reciprocal effect among countries or among actors in different countries. These effects often result from international transactions, such as flows of money, peoples, and messages across international boundaries. This phenomenon had increased tremendously in the international political system since World War II.

More recently, the European Economic Community has become a classic model for many developing countries to emulate. Evidently, between 1966 and 1976, several attempts were made by the West African states, through various conferences, to establish a regional economic market and community. The goal of providing Africa with economic leadership was regarded by many as one of the main objectives of the O.A.U., but the initiative for all these conferences was sponsored by the E.C.A. rather than the
O.A.U. The failure of the O.A.U. to act effectively was due to a number of political upheavals, such as military coups, the stalemate of the Rhodesian question, the Nigerian civil war, Egyptian-Israeli wars, etc. all of which temporarily paralyzed the Organization. It should be borne in mind also that the E.C.A. is an agency of the United Nations. Above all, the will to establish an economic community in West Africa came from the heads of state and governments themselves.

In 1961, the Nigerian *Daily Times*, commenting on the economic integration of East Africa between Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda stated "These three states have stolen a march on the older African states. They have achieved one of the objectives of Pan African nationalism without tears." Although the East African experience was a legacy from British colonial rule, the question is this: How can one integrate a number of states. For much of man's history, force was the answer. More recently, however, Western Europe has captured the imagination of world statesmen with a new method of integration. It should be emphasized that the E.E.C., or for that matter, this Western European economic integration, was not achieved euphemistically. It was an attempt to pursue a theoretical notion based on the functionalist theory "that the most desirable path to international community building proceeds gradually from transnational cooperation in the
solution of a common problem." In the case of Europe, the problem is economic. The operational realities of the E.E.C. were based on the premise that economic agreements and customs unions of various kinds increase trade and transactions so much so that the increased flow across borders creates problems that are difficult to solve by separate state machineries. A supranational bureaucracy is created to deal with these problems. Industrial groups, particularly labor and business, deal with these problems organized on a supranational level to put pressure on the new bureaucracy which in itself acts as a pressure group for further integration. Gradually, loyalties follow economic interest and become focused on the new center and a new political union comes into existence. The process is gradual and requires patience.

The E.E.C. so far has been the most successful model of its kind in the world. Since then, statesmen, journalists and theorists have all generalized that the Western European model could be applied elsewhere. However, in this world, where politics vary over time and from place to place, there is no reason to assume that a single set of conditions will always and everywhere apply. Integration in Europe as exemplified by the E.E.C., was the result of two disastrous world wars and the growth of modern industrial economies. Africa has had no such wars and has only developing economies. These economies are often based on one cash-crop commodities, the prices of which are manipulated by the industrialized nations. This demonstrates that the European formula does not apply in
most developing countries, such as in West Africa. The serious attempt on the part of the West African statesmen to imitate the E.E.C. was a calculated attempt to alleviate the economic stress on their states thereby saving their hard-won political freedom.

One of the most important factors to be considered here is the different role of interest groups in an industrial pluralistic European setting and the pre-industrial, partially unitary setting, in Africa. The part played by groups in the integration process is a key part of the European integration theory. Within the framework of well established supranational institutions, interest groups are the motors that drive the integration process forward. African countries had no such groups. The prevailing ideology influenced by the need for unity during the struggle for independence made the political systems more centralized than pluralistic. Moreover, the underdeveloped economies do not generate the full range of economic interest or the middle-level management skills to organize what specific interest does exist. Though small business groups, mostly on an indigenous basis do exist, it is difficult to predict the future of the Western African market because of these groups.

The functionalist theory also assumes that an increased flow of transactions (trade and peoples as well as capital) across the borders facilitates the integration
process. This is not the case in Africa. The modern economics and communications superimposed by the colonial powers inclined African countries not towards one another, but towards the metropolitan states. This is precisely the case of the former French West African colonies associations with the E.E.C. to illustrate the magnitude of the economic problems faced by the African states, the state of intra-African trade at the time should be mentioned. Most, if not all, African countries import far more from the major industrial powers than they do from each other. In 1970, Africa imported about 10.97 billion dollars from the world, of which 30 million dollars or only 6.7 percent, came from other African countries. With Africa's exports to the world representing about 12 billion dollars at the same time, the percentage from inter-African exports works out to 6 percent. Africa's trade with other developing countries is also twice that of intra-African trade. Finally, inter-African trade is "the smallest of all the intra-continental trades of developing countries."43 Thus, Article Two of the protocol signed by the West African heads of state and governments in 1968 at Monrovia, made provisions for the abolition of tariffs and quantitative restrictions among member countries and to ensure factor movements in the subregion. Article 25 of the treaty also provided for the immediate establishment of a customs union to be followed by free-factor movements for
the purpose of the common market arrangement. All these efforts were geared towards increasing trade and transactions among the West African states.

According to Joseph Nye, one of the neo-functionalist theorists, "political actors in a scheme for regional integration, faced with heavy demands upon common institutions resulting from an increasing volume of transactions, may choose to deal with them on a strictly national basis, or they may decide to strengthen the common institutions." The latter was the course of action taken by Ghana in its Business Promotion Act and the A.C.O. to expel aliens, mostly Africans, from the country. Thus upon Nye's hypothesis, the study of integration in areas like West Africa should not necessarily be tied to the growth of supranational bureaucracy or growth of trade as a necessary feature in the integration process. Every "coat" of the European theory needs alterations before it can be worn in an African climate. A careful examination of the treaty establishing E.C.O.W.A.S. indicates that it was a practical program carefully tailored to the needs and the susceptibilities of the 15 West African states. E.C.O.W.A.S. united former French and former British colonies with a former Portuguese territory and the long-independent Republic of Liberia. The immediate objectives of the community were simple and strictly economic.
By stages, member states were to eliminate customs and similar duties in trade among themselves. They were also to end all other restrictions on this trade and establish a common tariff as well as commercial policy towards the rest of the world. There should be free movement of people, capital, and services. Joint development of a wide range of economic facilities was envisioned as well as cooperation in research and training. Friendly division of labor, rather than rivalry, was to be the principle pursued by member states in their economic relations with one another. A reasonable time table based on a gradual process was emphasized in the treaty for accomplishing these objectives.

Most important of all, the treaty recognized that some countries might lose financially as a result of adjusting their duties to the level of the new external tariff. The fund of the community would provide compensation in such cases where a country's pattern of trade could be shown to have worsened because of its compliance with the treaty. The community funds would also be used as a guarantee for outside investments made within the community in pursuance of community policy. Above all, to ensure equitable distribution of benefits to member states, community funds would be used to finance projects in the poorer member states.
However impressive the working principles of this treaty establishing E.C.O.W.A.S. would appear on paper, certain problems were inevitable. First, the treaty referred to harmonization of monetary policies. This would present one of the most intractable problems, as the E.E.C. is at present facing. With the exception of Guinea, the Francophone countries are to varying degrees (some very closely indeed) linked to the French franc. Liberia uses the U.S. dollar. Guinea Bissau is loosely linked to Portugal's currency. Each of the former British colonies, namely Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia has its own currency. Although arrangement had been made for clearance of accounts among members, the diversity of currencies would over time complicate economic cooperation.

The variety of political systems and economic practices in the states were likely to precipitate some minor but delicate, problems as well. In the Ivory Coast and Liberia, private enterprise is paramount. In Nigeria and Ghana, the emphasis is on mixed economy, private as well as public. Guinea and Guinea Bissau practice a type of collectivism. The problem lies in how much these different economic systems would work together in such an economic union. One question that arises in these circumstances is how a private enterprise in the free-market economy of Liberia can do business in a socialist economy of Guinea, or vice versa?
The treaty defines "rules of origin" of goods to be subject to common tariff treatment by members. The definition was that they must have been wholly produced by enterprises whose headquarters are located within the community. A further qualification was that 51 percent of the equity of these goods be held locally. Although the treaty offered a definition concerning the origin of products, there were many disputed cases.

It was the existence of an enormous disparity in size and resources of the participating countries that would provide the community with its greatest challenge. For some time, there was the fear among some of the smaller poor countries that Nigeria, with its large population and immense natural resources, might overshadow all the other members. Nevertheless, as Joseph Nye has pointed out, the size of potential participants measured in total GNP seems to be of relatively greater importance in integrating schemes among less developed states. His hypothesis was that "It almost looks as if the lower the per capital income of the area, the greater the homogeneity in size of economy must be." Far more important, however, would be the location both of projects to be undertaken by the community itself and those that would have to be encouraged to come into existence by the community.

For many types of modern industry, Nigeria, Ghana, and perhaps the Ivory Coast, might offer an adequate market,
while for some, a market comprising the whole community might be thought to be adequate. Much diplomacy and much restraint would be needed to ensure full cooperation in such matters. It is important, however, to guard against the assumption that measures increasing joint gains from the relationship would be free from distributional conflicts. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations would strive to increase their gains from transactions, even if they both profit enormously from the relationship. If such asymmetrical relationships occur, it is bound to create problems in bargaining. The treaty establishing the E.C.O.W.A.S. allowed 15 years for its full objectives to be realized. If the will at the signing of the treaty was evident, survived, and grew in strength, all such problems could be resolved. It should be assumed also that interdependence could be defined entirely in terms of evenly balanced mutual dependence. It could also be assumed that less dependent actors can use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues. As the operations unfolds all kinds of problems could appear.

According to Inis L. Claude,

functionalism sets out to treat the basic ailments of mankind. Its proposes to elevate living standards in backward areas and reduce the interference of national frontiers in the working of complex global economy. It minimizes the factors that
make for economic instability and promotes the attainment of high levels of health, literacy, cultural, and social justice. Given the absence of interest groups and bureaucracy in the West African process that theorists suggest are the motors of the European integration, one might ask whether a powerful ideology such as Pan-Africanism can serve as an impetus for the integration of E.C.O.W.A.S. Pan-Africanism is an interdependent set of values or action-oriented ideas widely dispersed among African nationalists after World War II. It creates some form of solidarity among the African states in their dealings with the outside world in both political and economic issues. The values and the sentiments attached to this ideology are important in that sometimes they lead to sacrifice at initial low cost and equitable distribution of benefits. The ideas are equally important for they determine how decisions are made to accomplish an objective consistent with the goals of African unity. In this respect, Pan-Africanism is a powerful force in support of this region's integration. More important to this ideology of Pan-Africanism is the extent to which the elite groups within the integrating units think alike in their approach to the concept of African unity. At the time when the economic necessities of the participating states prompted the establishment of the E.C.O.W.A.S., about half of these countries were under military rule. The remaining civilian leaders, with the
exception of Sekou Touré of Guinea, have been strong advocates of regional economic grouping in West Africa. Evidently, the capacity of these key decision makers to respond to these economic demands within their respective political units should play an important role in the integration process. Careful examination of the treaty establishing the E.C.O.W.A.S. indicates conclusively that equitable distribution of benefits among members and a low visible cost or no cost at the inception of the integration process were crucial. As Joseph Nye has pointed out, this concept (low visible cost and equitable distribution) is central to the neo-functionalist theory.

At the lowest level, the great gain to the whole area would be inevitable. It would end smuggling of produce, which is encouraged on a large scale by discrepancies in duties and official prices in each state. At a higher level, E.C.O.W.A.S. would strengthen the voice of its members in the world's economic market. A process such as this would show a way forward for the rest of Africa and the poorer countries of the world. The ideology of Pan-Africanism might be useful to create the union, but this alone will be inadequate for the maintenance of the union. It seems evident that ideology combined with utilitarian factors, such as those above, might be the major force in the creation of the community.
A final question in this discussion is this: Can a successful operation of E.C.O.W.A.S. lead to a political union of the West African states? At the time when the treaty for E.C.O.W.A.S. was signed, there was no question of a member state sacrificing a shred of its sovereignty. Citizens of all the states would enlarge their political horizons by becoming community citizens. All obstacles to free movement of people within the community would be abolished. This kind of social integration already exists on a small scale in many of the West African states. The artificial boundaries drawn by the former colonial powers split one tribe between two countries. Each West African country shares the same tribesmen with its neighbors. With the exception of Guinea Bissau, colonial heritage had endowed this region with two elite languages, French and English, which serves as a lingua franca for the multilingual tribes. The culture is also a mixture of African and French or English.

Time has shown that while the political kingdom envisioned by Nkrumah is very far away, the economic unity of Africa is no closer because of Africa's economic problems inherited from colonial rule. Some of the obstacles can be attributed to a single commodity economy, the low degree of industrialization, lack of intra-African infrastructure, and the economic dependence on ex-colonial power as well as other industrialized Western countries.
Nevertheless, these attempts to establish regional economic groupings in Africa is a step in the right direction and the role of Ghana in this respect was significant.


3. Ibid., p. 85.

4. Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Niger, Benin, Chad, Gabon, and Malagasy.


9. Ibid.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


28. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


32. Africa Diary (November 24 - 31, 1974).


35. Ibid.


37. The signatories to the E.C.O.W.A.S. were Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Mali, Upper Volta, Ghana, Benin, Niger and Togo. For full text of the declaration of E.C.O.W.A.S., see West Africa (November 22, 1976).


39. The following civilian governments were overthrown by military coups in 1966: Central African Republic - on January 1, Upper Volta - January 3, Nigeria - January 15, Ghana - February 24, Nigeria - July 29, and Burundi.


42. Nye, Pan Africanism and East African Integration, p. 18.


45. Ibid., p. 441.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In terms of the classical European definition, African nationalism is a unique phenomenon; Africa possesses few nations in the European sense. The continent was partitioned during the last quarter of the nineteenth century into small administrative units by the European powers to meet their own interests and convenience. The boundaries carved out by them, and amended in 1919 after the defeat of Germany in World War I, cut across tribal territories, thus overruling the dictates of both geography and economics. Ghana is a typical example of how these tribal states were folded together for administrative purposes by colonial rule. The new concept of African nationalism, championed by Ghana, was evoked by aspiring African leaders after World War II as a means of capturing the colonial state. When this was accomplished, the captured state was quickly legitimized by constitutional government. National flags and anthems also symbolized the captured states. The old colonial boundaries are now recognized internationally. Each unit constitutes a new nation-state in the global political system.

After independence from Great Britain in 1957, Ghana, under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, the most eminent
Pan-Africanist of his time, took the leading role in stirring up radical nationalism throughout the continent. Its main goals were to eradicate colonialism and racism. Nkrumah believed that the colonial powers could not afford to give of their empires, and to imagine them handing freedom and independence to their colonies on a silver platter was the height of folly. This conviction called for an ongoing, dedicated commitment to nationalist revolution.

The militant and radical approach undertaken by Ghana to accomplish its goals in Africa took many forms. The most fruitful ones involved various Pan-African conferences, which united nationalist forces throughout the continent to work out strategies. Nationalist forces received political education, financial aid, and training of "freedom fighters" for guerrilla warfare. These activities were coordinated with violent anti-colonial propaganda, channelled by the mass media. Appeals for the cause of African nationalism were made to various world councils. Under the leadership of Nkrumah, Ghana went so far as to suggest to the United Nations that the strict application of General Assembly Resolution 15-XIV (of 1960) could eradicate colonialism and racism in Africa by December 1962.

Personality plays an important role in diplomacy, and Nkrumah's essential role as the formulator of Ghana's
foreign policy should not be overlooked. Nkrumah, who passionately believed in the ideology of revolutionary Pan-Africanism, repeatedly claimed that Ghana's revolution would not be complete until all of Africa was free of colonial domination and minority racist rule. Only then could the true independence of Africa be realized, and the "African Personality" developed in world affairs. Failure in any African country was perceived by Nkrumah as a threat to African unity. Nkrumah ultimately wanted the newly independent African states to form a continental union government similar to the United States or the Soviet Union.

Nkrumah was thus prepared to protect those countries where successful revolutions occurred in line with his thinking, as he did in the Congo. However, when African leaders were unsympathetic to the African socialist revolution, Nkrumah did not hesitate to use covert actions to overthrow their regimes. Ghana was accused on several occasions by its neighboring states in West Africa, especially the Francophone countries, of encouraging and indulging in subversive activities in their countries. Nkrumah's actions were bitterly condemned by all African states when the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) was formed.

Some concepts of African unity were shared to a large degree by all African leaders during the initial stages of
the nationalist revolution. The problems which arose later
did not lie in objectives but rather the degree of
commitment, how the goal should be reached, the sacrifice
each country should make, and the nature of eventual
unity. These problems and differences became more apparent
as more African states gained independence after 1960.

It is not difficult to find the context in which
Nkrumah's Ghana maintained the leadership role in African
liberation and unity. Nkrumah had the advantage of being
President of the first colonial territory south of the
Sahara to gain independence after World War II. Nkrumah's
strong Pan-Africanist ideals made him the presumed
undisputed leader in African affairs. His most outstanding
accomplishments were two conferences held in Accra in 1958,
which brought Arab and Black Africa together under the
banner of African nationalism. Prior to this, the Arab
countries in North Africa tended to identify more with
their Middle East counterparts, and preferred to be called
Arab rather than Africans.

The emergence of many new independent African states
in the early 1960s, coupled with the formation of the
O.A.U. in 1962, posed a tremendous challenge to Ghana as it
struggled to maintain its leadership role. Since 1963, the
radical leadership role of Ghana has continued to decline
in both content and approach.
The "showdown" came when Ghana was excluded from the Liberation Committee of the O.A.U., and when its proposals for a continental union government were rejected. The majority of African states saw African unity as a loose form of association with an emphasis on key functional areas at the regional level, ultimately leading to economic communities (north, south, east, west, and central).

Nkrumah bitterly resented the O.A.U.'s decisions, given the time, materials, and human resources which Ghana had placed at the disposal of African nationalist revolutionary movements. No African leader could deny that Ghana's Pan-African activities acted as a catalyst for nationalist awakening in Africa, which in turn hastened the decolonization process. In retaliation, Ghana refused to pay its contribution to the Liberation Committee, which it regarded as a conservative body.

Until he was ousted from office by a military coup, Nkrumah maintained that a united Africa could not be proclaimed by amorphous slogans of "freedom and unity," but had to be pursued in terms of economic necessity and cohesiveness. This involved commitment to socialism on a continental scale, through equal sharing of the products of economic development. These developments were to come under the central political control of a continental union government. However, as Ghana pressed harder for a continental government, its neighbors in West Africa
(Nigeria, Liberia, and the Francophone countries) urged a loose confederacy or community that would eliminate the risk of personal ambition and control by a single African leader or state. This was deemed more important in the creation of inter-African solidarity and stability than any ideologically imposed union government. Nkrumah's quest for an African continental government came at a time when the concept of nationalist revolution had yet to be consolidated. New leaders were just beginning to breathe the fresh air of independence, and they were very protective of their sovereignty, personal power, and prestige at home. Given the personalized, authoritarian nature of these African leaders, who proclaimed themselves founder-presidents in their respective countries, they preferred to be big fish in a small pond rather than be swallowed up in a continental government.

Once the O.A.U. took the leadership role in African liberation and unity away from Ghana, the concept of African unity would no longer be embodied in a continental union government. Instead, unity could only be achieved by joining together local forces in a framework of regional economic groupings. The immense size of the continent, its poor communication systems, and its diverse, cultural cleavages meant that tremendous work needed to be done before the countries could join together in one unit.
The three regimes that followed Nkrumah's cooperated with the O.A.U. to varying degrees, and with varying commitment and zeal. The differences in policy of these regimes, one civilian and two military, lay in the degree and intensity with which each regime participated in and agreed with the O.A.U. majority decisions, as well as how policies were implemented. None of the leaders advocated immediate surrender of sovereignty for an African union government.

The two military regimes vigorously pursued a policy with other West African states to form a West African economic community. They both intensified Ghana's economic and social activities with their neighbors through joint commissions. These undertakings were very difficult due to mistrust and suspicion of Ghana during its two civilian regimes. Under Nkrumah, Ghana was accused of subversive activities. Under Busia, West African aliens were expelled from Ghana, with the aim of dealing with economic and social problems in domestic affairs.

Ghana also faced problems with the French-speaking sub-Saharan states, which tended to think of themselves as having a community of interests not shared by other African countries. This was exemplified by the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache. These countries tended to look inward to the relationship between themselves rather than African continental politics. The attitude of the
former French territories implied that, to them, the road to economic freedom was through free negotiation between them and metropolitan France through association with the European Common Market, not through local arrangements with neighboring countries.

These factors meant that Ghana had to first live in peace with its neighbors in order to accomplish its policy goal of economic integration in West Africa. The crux of these problems could be explained by the limitations in the functional theory of integration. In the first instance, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to separate economic and social tasks from political tasks. The road to integration by the establishment of joint commissions depended on political acts of will by the leaders, which in some cases were lacking. The various governments involved were unwilling to hand over power to an international authority any tasks that encroached upon their political sovereignty, because most of these regimes were military or authoritarian. Even expectations for economic gains that could be facilitated by lowering or removing tariff barriers could not induce enough motivation for the formation of permanent custom-unions, which might ultimately have led to strong economic cooperation sufficient to promote genuine economic integration in West Africa.
In the twenty years under consideration (1957-1977), Ghana's role in African liberation and unity changed dramatically both in style and content. Its activities ranged from militant Pan-Africanism under Nkrumah, moderation under the N.L.C., and extreme passivity under Busia. The differences in Ghana's African policy during the four regimes were not those of aims, but those of methods. In retrospect, Ghana's African liberation policy did not change much. The self-proclaimed leadership role under Nkrumah was abandoned for collective leadership under the O.A.U., and several domestic and foreign factors may have contributed to the shift in policy. Among the key domestic factors were individual leadership style, political philosophy, egocentrism, and the state of the economy. However, reliance on these explanations could neither address the concrete certainties nor eliminate the multiplicities of trends in contemporary Ghanaian politics; such a mode of analysis might contain incongruent theoretical assumptions and/or expectations. For example, there was no guarantee that a strong leader presiding over a healthy economy would pursue militant Pan-Africanism or vice versa.

The personalistic nature of African leadership, combined with the decisional latitude of leaders who are the heads of highly organized political parties, means that any established pattern of foreign policy decision-making
must also be assessed with attention to the leaders' personal idiosyncracies. Applying this concept to Nkrumah and Busia, it is clear that their political styles were completely opposite. Thus their approaches to African liberation and unity were also different. Whereas Nkrumah's policy towards white minority rule in South Africa took the form of economic sanctions and endorsements of ongoing guerrilla warfare by South African "freedom fighters," Busia's policy was of "Dialogue," which lacked genuine revolutionary action in the eyes of the majority of African leaders. Busia's policy reflected the personal conviction and cultural ties with former colonial rulers, and had little or no connection with the problems under consideration.

Under Nkrumah, African unity was conceptualized as an immediate surrender of individual national sovereignty to form an African continental union government. This concept was reflected in Ghana's Republican constitution of 1960. A clause in the constitution provided for Ghana to surrender part or all of its sovereignty to promote such unity. Nkrumah initiated this with the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, which ultimately failed.

Under Busia, regional economic cooperation, endorsed by the O.A.U., was thwarted by the notorious Alien Compliance Order. The order precipitated severe criticism in Ghana. Such criticism usually came from younger
intellectuals, who used the issue to press for a stronger African policy. This was precisely the action taken by the N.R.C. In other words, during Busia's regime, issues concerning African liberation and unity were secondary to what was best for Ghana.

Nkrumah, having been an active participant in the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945, continued to press for radical Pan-African nationalism. In pursuit of his radical objectives, he advocated "Positive Action" based on Gandhi's concept of nonviolent civil disobedience. In Nkrumah's view, this tactic could work in every colonial territory in Africa, given the similarity of Africa's problems. The need to further and preserve the revolution in other African states continued to be the determining factor in Nkrumah's political decisions in the African political arena.

Under the leadership of Nkrumah, the nature of the Pan-African movement, as preached by Marcus Garvey, William DuBois and others, expanded to include such concepts as decolonization, anti-imperialism, African Unity, "African Personality," and African Socialism. In Ghana, this form of socialism was called Nkrumahism. Nkrumah was able to consolidate political power at home through authoritarian measures, and a healthy economy when he assumed power.

As the leader of the first black state to become independent south of the Sahara, Nkrumah was a spokesman
for African revisionism. Before the O.A.U. assumed the leadership role in African liberation and unity in 1963, Accra was the Mecca for African nationalist leaders. Nkrumah was the doctrinaire to whom all national movements, south of the Sahara, looked to for support and guidance. But Nkrumah was not infallible. He believed that he alone had all the solutions to the problems of the African revolution, and he would not accept compromise or defeat. Nkrumah's extreme desire to foster and extend his revolutionary dynamics was intimately connected with a desire to preserve the image which Nkrumah created for himself as a leader whose goals were those of every African nation. Despite his faults, Nkrumah contributed more than anyone else to the promotion of radical and militant African nationalism, as well as the "African Personality" in world affairs.

Conversely, a need to preserve the status quo became the key factor in Busia's foreign policy. As a member of the Wenchi chieftancy in Ghana, Busia was more traditional in thought and outlook. His senior position as a district administrator in the colonial administration, a position held by only two native Africans up to that point, and his Oxford education might also have contributed to his elitism.

Since his debut in Ghanaian politics, Busia was a strong opponent of Nkrumah in both domestic and foreign
policy. Nkrumah and many other radical African nationalists felt that certain African institutions, such as chieftancy, should be excluded from African politics; they were the breeding ground for tribalism, which militates against national unity and nationalism. But Busia felt that chieftancy was one of the traditional institutions of democracy in African society. Before Ghana's independence, Busia demanded a constitution that would preserve the character of tribal regions, guarantee the position of the chiefs, and entrench democratic rights in traditional African society. Busia supported active participation of the chiefs in politics through a bicameral legislature. This was the only means of countering the process of disintegration of traditional African society begun by Nkrumah's revolution.

As a nationalist leader, Busia was very much aware of the ill effects of the colonial presence in Africa, but he was inextricably tied to certain values which he thought were beneficial to traditional native customs. By separating colonial influence from colonialism itself, Busia seemed to have interpreted the impact of colonial rule as an ongoing source of ideas for the rectification of contemporary ills in African society. Under Busia, therefore, Ghana's role in African liberation and unity was minuscule. Any trace of radicalism in African affairs gave way to conservatism. In retrospect, Busia's conservatism
in African politics was due to the country's lingering ties with the former colonial powers, and the desire for economic security. Busia's conservatism can also be evaluated in light of domestic and social pressures prevailing in Ghana at the time. In many ways, Busia's political thinking about African fell short of the new concepts of the Pan-African movements, which were laid down by African nationalists and leaders at the All African Peoples Conference in Accra in 1958.

The question now is, what about the two military regimes, namely the N.L.C. and the N.R.C., which alternately succeeded Nkrumah's and Busia's regimes? Generally speaking, there was not much difference between the two, because of the training and background of their leaders. The N.L.C. was the first military regime in Ghana and its rule was experimental. It inherited a chaotic political and economic situation from a regime that devoted all national material and human resources to further one man's continental ambitions. When the N.L.C. took over, the country was at the brink of economic bankruptcy. The democratic system of government bequeathed to Ghana at independence had been replaced by one-party authoritarianism. Ghana had also become completely isolated from its neighboring countries because of Nkrumah's subversive activities in these countries. The N.L.C. was thus faced with internal and external problems
to solve, and as such could not stretch itself over the entire continent. The N.L.C.'s main concerns were to establish good relationships with its neighbors, in order to implement O.A.U. resolutions.

The radical and militant posture of the N.R.C. was a reaction against Busia's conservatism in African politics. Its young military officers had climbed up their career ladders during the heyday of Ghana's years as bastion of African liberation and unity. They strongly opposed Busia's policy in Africa, especially "Dialogue" with South Africa and the Alien Compliance Order, which once again had put Ghana in obscurity in African politics. These two policies were completely opposite of what Ghana had stood for throughout the African revolution. The N.R.C. immediately reverted to Nkrumah's radical and militant ideas to pull Ghana from obscurity and isolation. When the N.R.C. took over, none of its civilian advisors, whether from the Busia or the Nkrumah regime, could reconcile a request for outside aid, particularly from the West, with the goals of the African revolution. The regime's commitment to the revolution was reflected in its leaders' speeches, its "Charter of Redemption," and its extra contribution to the O.A.U. Liberation Committee after its election to the committee in 1972.

A final question to be answered is that of Ghana's future role in African politics. Prediction is a risky
business, not the least in Africa, where regimes are unstable due to political and economic upheavals associated with rapid modernization. A more balanced assessment of this question could be made with the passing of time, when regimes, presumably, will be more stable. Suffice it to say that since other African states remained under colonial rule after 1977 and Apartheid existed in South Africa, commitment to the dynamics of the African revolution, as dictated by the O.A.U., would essentially be Ghana's main policy in Africa. The commitment will vary from moderate to radical, depending on internal economic conditions at a particular time, and also depending on the degree of commitment by Ghana's and sister states' leaders to the ideals of Pan-Africanism.
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